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ABSTRACT
ON FRUSTRATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF A DEMOCRATIC POLITICS OF
PERSEVERANCE
Juman Kim
Anne Norton
This study examines democratic frustration as a defining experience of ordinary citizens,
exploring how ordinary citizens should properly understand their democratic aspirations
as being the source of both inspiration and frustration, and how a more robust citizenship
can take shape in three distinct dimensions of democracy—communicative, symbolic,
and temporal. Examining democratic communication as a site of frustration that invites a
moral-psychological analysis of how to foster a better attitudinal strategy, Chapter two
proposes a theory of magnanimity with which we can harness the motivational power of
superiority while making the very power more compatible with and conducive to a sound
and vibrant democratic politics. Focusing on the symbolic dimension of democracy,
which involves the politics of the people, Chapter three offers a theory of the sublime
people as an interpretive tool that highlights both the need of individual citizens to invite
and invoke the people and the importance of holding up against the tendency of
endangering themselves to lapse into uncritical passivity and the idolatry of the claimed
people. Chapter four warns against the popular trend of placing overemphasis on
relatively short-lived extraordinary moments in our democratic experience, and proffers
an alternative view of time as a journey, showing how each individual can grow more
attached to reality while becoming more attentive, inventive, and persevering.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

The devoted democrat has but one plan: to provide all people with access to
what they are entitled to, in the name of equality in both freedoms and rights.
Stéphane Hessel

Keep your hands on the plow! Hold on!
Langston Hughes

Oh Troglodytes! Your virtue has begun to be a burden to you.
Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu

1

Very few would venture to resist democracy today. Whether it is “the best possible state”
or “the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time,”1 democracy seems to have become “a universal commitment” or the sole
name to which “the only possible procedure of legitimization for a political regime lies in
its reference.”2 From the Arab Spring to the 15M (quince de mayo) and the more recent
Catalonia crisis in Spain, from Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter movements in
the United States to a series of popular uprisings in South Korea, Hong Kong, Turkey,
Ukraine, France, and Brazil, we have heard deafening voices over the past few years,
demanding democracy or a more real democracy. Its appeal is enduring and worldwide.
Democracy seems to have achieved “the status of being taken to be generally right.”3
What we are now witnessing is perhaps the “apotheosis of democracy.”4

1

Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989),
49; Winston Churchill’s speech delivered in the House of Commons on November
11th, 1947 in Robert Rhodes James ed., Winston Churchill: His Complete Speeches,
1897-1963, Vol. VII (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), 7,566.

2

Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10 No.
3 (1999), 5; Étienne Balibar, “Historical Dilemmas of Democracy and Their
Contemporary Relevance for Citizenship,” Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 20 No. 4 (2008),
525.

3

Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” 4.

4

David K. Kim and John L. Jackson, Jr., ”Democracy’s Anxious Returns,” The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 637 (2011), 7. Notice
that Slavoj Žižek once observed that the protesters in Egypt wanted “what in other
countries the Occupy movement was protesting against: ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’.”
Likewise, some leftists thinkers, including Jodi Dean, tend to regard ‘democracy’ as
being unworthy of re-appropriation because its association with political and
economic (neo)liberalism. See Slavoj Žižek, “Trouble in Paradise,” London Review of
Books, Vol. 35 No. 14 (2013) and Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal
Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2009). However, more people, regardless of their distinct political
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Yet democracy seems to run into trouble these days. A number of emergent
democracies may not have collapsed, but some have slid more toward nominal
democracies with an autocratic tinge.5 Popular exhilaration for democracy has often
evaporated into a more cynical disillusion accordingly. Meanwhile, people in the most
advanced and well-established democracies have called into question the alleged
superiority and credibility of their system. In the United States, for instance, it is often
noted that Congress—the presumed most democratic branch of government—has long
been dysfunctional, in which opposing major parties, perhaps too often, bring the
legislative process to a complete standstill.6 A sizable number of unhappy citizens choose

backgrounds, have been striving to rethink and rework rather than dismiss the idea
of democracy for their political cause. Among the leftists, for example, see Ellen M.
Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) and David Graeber, The Democracy Project (New
York: Spiegel & Grau, 2013). John Dunn observes that “[t]o reject democracy today
may just be … to write yourself out of politics.” John Dunn, Setting the People Free:
The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), 41. Even Xi Jinping,
President of China, uses the term democracy frequently to defend the Chinese model
of governance or “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”
5

Orbán’s Hungary, Putin’s Russia, Erdogan’s Turkey are living examples. For
theoretical accounts of the topic of democratic consolidation, erosion, and recession,
see Richard D. Anderson, Jr. et al., Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), Dan Slater, “Democratic Careening,”
World Politics, Vol. 65 No. 4 (2013), Ellen Lust and David Waldner, Unwelcome
Change: Understanding, Evaluating, and Extending Theories of Democratic
Backsliding (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2015), and Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to the
Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 26 No. 1 (2015), and other
essays contributed to the same issue of the Journal of Democracy.

6

According to the Gallup poll in October 2017, only thirteen percent of the
respondents approve of the way Congress is handling its job [Electronic source:
http://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx]. Although public trust in
Executive and Judicial branches is generally higher than that in Legislative branch, it
is also true that modern-day Presidents are seen less as a uniting figure capable of
standing above factionalism. Instead, they often unapologetically take a strategy of
going partisan rather than simply going public. Cf. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New
Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007) and B. Dan
Wood, The Myth of Presidential Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009). The ever-accelerating tendency of heavy reliance upon courts and

3

to participate in popular uprisings and protests in the name of democracy. But they have
often placed much emphasis on the feeling of “being together” and “fighting together”
per se so that all the ferocious fights sometimes look a distracting irrelevance, failing to
convert the public clamor for changes into well-established political programs that can
generate actual policy changes. One theorist has even lamented that many protesters these
days “do not have a collective project.”7
Upon this odd coexistence of the lasting enthusiasm with democracy and the
increasing disillusionment that runs parallel to such enthusiasm, a growing number of
scholars and pundits have made a series of prognoses about the future of democracy,
posing questions that evoke some sense of urgency: Can democracy keep thriving? Can
we still believe in democracy’s progressive design? Is democracy going to decline, or has
it already begun to fade? If so, is there any way to save democracy, or put it back on the
right track? Or, do we need to conjure up any alternatives to democracy?
Many seem to be eager to know more about democracy: its place in history, its
recent metamorphoses corresponding to the changed and changing conditions, and the
chance of its demise and resilience. In this respect, those diagnosticians follow the path
paved and trodden by democratic theorists of earlier generations such as Alexis de

judicial means for dealing with core political questions has disturbed many people
not just because it is regrettable that they have expended excessive energies and
too much attention on the most elitist and least democratic branch of government,
but also because in so doing, they have effectively made the judiciary a central
forum for sheer struggles for supremacy between the major parties.
7

Ivan Krastev, Democracy Disrupted: The Politics of Global Protest (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 20.

4

Tocqueville8 and Francis Fukuyama,9 aiming to forecast—albeit perhaps less
prophetically—the direction in which democracy seems to proceed.10
This particular intellectual and political atmosphere of the present, however, gives
us a long pause. It is a pause for reflection upon what we know of democracy as well as
what we know about it. Put differently, as radical outbursts of public anger in the name of
democracy have become remarkably visible while at once public cynicism about
democracy seems to run deeper, it is perhaps the right time to pose a different yet equally
important question not from the position of diagnosticians afar but from that of a citizen:
how do we feel about democracy—what do we do with our democracy and what does
democracy do with us?
With this question concerning our felt knowledge experienced in the everyday
democracy, this study aims to shift our attention from evaluating and designing

8

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2000). In fact, Democracy in America marked one of the earliest positive uses of the
word ‘democracy’ in modern political and social theorizing. As one prominent
historian points out, “it was largely thanks to his work that ‘democracy,’ the word,
had come to stay in current American political parlance.” Paul Cartledge, Democracy:
A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 297.

9

Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989),
which later developed into The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free
Press, 1992).

10

Latest notable examples include David Runciman, The Confidence Trap: A History
of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013), How Democracy Ends (New York: Basic Books, 2018),
Tzvetan Todorov, The Inner Enemies of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2014),
Steven Levitscky and Daniel Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die (New York: Crown,
2018), Yaschar Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger
and How to Save It (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), and Cass Sunstein
ed., Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America (New York: HarperCollins,
2018).

5

democracies11 to understanding the collective mind of ordinary democratic citizens.12 It
is a study of democracy, placing particular focus on a noun of agency, a democrat, rather
than on a system of rule per se. My aim is to pursue and propose a democratic theory that
can bring to the fore the lived experience of ordinary citizens for whom democracy is
both an idea and a reality.13
My study is unapologetically eclectic whose approach can be characterized,
broadly, as phenomenological, pragmatic, and thematic. I take a phenomenological
approach to democracy insofar as I seek to highlight the embodied experience of ordinary
citizens.14 I also deem my approach to be pragmatic as well in part because I start my
arguments from the fact of a perceived democratic culture, which has rendered the age11

My primary concerns are not with institutional arrangements compatible with and
suitable for democratic ideals. For such an endeavor, see Heather Gerken, The
Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing And How To Fix It (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009). Democracy indices widely used by empirical social
scientists include the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit.
See their website at https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index.

12

As for the notion of understanding, I take a Weberian means to achieve an
Arendtian end. For Weber, understanding involves the interpretive grasp of “the
complex of meaning” [Sinnzusammenhang]. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An
Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of California, 1978), 9. For
Arendt, understanding eventually requires “[coming] to terms with or reconcile
ourselves to reality, that is, [trying] to be at home in the world.” Hannah Arendt,
“Understanding and Politics,” Jerome Kohn ed., Essays in Understanding 1930-1954:
Formation, Exile, Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken, 2005), 308.

13

In other words, this study concerns those to whom democracy is something utterly
familiar and diffuse.

14

Note that phenomenology began to direct significant attention in American political
theory only in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Existential Phenomenology and
Political Theory: A Reader (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972), the first anthology of
phenomenological writings pertinent to the study of politics in the English language,
came out in 1972 edited by Hwa Yol Jung. In the following year, Maurice Natanson
edited and published two-volume-collection, Phenomenology and the Social Sciences
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), whose second volume includes
three entries on phenomenology and political science written by Hwa Yol Jung, Carl
Friedrich, and John Gunnell.

6

old debates about the best type of government virtually outmoded,15 rather than from any
philosophical presuppositions about democracy.16 Most of all, this is a thematic study in
that it centers on and revolves around a particular theme—frustration—all through the
course of the research even while discussing distinct dimensions of democratic politics.

FRUSTRATION ENDOGENOUS TO DEMOCRACY
Why frustration? For frustration is the most characteristic experience common to
ordinary democratic citizens. The word frustration comes from frustrari (to disappoint)
and frustra (in vain). It indicates feelings of being balked and foiled, feelings that arise
when original expectations of satisfaction are made null and void. It may sound odd or
counter-intuitive. One would want to argue for the exact opposite: democracy guarantees
that the greater number of people should not be frustrated. This is the gist of the majority
rule, the argument goes, and that is why democracy is superior to other types of
government.17
This view is not entirely without merit, especially at least at the collective and
15

To paraphrase Kant’s answer to the famous question posed by Reverend Johann
Friedrich Zöllner, it is fair to say that we are living in an age of democracy, though
not in a democratized world.

16

See Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” in Richard
Rorty Philosophical Papers Vol. 3: Truth and Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998)

17

For instance, Jeremy Bentham, especially from the 1820s onward, supported
representative democracy because it was the only form of the government which
would afford the best security for the interest of the larger public. See Philip
Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).

7

abstract level. It would make perfect sense that if all cannot be satisfied, the society
should make the majority feel satisfied at the expense of the minority’s frustration. Even
if that is what democracy does, however, what ordinary citizens experience might be
different. Two points deserve a brief remark.
First, what seems to be overlooked in the systematic explanation of the majority
rule is the fact that the method of majority decision, as G. E. M. Anscombe once aptly
pointed out, is not identical to “the principle of the decision’s being what the majority
wants.”18 On the experiential level, for example, it is not uncommon that “the majority
vote in the minority in a majority of cases.”19
Second, there seems to exist a paradox of fairness and equality: democratic
citizens are more susceptible to frustration, not less, precisely because their desires, in
principle, count equally in democracy. This paradox resonates with Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s
perceptive critique of John Rawls’s portrayal of a well-ordered society. Rawls
understands his ideal society as devoid of rancorous sentiments such as resentment and
envy. For his proposed principles of justice ensure that everyone is treated equally and
fairly. There would be no “destructive feelings,” presumes Rawls, because fairness and
equality eliminate any occasions for those feelings. Dupuy accuses Rawls of his
somewhat one-dimensional moral psychology. What Rawls has overlooked is the fact
that those negative feelings arise not just from the failure of his justice system, but also
from its very operation. In other words, fairness and equality, to some extent, are
18

G. E. M. Anscombe, “On Frustration of the Majority by Fulfillment of the Majority’s
Will,” Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1976), 166.

19

Ibid.
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constitutive of those very feelings. For people now feel more entitled and can hardly
attribute their own failure or loss to anything external to themselves.20 Likewise, if the
desire of each citizen appears to have equal weight, the rejection of one’s desire would
arouse more intense frustration, not less.
Now, it must sound more plausible to say that frustration is the most characteristic
experience that pervades the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Yet my main focus is not
on any frustrations taking place in democracy, but on democratic frustration. By that I
mean to place special emphasis on the fact that there is frustration endogenous to
democracy, frustration whose source is nothing but democracy itself. My primary
concerns are precisely with this kind of frustration.
Democracy displays an ambitious vision that ordinary citizens are the author and
builder of their common world. The principle of popular self-rule presupposes the
presence of individual citizens capable of judgment, decision, and action. Democracy
connotes not only popular participation but also an obligatory passion for autonomy, both
20

Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Avions-nous oublié le mal? Penser la politique a près le 11
septembre (Paris: Bayard, 2002), Cited from Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways
Reflections (New York: Picador, 2008), 87-89. For Rawls’s argument pertaining to
this discussion, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1971), 142-145 and 532-541. For Rawls, the presence of resentment and
envy, for instance, indicates that there are some problems in the basic structure of
justice principles. Otherwise, believes Rawls, reasonable people would not resent the
fact that they lose or fail, nor feel envious of others’ success. Jeffrey Green has
recently expanded on Rawls’s theory and developed his own theory of “reasonable
envy toward the superrich.” Unlike Dupuy and Žižek (and myself), Green’s primary
concern in his attending to the question of envy is not with pointing out the blind
spot of Rawlsian moral psychology, but with extending the logic of Rawls so as to
conceptualize the role of envy in the implementation of Rawlsian justice. See his
“Rawls and the Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable
Envy toward the Superrich,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No.1
(2013).

9

individual and collective. Put differently, in a democratic society—which Pierre
Rosanvallon, following Tocqueville, once described as a society of similar individuals
[une société de semblables]21—individuals are thought to be free and equal agents who
form ideas and beliefs, adopt goals and purposes, and act to pursue those purposes, not
alone, but “in concert”22 with other fellow citizens.
Certainly, the promise of democracy has never been fully materialized. The ideals
of freedom, equality, and autonomy, much glorified notwithstanding, have to date
remained incomplete. Sometimes, such a glorification sounds mere ritualistic, rhetorical,
and even hypocritical especially against the backdrop of harsh realities that do not live up
to those ideals.
Yet democracy cherishes a peculiar culture of transmuting its incompleteness into
potential for development and its hypocrisy into occasion for self-correction.23 This is
how democratic citizens—to invoke and paraphrase Clifford Geertz—are suspended in
webs of the meaning of democracy that they themselves have spun.24 In democracy,
21

Pierre Rosanvallon, The Society of Equals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2013), 12. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2000), Vol. II, Part. IV, Ch. 2.

22

Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1972), 143.

23

This characteristic of democracy can be well discerned in the strategies that a
number of democratic activists and reformers have often employed. One classic
example is Frederick Douglass’s speech, “What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?”
Philip S. Foner ed., Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings (Chicago:
Lawrence Hill, 1999).

24

Geertz once put it that “[t]he concept of culture I espouse … is essentially a
semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs
of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, the analysis of it
to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one
in search of meaning.” Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected
Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5. Similarly, democracy can be thought to be

10

people perceive themselves as free and equal agents and take their seemingly unattainable
ideal of self-rule to be achievable and, therefore, worthy of sustained pursuit and
commitment. Democracy, at the fundamental level, operates as “an ethical ideal”25 or “a
noble dream.”26
That democracy allows for the gravitational pull of aspiration, or that it cannot
shed its idealistic potential, is part of the enduring appeal of democracy I sketched above.
Yet those persisting ambitions, hopes, and promises have also paved the foundation of
disappointment and despair. Democratic citizens are “preoccupied with the prospect of
failure.”27 This leads us to an acknowledgement that democratic citizens may well be
placed in a particular systematic predicament. This commonplace predicament so
incident to and typical of democratic life is what I term democratic frustration. It refers to
a kind of frustration whose source is nothing other than democratic aspiration itself.
Democratic frustration is rather banal than unusual. However, it is not my
intention to explore the multitudinous array of episodic emotional outbursts in the course
of democratic activities and engagements only to confirm the fact that frustration is an

language-games à la Wittgenstein, a bundle of ideas and practices characterized by
their public, conventional, yet open texture. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), §§ 23, 65, 66.
25

James T. Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European
and American Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 4.
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Susan Mandus, “Democracy: A Nightmare or a Noble Dream?” The Tampere
Lecture 2008 [Online Source: http://www.tampereclub.org/epublications/vol3_mendus.pdf].
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David Runciman, The Confidence Trap, xii.
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empirical reality of democratic citizenship.28 My claim goes rather deeper. I propose to
view frustration as the general tone of democratic life. It is a feeling but at once a
background of feelings. In other words, I see frustration as a mood; not just a mood, but
the defining mood of democracy.
It may sound too pessimistic at first glance that frustration is the condition of
democracy. To some extent, it seems to be expressive of a general political fatigue
originating from contemporary democratic politics, which sometimes looks so stale and
sterile. Yet it should be noted that I do not mean to draw an entirely pessimistic
conclusion that whatever democratic citizens do will ineluctably press them further and
further into hopelessness. That frustration persists does not in itself constitute pessimism.
To the contrary, I aim to show that the task before democratic citizens is how to manage
their motivation and psychological costs by properly attending to and coming to terms
with the mood of frustration. Otherwise, citizens can easily fall into a passive and cynic
acceptance or a utopian escapism, the two most popular extreme strategies for relaxing
the tension of frustration.

28

The list of political and civic activities cannot be exhaustive. Some activities are as
highly intensive and demanding as running for office or organizing and mobilizing
campaign events, protest movements, and other rallies and marches. Other more
casual and less burdensome activities include casting votes to choose
representatives, pressing, persuading, or imploring those representatives and other
officials by having recourse to non-electoral means such as visiting or calling their
offices, giving or cancelling donations to them, attending political events and
meetings, signing petitions, displaying yard signs, and just talking with friends,
neighbors, or strangers about politics and policy issues. Citizens may do all of these
activities at local, state, national, or international levels. And, perhaps more
importantly, a considerable number of citizens choose not to do any of these
activities, at least most of the time. Their abdication from politics can be selfimposed or socially imposed. See Ben Berger, Attention Deficit Democracy: The
Paradox of Civic Engagement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
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In chapters two, three, and four, this study will examine democratic frustration
along three different dimensions of democracy—communicative, symbolic, and temporal.
Divided into three main chapters, it is organized as a combination of independent
modules, each of which articulates a distinct aspect of democratic frustration as well as
fleshes out the general points of the project. The common objectives are as follows: to
elaborate what exactly is the situation in which ordinary democratic citizens are placed,
to show why that situation is particularly frustrating, to discuss what conventional
solutions are available and to what extent they are not satisfactory, and to argue for my
own proposal and to explain why that could be a solution worthy of special attention.
The overarching goal of this study is to pursue an alternative course to both
cynicism and utopian escapism. I aim to pave the way to properly understand democratic
aspirations as being the source of both inspiration and frustration, and embrace and make
most use of frustration as means through which democratic citizens can keep their
aspirations alive while growing more attached to reality, not less, and becoming more
attentive, inventive, and persevering.
By dwelling on, and coming to terms with, democratic frustration, citizens can
better configure both their disenchantment with democracy and their aspirations for its
fulfillment at the same time. I also highlight how this careful view of frustration allows
democratic citizens to gain insights into the processual character of democratic desires
and politics gleaned from brooding over their loss and failure. Living with frustration
may put democratic citizens in great affliction. But it can be a gift in disguise insofar as it
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helps them to better attend to what they are, thereby intimating what they may become.29
Proffering a proper etiology of democratic frustration as well as normative
suggestions as to how we can better manage such frustration, this research not only sheds
light on a timely topic of democratic frustration, but also contributes to a growing
conversation among political theorists and other scholars in the humanities and social
sciences about the affective condition of democratic politics, realism and idealism,
overheated partisan politics, populism, and popular hopes for democratic progress and
grievances at its regress.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will further discuss the theme of
frustration as a defining mood of democracy, sketching its pervasive and critical meaning,
and, then, explain why I take a trifocal approach, an architectonic theoretical tool I
devise in this study, and briefly outline the main thrust of the following chapters.

FRUSTRATION: MOOD AS WELL AS FEELING
To regard frustration as a mood along with a feeling raises a number of questions. What
is a mood? How is it distinguished from feeling or other terms that signify human
sentiments such as emotion or affect? What does this view bring into focus?
As far as the purpose of this study is concerned, five exemplary conceptions merit
29

Certainly, “what we may become,” as Shakespeare’s Ophelia alludes to, may
remain unknown even after “what we are” is revealed. William Shakespeare, The
Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act IV, Scene 5: “we know what we are, but
know not what we may be.”
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special attention: principle, drive, currents, ethos, and temper. I will discuss them briefly
below. Montesquieu once used the term principle [principe] of government in a rather
idiosyncratic way. A principle, according to him, is “that which makes [people] act.” In
other words, they are “the human passions,”30 or the animating, motivational, and
inspiring affections, which set people in motion. Montesquieu selected one principle for
each of the correlative structures of government. For example, honor is the principle of
monarchical government according to which people living in the monarchical
government take action. In the case of democracy, on the other hand, virtue is the
motivating principle.31
Max Weber’s magnum opus was intended to “discover the psychological drives
[Antriebe] which led people to behave in a certain way and held them firmly in this path.”
What he found out, as widely known, was Calvinists’ protestant ethic, or, to be precise,
the role of an existential fear and trembling inspired by Calvinist predeterminism. This
religious ethic, perhaps quite ironically, gave rise to the most methodical approach in
secular everyday life, “turning [those believers] toward a rational life in the world, but

30

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 21.

31

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 22-30. While praising this analysis as
Montesquieu’s entirely original contribution to the traditional inquiry of the nature of
government, Hannah Arendt later commented that honor (or love of distinction) and
virtue (or love of equality) are two distinct yet equally fundamental and immediate
feelings. Honor is a genuinely human sentiment because “men are distinguished,
that is, different from each other by birth.” Virtue can also be a genuinely human
sentiment given the condition of “living together with and belonging to a group of
equally powerful men.” Hannah Arendt, “On the Nature of Totalitarianism,” 334-338.
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neither of this world nor for it.”32
Emile Durkheim famously popularized the term social facts, which consist of
“manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual[.]” Social facts
include “beliefs, tendencies and practices of the group taken collectively.” Some social
facts “do not present themselves in [a well defined] form but which also possess the same
objectivity and ascendancy over the individual.” Durkheim called this particular type of
social facts “social currents.”33
While discussing the peculiar characteristics of modernity, Michel Foucault once
suggested that we focus on “the attitude of modernity,” by which he meant “a mode of
relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end,
the way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the
same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.” In other words,
continued Foucault, this attitude is close to “what the Greeks called an ethos.”34
Finally, Joseph Krutch, an American writer, articulated the temper of the
twentieth century in his book, The Modern Temper. He characterized the temper of the
century as an anguish state of disharmony, ambiguity, and isolation. Krutch believed that
this acknowledgment of despair was necessary for understanding modern culture and
32

Max Weber, “The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism” in Peter Baehr
and Gordon Wells eds., The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other
Writings (New York: Penguin, 2002), 69-122.

33

Émile Durkheim, “The Rules of Sociological Method” in Steven Lukes ed., The
Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method (New
York: The Free Press, 1982), 53-55.

34

Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” Paul Rabinow ed., The Foucault Reader
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 39.
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society correctly.35
These accounts show some affinities with my approach. Although I am skeptical
of the Montesquieuian system of principle that assigns one passion to one type of
government, I share in common with Montesquieu that I recognize the importance of that
which sets people in motion. This interest in motivation, of course, resonates with the
Weber’s theoretical orientation. With respect to its pervasive and objective characteristic,
frustration can be compared to temper and social currents, although my focus is not
necessarily on all-encompassing atmosphere of society at large. Frustration, on my
account, shapes the attitudes, or we might say, ethos, à la Foucault, in a direct or indirect
way.
That said, the best terminology suitable for characterizing the role and place of
frustration is mood. Byung-Chul Han’s succinct categorization warns against the
tendency of equating or conflating four different related yet distinct terms of human
sentiments: mood, feeling, emotion, and affect.36 Mood or atmosphere [Stimmung],
according to Han, “expresses a way-it-is[,]” representing “a state of being or state of
mind [Befindlichkeit].” It has an objective character and is “static and constellative.”
Feeling [Gefühl] refers to something objective as well, albeit to a lesser degree. It allows
“duration” or “narrative length or breadth.” On the other hand, emotion [Emotion] and

35

Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and
Company, 1929). Cf. C. Wright Mills, “The Conservative Mood,” Dissent, Vol. 1, No. 1
(1954).

36

Han is critical of a number of recent studies unconcerned with, or less sensitive to
the conceptual differences among these terms, one example of which is Eva Illouz’s
Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).
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affect [Affekt] “refer to strictly subjective matters[.]” Emotion is more fleeting than
feeling; affect is even more momentary. Both are “expressions of subjectivity.” If feeling
is “constative,” emotion is rather “performative” while affect is “eruptive.”37
Although Han’s analysis is in line with some of the empirical psychological
studies,38 his languages mark the legacy of Martin Heidegger in whose work mood plays
a quintessential role. In Being and Time, for instance, Heidegger explains that mood is
neither wholly external nor entirely internal.39 He says: “A mood assails us. It comes
neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of
such Being.”40 Mood is indicative of our thrownness [Geworfenhiet], a context in which
we are already situated. It is something presupposed by intentional actions. It
“[determines] the space of possible kinds of concern.”41

37

Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power
(New York: Verso, 2017), 41-48.
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See, for example, Panteleimon Ekkekakis, The Measurement of Affect, Mood, and
Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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Heidegger stresses the importance of mood when he attempts to challenge the
age-long hierarchy between logos and pathos (or ousia and pathos). See, for
instance, Plato’s Euthyphro (11a-b) where Socrates admonishes Euthyphro for
continuously talking about mere affect or quality (pathos) of the problem while not
seeing the nature or essence (ousia) of the problem. Since Plato, explains Heidegger,
pathos in general has often been seen as “the utterly fleeting and ungraspable
shadows of clouds flitting across the landscape.” Heidegger does not dismiss outright
this characterization. Yet he is interested in how to “grasp mood positively as
belonging to the essence of man,” or, as Jean-Paul Satre once put, as “a specific
manner of apprehending the world.” See Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental
Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1995), 64-65) and Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outlines of A Theory
(London: Methuen, 1962), 57.
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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Low, 1962), 176.
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Matthew Ratcliffe, “The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life,” The
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
357.
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Heidegger’s study of mood is massive, including his lengthy and rigorous account
of boredom as the foundational mood [Grundstimmung] that, according to him, prompts
philosophical thinking. Here, I just focus on one element in his account of three distinct
modes of boredom since his distinction can give us important insights into mood in
general. Heidegger offers a tripartite distinction of boredom: “becoming bored by
something,” “being bored with something,” and “profound boredom as ‘it is boring for
one’.”42 The first kind of boredom is the one when there is a particular situation that fails
to satisfy us. The second kind of boredom, on the other hand, is deeper because it is not
the case that any particular thing that fails to satisfy us. Even if “there is nothing at all to
be found that might have been boring about” particular things, claims Heidegger, one
could still be in the situation of boredom, which would come to attention later. The third
one is even deeper because boredom in this case is all encompassing.
Let us focus on the distinction Heidegger makes between the first and the second
ones. This is essential for understanding my use of democratic frustration as well
precisely because what I intend to emphasize by proposing to conceive of frustration as
the mood of democracy is that democratic citizens are being held in the situation of
frustration. Heidegger uses two illustrative examples (waiting a train at a quiet and
uninspiring station and attending a dinner) to explain the difference between the first and
the second type of boredom. An important and subtle difference is how he describes one
would pass the time in response to the respective situations of boredom.

42

Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 78-159.
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We read the timetables or study the table giving the various distances
from this station to other places we are not otherwise acquainted with
at all. We look at the clock—only a quarter of an hour has gone by.
Then we go out onto the local road. We walk up and down, just to
have something to do. But it is no use. Then we count the trees along
the road, look at our watch again—exactly five minutes since we last
looked at it. Fed up with walking back and forth, we sit down on a
stone, draw all kinds of figures in the sand, and in so doing catch
ourselves looking at our watch yet again—half an hour—and so on.43

In this case of the train waiting, it seems obvious that one is bored by the situation and
kills the time by doing unambiguously meaningless things. The second case, however, is
quite different.

… cigars are passed around again. We have already let them pass by
once, but now we take a cigar. We are not getting sleepy, and yet—we
smoke, not to become more sleepy, nor to be stimulated by the
nicotine, but because smoking itself is a socially ideal way of passing
the time, which is not to say that everyone who smokes is passing the
time in so doing, i. e., is bored. Socially ideal—this is intended to
mean that smoking is part of it all, one is encouraged to do so, and in
this way—without our knowing it—an inconspicuous possibility of
passing the time plays right into our hands. Passing the time is thus
there in this situation too, though admittedly hard to find, and this
precisely because it presents itself in such a public manner.44
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Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 93.
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Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 111-112.

20

Heidegger explains that “[p]assing the time is not lacking in this boredom either.” It is
not “hidden or repressed[.]” But, interestingly, it is “transformed in a particular way[,]”
as his cigar example indicates.
How can we extrapolate his perceptive analysis to my case of democratic
frustration? I would suggest the following reading. Individual citizens might be frustrated
by a number of events for a lot of different reasons. We can recognize it by looking at
their emotional reactions: rage, impotent anger, despondence, et cetera. Absent those
usual signs of frustration, however, one can still be held in the condition of frustration. In
other words, it is plausible that citizens, perhaps without knowing at the moment, are
expressing their deep-seated exasperation in a “transformed” and “socially ideal” way.
Just like what the Heidegger’s guest did by smoking a cigar. Perhaps citizens dispute
with other fellow citizens over pressing issues or participate in a mass protest. They may
choose not to do anything, showing a nonchalant shrug to any democratic issues.
Nonetheless, we should still be able to read their frustration or frustration permeated
through the space in which they are placed. This does not mean that their actions (or
inaction) are entirely disingenuous or mere perfunctory. What it means is frustration can
be understood as a status in which democratic citizens find themselves situated, which
implies the persistence of frustration at the structural level, not merely as an episodic
emotional register.
That said, my focus is placed on how democratic citizens would be likely to
21

approach the condition of frustration in a more conspicuous way. I will look at how they
adopt attitudes, orientations, and ethos and pathos with regard to it. The most
symptomatic reaction to frustration is to escape it. Frustration breeds an impulse to seek
immediate comforts or consolations, inviting extreme reactions. Two strategies prevail.
The first strategy is to remove or cut down high expectations and to be content
with the status quo or to take an even more pessimistic view of democratic life so as to be
prepared for the anticipated uneasiness. The second strategy is to make oneself deeply
immersed in a utopian scheme of thoughts. As long as one keeps gravitating toward and
clinging onto some of the heightened hopes and ideals, she may be able to hold the sense
of frustration at bay, at least temporarily. These two immoderate extremes—one urges us
to let go of much hope and the other makes us live by moving from dream to dream in the
sense of drifting in utopianism—are the most popular avoiding strategies that could oust
frustration from the view.
To escape the feeling of frustration may sound natural and optimal, but it is worth
noting that such an endeavor misses out on the opportunity to properly understand and
attend to the situation we are in. A lurking danger is a devastating twofold trend of
cynicism and utopian escapism. Both can serve as subterfuges in which people may
temporarily take refuge. Neither, however, is an effectual and sustainable solution.
Instead, we need to foster a different strategy with which we can better cope with the
indelible democratic frustration.
Contemporary democratic theory, unfortunately, has failed to properly attend to
22

the phenomenon of democratic frustration in part because most theorists have devoted too
much attention either to analyzing idealistic arrangements of democracy or to describing
the dispiriting reality of democratic politics. These alleged idealism and realism also
reflect intellectual anxieties torn between utopianism and cynicism. The point is not that
the former is too idealistic and the latter too realistic. The real danger is that the former is
often a siphoning away of attention, a distraction from how to savor ideals as genuine
possibilities in the everyday democracy, while the latter often distracts us from reality—
by accepting the limits of the given situation too quickly, often demoralizing any attempts
to look at broader and deeper truth of the very situation.45 Thus, those two tendencies can
degenerate into a devastating twofold trend of cynicism and utopianism.

THROUGH A TRIFOCAL LENS, CLEARLY
This study offers a threefold framework through which we can better understand
frustration as endogenous to democracy. I call the overarching framework a trifocal
approach because of its analogy to trifocals. Trifocals are a pair of glasses that have three
regions that correct for near, intermediate, and distance vision. The lenses with different
focal lengths remind us of what it means to have good vision—being capable of
discerning objects visually at a short, medium, and long distance. Yet we normally rather
45

Reality is multifaceted. Studs Terkel once interviewed Virginia Durr who was a
founding member of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. When asked how
did she become an activist, she said that the Depression changed it all. The following
statement of hers would have been said by anyone: “It was the first time I had seen
the other side of the tracks. I saw the world as it really was.” [Emphasis added.]
Studs Terkel, Hope Dies Last: Keeping the Faith in Difficult Times (New York: The
New Press, 2003), xxiv-xxv.
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hold a holistic view of our vision (twenty-twenty or not) than keep ourselves conscious of
the distinct capacities to see the objects at different distances unless we come to suffer
from presbyopia or other clinical problems that demand for precise correction.
Likewise, the democratic life—a backdrop against which democratic frustration
arises—has different reference points.46 Democratic citizens form and perform their
agency in the different terrains of focus, structured by distinct expectations concerning
diverse goals, ideals, and desires. Just like trifocals that offer a tripartite
compartmentalization of lenses, I shall reduce my considerations to three dimensions of
democratic life, offering a threefold analysis of democratic frustration: Communicative,
Symbolic, and Temporal, each comprising four components: Subjectivity, Ideal, Source of
Frustration, and Proposal. The attached table arranges them in a schematic form.

46

Certainly, I take trifocals to be an analogy to my threefold framework, and no
more. Notice that trifocals may sound anachronistic from the perspective of modern
day ophthalmology and optometry. Many people with presbyopia would now prefer
line-free progressive lenses to trifocals. Likewise, my focus on the three dimensions
of democratic life does not mean to preclude myself (and others) from looking into
another important dimensions of democracy such as economic, bureaucratic, and
technological dimensions.
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Table 1 Trifocal Approach
Trifocal Dimensions

Subjectivity

Communicative

Symbolic

Temporal

Citizen-Partisan

Citizen-Sovereign

Citizen-Becoming

Keeping
Enacting Popular
Ideal

Conversations

Progress
Sovereignty

Going

Source of

Striving for

The Unrepresentability

Fast tempo and the

Frustration

Superiority

of the People

bifurcated temporality

Proposal

Magnanimity

The Sublime People

Experience/Journey

The communicative dimension of democracy involves a variety of conversations
and contestations into which ordinary citizens enter. This is where the relationship
between the first person and the second person matters. Here, democratic citizens are
thought to aspire to attain and exercise mutual respect. It is important, however, to
recognize the fact that the democratic subject cannot but exist as a citizen-partisan in the
realm of communication, holding her own superiority over her opponents and hoping to
25

defeat them. In other words, it is common that democratic citizens tend to escalate
partisan tensions by fanning the flames of mutual contempt, hatred, and aggression even
while acknowledging that in democracy they are supposed to uphold the ideal of mutual
respect.
This creates a particular condition of frustration. Again, I do not merely mean that
individual citizens are likely to feel frustration in a particular episode of conversation.
More fundamentally, frustration as a mood occupies the mind of democratic citizens. The
two most extreme tendencies—to cease all efforts to talk to one’s opponents and to
pounce on their words in every possible way—are indicative of frustration. How can
democratic citizens keep motivating themselves to engage in democratic conversations in
a way that mitigates too much aggression? I argue that moralist pleas for rationality,
civility, and tolerance would not work very well precisely because those solutions do not
properly understand the motivational aspect of the urge for superiority. Yet it is not
desirable to promote the sense of superiority in a counter-productive form. Examining
democratic communication as a site of frustration that invites a moral-psychological
analysis of how to foster a better attitudinal strategy, I propose a theory of magnanimity,
with which we can harness the motivational power of superiority while making it more
compatible with and conducive to a sound and vibrant democratic politics.
The symbolic dimension of democracy involves the politics of the people. Here,
the democratic subject takes the form of citizen-sovereign, participating in “the
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continuing self-fashioning of the demos.”47 This is where the relationship between the
first person singular and the first person plural matters. The people cannot appear in any
immediate form. This indefinite nature of the people makes its representation both
necessary and incomplete, which makes individual citizens in permanent tensions with
the people. This tension creates a particular condition of frustration, which can be
characterized by the tense dynamic of the need of individual citizens to invite and invoke
the people at the risk of betrayal and suppression by the despair emanating from the
inescapably incomplete and possibly false representation.
Two extreme solutions provide particular ways in which individual democratic
citizens can shape their sensibilities toward the people by way of relaxing the tensions
between themselves and the people. The first method, which I call a reductionist
paradigm, views the people as the foundation of political authority while constraining the
potential of popular energy. On the other hand, the second method, which I call an
aspirational paradigm, valorizes the popular energy of ordinary people. The former is
driven by the fear of the popular power while the latter is galvanized by the delight in
communion with the people. Recognizing the fact that these two paradigms end up
mutually reinforcing as well as the problem of erasing the tension between individual
citizens and the people, I propose a theory of the sublime people as an interpretive tool
with which we can better attend to the interplay between the individual citizen and the
people. This particular aesthetic approach to the people highlights the pleasure of the
sublime, which helps the citizen to invoke and engage in the people while elevating the
47

Sheldon Wolin, “The Liberal/Democratic Divide: On Rawls’s Political Liberalism,
Political Theory, Vol. 24, No.1 (1996), 98.
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capacity of herself. In so doing, it paves the way that resists a worrying twofold trend of
minimalism and populism.
The third and last dimension concerns the question of democratic time. The
democratic subject takes the form of citizen-becoming. Previously, the focus was on the
question as to how the citizen could form and exercise her democratic agency against
potentially offensive others (the communicative dimension) and the people at large (the
symbolic dimension). Here, what matters is the relationship between the democratic
subject and time. The individual citizen is a temporally extended being. She might retain
her “first-personal perspective and identify as the same subjective self from moment to
moment,” but “over time, gradual change can accumulate such that [she] no longer stand
in the same-self relation to a past self.”48 To think about oneself persisting and becoming
through time involves understanding oneself from both the agential (first-personal) and
observational perspectives.
When it comes to democratic time, however, citizens are prone to place
overemphasis on relatively short-lived extraordinary moments at which they express their
wishes, desires, and opinions through various means of participation, electoral or
otherwise. The rest of ordinary time is often left unattended. In other words, democratic
time has tended to be characterized as a series of vapid proceedings save only a few
sweeping overheated moments. This binary shows some signs of particular temperaments
with respect to time perceived as pervading in democracy—impetuousness on the one
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L. A. Paul, “Subjectively Enduring Self” in Ian Phillips ed., The Routledge Handbook
of Philosophy of Temporal Experience (London: Routledge, 2017), 267.
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hand, and apathy on the other—which aggravates a twofold trend of voluntarism and
deterministic defeatism. This chapter argues that the bifurcated view of democratic time
robs democratic citizens of a temporal space suitable for self-growth or self-overcoming.
I propose an alternative view of time as a journey, stressing that each individual “has its
own time carries within itself its own temporal measure[,]”49 and that she can grow more
perseverant by staying or tarrying in the time of frustration.
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Reinhard Koselleck, Sediments of Time: On Possible Histories (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2018), 4.
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CHAPTER 2: The Communicative

From Impudence Toward Magnanimity:
Reclaiming an Aristotelian Sense of Superiority for Democracy

There are seasons in every country, when noise and impudence pass current for worth.
Alexander Hamilton

It is not enough for me to win—the other must lose.
Gore Vidal

[T]hinking how obscurity rids the mind of the irk of envy and spite;
how it sets running in the veins the free waters of generosity and magnanimity;
and allows giving and taking without thanks offered or praise given[.]
Virginia Woolf
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Long before Donald Trump burst upon the political scene, parading shameless selfflattery and disregard for others, Athenian democratic citizens once came under attack for
their “effrontery and impudence.”50 The accuser was Socrates. In his peroration at the
trial that resulted in his death,51 Socrates came to conclude that he lost the case not
because his arguments were inadequate and unconvincing, but because he lacked
effrontery and impudence, arguably the most conspicuous characteristics attributable to
his fellow Athenians. By highlighting these characteristics, Socrates points out that
perhaps contrary to the conventional wisdom of his time, the boldness and fearlessness of
Athenian democratic citizens, often praised for promoting frank speech [parrhēsia] and
daring acts, are not entirely worthy of acclaim. According to him, those dispositions can
lead citizens toward shameless self-praise and disrespect for truth and justice.
Yet there is an irony. From the perspective of ordinary Athenians, it was Socrates
who had the effrontery to disregard outright the authorities of his fellow citizen-judges.
Notice that Socrates began his defense speech by flouting a social norm of the time—he
50

Plato, Apology, 38d. Translation by Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant. The
original Greek terms are tólma and anaischuntia, which sometimes translate into a
number of distinct yet related sets of words such as “impudence and shamelessness”
(by Harold North Fowler) and “boldness and shamelessness” (by G. M. A. Grube). I
will revisit the semantic and emotional affinities between tólma and anaischuntia in
the following section.
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As Josiah Ober succinctly describes, “In 399 BCE, the Athenian citizen Socrates,
son of Sophroniscus of the deme (township) Alopece, was tried by an Athenian court
on the charge of impiety (asebeia). He was found guilty by a narrow majority of the
empanelled judges and executed in the public prison a few days later.” Ober,
“Socrates and Democratic Athens,” Donald R. Morrison ed., The Cambridge
Companion to Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 138.

31

referred to the judges simply as “men of Athens” [andres Athenaioi], not as “judges”
[adres dikastai]. Later, he gave the name of “judges” only to those who voted for his
acquittal.52 Hence, Socrates displayed an arrogant contempt for the opinion of his peers
precisely when he was castigating them for their shameless disrespect for him. It is ironic
because Socrates does not seem to be lacking what he claims he is short of; his
impudence could be well detected by his opponents. We can see a direct parallel to the
Athenian impudence—which Socrates harshly condemns—in the attitudes of Socrates
himself. In other words, Socrates’s mode of engagement may be no less impudent than
that of his alleged opponents.53
If we set aside the oft-made juxtaposition between Socratic philosophy and
democratic rhetoric or that between the philosopher and the sophist,54 what comes into
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Socrates says that “in call you judges I give you your right name.” Compare his
dictions in Apology, 17a and 40a. Harrold Tarrant also draws attention to the
Socrates’s deliberate choice of the term “judges” for the particular occasion. See his
note in Plato: The Last Days of Socrates (New York: Penguin, 2003), 221.
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The idea of irony in general and Socratic irony in particular deserve an independent
comprehensive study. For more on the concept of eirōneia and the role of Socrates in
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her “Reconsidering Socratic Irony,” Donald R. Morrison ed., The Cambridge
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clear view is an adversarial condition of political discourse into which both Socrates and
his fellow contestants entered as democratic citizens. Likewise, ordinary democratic
citizens routinely set foot in a polemical or antagonistic condition where they are
confronted with their opponents who are almost always ready to assail them. In this
impassioned situation, people are susceptible to impudence. Rather than reflect upon and
attend to their own possibly unsound or biased reasoning and be contemptuous of
themselves when they employ it, people are often not ashamed of being one-sided,
uncivil, and self-centered, and instead too easily hold their opponents in contempt. Their
penchant for victory defies humility, tolerance, and self-criticism.
Impudence⎯which has a Latin origin, impudēns⎯usually means shamelessness.
My point is that ordinary democratic citizens are prone to shamelessly disregard those
who have dissimilar and opposing views and perspectives. The primary reason I select to
use the word impudence rather than shamelessness is twofold. First, as archaic55 as the
former may sound, it does not instantly elicit such a narrow and peremptorily negative
response as the latter normally does. Second, unlike shamelessness, impudence usually
takes place against the backdrop of competing claims to superiority.
One might say that democratic citizens should refuse to talk of high and low in
the name of equality. Every citizen owes one another mutual respect and fair cooperation.
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The word impudence was more widely used until 19th century. For example,
Richard Steele writes about impudence in the then popular British magazine The
Spectator, placing it with a number of other colloquial expressions: "Impudence in an
Englishman, is sullen and insolent; in a Scotchman it is untractable and rapacious; in
an Irishman absurd and fawning. As the course of the world now runs, the impudent
Englishman behaves like a surly landlord, the Scot like an ill-received guest, and the
Irishman like a stranger, who knows he is not welcome." Robert Steele, The
Spectator, No. 20 (1710-1711).
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From this perspective, impudence can be seen as a simple failure—a failure to comply
with the basic rules and norms of democracy. Yet it is not reasonable to readily assume
that ordinary democratic citizens uphold the virtue of mutual respect expressing a sense
of humility and civility. Nor is realistic to believe that they usually practice unwavering
self-criticism prior to and in the course of confronting their opponents. Even if citizens
acknowledge the fact that in principle, they cannot know for certain the nature of any
political matter in its entirety, and that whatever values and perspectives they hold dear
cannot be undisputable, this awareness of one’s partiality and fallibility does not
automatically construct or confirm an intellectual and moral foundation of mutual
respect.
In fact, democratic equality does not have to be incompatible with the sense of
superiority; oftentimes, in practice, those two are intermingled. However vulgar and
modest it may sound, democratic equality experienced in the everyday democracy is that
each citizen is equally entitled to claim that she is right and her opponents are wrong,
and, by extension, that her people, her party, and her views are superior to those of her
opponents. In this down-to-earth version of democratic theory, the impulse to equality
can supplement rather than supplant the sense of superiority. To paraphrase Edmund
Burke’s remark, the haughtiness of disregard can combine with the spirit of equality.56
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Edmund Burke in his famous speech on conciliation with the colonies states that
“the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom[.]” Here, Burke
discusses the distinct nature of the southern colonies, especially with regards to their
love of freedom. Burke argues that since white British subjects in the southern
colonies are “masters of slaves,” freedom is to them “not only an enjoyment, but a
kind of rank and privilege.” He clearly acknowledges the fact that “the superior
morality” is attached to their sense of freedom. So, it is the existence of the system
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The comportment of democratic impudence, which implies the sense of
superiority, is the unfortunate corollary of the ontological condition of antagonism
conjoined with an epistemological tendency toward justifying beliefs that one wants to
hold—as opposed to constructing a political view based on a thorough and unbiased
examination of one’s preconceived ideas and beliefs. Thus, ordinary citizens can be
rather impudent, disregarding dissimilar views and perspectives especially when they are
politically aware and active in the face of stark opposition. To be impudent means to be
intellectually and morally presumptuous, which can easily provoke others to anger,
subject them to insult, and invite them into making claims that would lead them toward
their own impudence. It seems clear that if citizens continue to inflame one another with
impudence to an increasing extent, they will end up heightening mutual anger, hatred,
and aggression in the realm of democratic communication. This downward spiral of
impudence is conducive to a tense and vitriolic atmosphere of democratic politics.
Insofar as none or very few of us can escape blame for practicing and promoting
the politics of impudence, this can be called a democratic phenomenon—a phenomenon
that ordinary citizens clearly discern and commonly practice in the everyday democracy.
That said, it is neither realistic nor entirely desirable to deal with this problem by simply
of dominance (slavery) that makes their love of freedom much more “high and
haughty.” I would make an unorthodox Burkean argument that it is precisely the
alleged absence of the system of dominance that now prompts the urge of enhancing
self-esteem infused with the sense of superiority, which may place people in
confrontation with their commitment to mutual respect. In doing so, I disagree with
Thomas Paine who says in Common Sense that “[w]here there are no distinctions
there can be no superiority; perfect equality affords no tempation.” See Edmund
Burke, “Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies” in Francis Canavan ed., Select
Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. I (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999) and Thomas
Paine, Common Sense in Eric Foner ed., Thomas Paine: Collected Writings (New
York: The Library of America, 1995).
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calling for more respect, civility, and decorum. It is unrealistic because ordinary
democratic citizens are not capable of doing so unless they choose to rest content with a
democratic politics devoid of much energy and vigor. They tend to care
disproportionately more about their own views and positions or those bound up with
them by ideological or emotional contiguity, cloaking their intense care in the trappings
of impudence. It is not entirely desirable either because the suggested moralistic plea for
behavior guided strictly by those lofty ideals of respect, civility, and decorum can bring
about a politics that is markedly pallid and charmless, which is unable to offer excitement
and enthusiasm necessary for active participation.
Then, the task before us is twofold. While recognizing the negative consequences
of democratic impudence—that it is likely to create and perpetuate the condition of
frustration in which citizens keep mutually escalating and thereby being fed up with
contempt and hostility—we first need to refrain from dismissing it outright merely as an
inordinate and repulsive vice, and to address such a phenomenon as an integral and
enlivening part of democratic life. Second, if ordinary citizens are so inclined to
democratic impudence, we should examine and attend to where indeed their proclivities
and susceptibilities to impudence come from and seek out a viable strategy with which to
extract a motivational and self-gratifying element from it while preventing or alleviating
too much destructive aggression and obstinacy.
In this chapter, I aim to show that democratic impudence is indicative of the sense
of superiority that ordinary citizens often assert and indulge in, and search for the ways in
which to develop a more legitimate claim to superiority in democracy without promoting
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an unnecessarily overbearing pride and a searing disdain for opponents. The question is
not about how to denounce or transcend the abiding sense of superiority in democracy,
but about how to harness the motivational power of superiority while making it more
compatible with and conducive to a sound and vibrant democratic politics. My solution is
to turn to a related yet distinct form of superiority: magnanimity.
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 1 pays special attention to two
leading perspectives in contemporary democratic theory—liberal (deliberative) and
agonistic—which, on my account, have failed to properly address the problem of
democratic impudence. Section 2 proffers an anatomy of impudence as a pathos that
shows a curious amalgam of base shamelessness and cheerful boldness, which gives the
person enlivening energies as well as a belittling posture. Section 3 examines why it is
both naïve and wrongheaded to attempt to solve the problem of impudence by doing
away with it, and turns to the concept of magnanimity to remedy the situation. In what
follows, I will base my arguments on, and derive their tenor from, to large extent, my
reading of Aristotle—first his analysis of human pathē in general and
anaischuntia/anaideia in particular, then that of akrasia, and finally that of
megalopsychia—though I will also discuss other sources, both ancient and modern.
Rather than pretend to give a comprehensive exegetical study of Aristotle, I would like to
claim that his philosophy so understood can guide us to rethink and rework our
contemporary difficulties that concern the vexing problem of democratic impudence. My
novel reading of Aristotle in this purpose, in turn, provides a new insight into his theory
of magnanimity.
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BEYOND THE LIBERAL AND AGONISTIC MODELS
Contemporary democratic theory has not yet provided us with a framework best suitable
for clarifying and comprehending the problem of democratic impudence. Given that the
recent years have witnessed the growing concerns with the alarming polarization and the
rise of inflammatory expressions and impudent attitudes in the United States and beyond,
it is unfortunate that leading perspectives in democratic theory failed to address the
subject of democratic impudence.57 To fill this lacuna requires us to examine
predominant tendencies in the study of democratic theory.
First of all, the liberal democratic model understands the politics of impudence as
an aberration of democracy—not a problem incident to and typical of democracy per
57

A number of leading social scientists and journalists have claimed that America
has been deeply divided over the past few decades by socio-cultural values and
moral visions as well as political ideologies and preferences. For the recent political
climate in which much of outrage and incivility has been animating democratic
politics, see Jeffrey Berry and Sarah Sobieraj, The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion
Media and the New Incivility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), Diana Mutz,
In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2015), Katherine Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural
Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2016). See also Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue
Families: Legal Polarization and the Creation of Culture (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010), and J. D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in
Crisis (New York: Harper, 2016). For the ideological polarization of two major parties
in the United States, see Nolan McCarthy, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Polarized
American: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016);
for the asymmetrical polarization with congressional GOP being stretched rightward
far significantly, see Edward Carmines, “Class Politics, American Style,” Perspectives
on Politics, Vol. 9 Issue 3 (2011); for the development of party sorting and the roles
of religion, media, and gerrymandering in the process of polarization, see eds. Pietro
Nivola and David Brady, Red and Blue Nation (Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press,
2006); and for party sorting more in detail, see Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan
Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

38

se—while instead propagating an image of the idealized democratic self as deliberative,
reflective, self-critical, and tolerant. From this perspective, democratic impudence
appears to testify to the failure of establishing and complying with the basic rules and
institutions of liberal democracy such as rational deliberation, tolerance, and mutual
respect.
For instance, Rawls’s theoretical project for a “well-ordered society” presumes
that democratic citizens “take part in social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect
under appropriately equal conditions.”58 In the large scheme of the Rawlsian democratic
society, citizens are believed to “desire to act on the natural duty to advance just
arrangements.” It is as though their morality derive from “public principles of justice”,
not from actual “ties of fellow feeling.”59 However “realistically utopian”60 his theory
may seem, it remains less sensitive and attentive to how central the mutual exchange of
impudence (not of respect) is to our actual democratic life. Habermas’s advocacy for a
deliberative form of democracy idealizes “the attitude of communicatively engaged
citizens,”61 which is expected to enable them to realize “civic autonomy” via
unconstrained discourse. By pitting this particular attitude of mutual respect against that
of competition that people embody “simply in the role of actors oriented to success,”62
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John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), xv.
Emphasis added.
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Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 415.
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This is how Rawls himself understands his own theoretical position. John Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 4.
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Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory
of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 32. Emphasis added.
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Habermas demands that citizens drop the latter attitude in favor of the former. Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, too, pay more attention to how liberal democracy
proposes to design a set of better principles, or “fair terms of cooperation,” to resolve and
accommodate moral conflicts than to the fact that ordinary citizens routinely involve in a
number of non-deliberative activities in which they gear up for competition oriented to
success and victory.63 Martha Nussbaum and Sharon Krause—whose respective works
attend to and appreciate the role of passions and emotions in democratic deliberation
much more explicitly and extensively than their Neo-Kantian counterparts—also
endeavor to secure and valorize the ideal of equal respect.64
To be clear, I do not mean to dismiss such a normative claim as completely
pointless. Nor do I deny both theoretical and practical utilities of thinking about and
cherishing the ideal situation in which people may be guided to present themselves as
decent and right-minded and treat other fellow citizens with full respect. It is by no means
my intention to abandon the liberal democratic ideal of free and equal citizenship as such.
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Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1996) and Why Deliberative Democracy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), especially chapters 3-4. For the emphasis on an
ethic of mutual respect, see also James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism
in an Age of Diversity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Charles
Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in ed. Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism:
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
Michael Walzer draws up a list of those non-deliberative activities including
mobilization, demonstration, bargaining, lobbying, campaigning. See Michael Walzer,
Politics and Passions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), chapter 5. My
primary concern is not with elite politicians involving in these activities, but with
ordinary citizens intellectually and emotionally responding and reacting to a number
of different democratic issues.
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See Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), especially chapters 5, 6, and 10 and
Sharon Krause, Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), especially chapters 3 and 4.
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Yet I contend that any attempts to denounce the politics of impudence merely as a failure
of upholding democratic values without understanding the reasons—existential,
intellectual, and moral psychological—of its obduracy and recurrence would likely end in
empty gesture.
The agonistic model of democracy, though it falters in its own way as I will
explain shortly, proffers a better perspective, directing much attention to the antagonistic
nature of political existence.65 Chantal Mouffe, for example, draws on Carl Schmitt’s
understanding of the political when she claims that democratic politics “has to do with
conflict and antagonism, not free discussion.” For Schmitt, as Mouffe understands
correctly, “the criteria of the political … is the friend/enemy discrimination.”66
Democratic politics is largely about the “formation of a ‘we’ as opposed to a ‘they’, and
is always concerned with collective forms of identification[.]”67 William Connolly also
sees this subject-formation or identity-construction in connection with a series of
contesting differences. The struggle—agon—for political existence is decisive and
pervasive.68 From this perspective, partisanship is normally presented to democratic
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citizens as a fait accompli.69
It is true that the agonistic model—especially its deep skepticism of a
rationalized, consensus-based politics—helps us to better appreciate the ontology of the
democratic self, whose political existence bears inherent and permanent conflicts.70 Yet
the agonistic embrace of those inherent and incessant struggles—which is profoundly
exemplified by Connolly’s call for an ethos of “agonistic respect”—seems to redouble the
standard liberal model by lifting up the already elevated level of civic respect. Connolly’s
strategy aims to foster more tolerant and more respectful citizens whose “chastened
partisanship” enables them to arrive at “negotiations and settlements.”71 Albeit different
from the liberal virtue of mutual respect, this “agonistic respect” too is “a reciprocal
virtue,” a virtue “appropriate to a world in which partisans find themselves in intensive
relations of political interdependence.”72 The problem, though, is that the reciprocal
respect on an equal footing—agonistic or otherwise—is hard to achieve. If the liberal
model displays its naiveté in believing or pretending that ordinary citizens can treat one
69
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another as fellow moral and political agents equally, fairly, and rationally, the agonistic
model—which has gained popularity by condemning the liberal model’s refusal to take
into serious account heightened antagonism embedded in democratic politics—would
rather be too aspirational insofar as it demands that ordinary citizens respect their
enemies while clearly acknowledging and even welcoming a series of disputes and
confrontations with them. It requires too much heroic or tragic a virtuosity to fight
against and at once do justice to one’s foes.
The binary between the liberal model of democracy and its agonistic counterpart
roughly overlap that between “political moralism” (or idealism) and “political realism”, à
la Bernard Williams.73 Again, the greatest advantage of the agonistic model of democracy
is its acutely realistic recognition of the ontological condition of democratic antagonism.
Its realism, however, seems to go awry when it carries on with the ideal of equal mutual
respect, which has been championed by its liberal deliberative counterpart. Though
deeply sympathetic to the realistic appeal of the agonistic model,74 I contend that the
agonistic model remains idealistic in its own way as it persists to valorize robust agonistic
politics which requires heroic virtuous citizens who properly respect their enemies. Its
radical proposal is hardly lived out. I argue that we need a realism that is even more
deflationary and thereby achievable. By that I mean to focus more on actual emotional
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burdens and psychological costs that dissuade ordinary citizens from pursuing those ideal
virtues of mutual respect, and stay adhering to those earthy realities without envisioning
the ideal situation75—not merely of a liberal deliberative kind, but also of an agonistic
sort.
The realistic democratic theory, on my account, begins with a keen
acknowledgment that democratic citizens tend to flatter themselves and their group while
appreciating the opportunity to regard their opponents as worthless. Empirical studies
ranging from political psychology to cognitive science help us better understand the
epistemic tendency of one-sidedness in the antagonistic condition of democracy, which is
always rife with political divides, factional disputes, and polarized ideologies.76 People
mostly stay close to like-minded fellows: “likes talk to likes.”77 In the constant presence
of their opponents, they normally do not “seek out and assess information and
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interpretations”78 on their own with an open and self-critical mind. Instead, they
selectively expose themselves to a friendly environment, relying upon partisan resources
with which they can make sense of political issues at ease. The group—most notable
examples include parties, factions, and identity groups—offers particular reasonings,
cues, frames, and heuristics,79 and people process overflowing information with and
through those partisan prisms. The decisions they make and the attitudes they form,
therefore, depend largely upon the polemical situation in which they are placed.
This partisan epistemology is intertwined with partisan psychology or attitudes.
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Within their partisan enclave, democratic citizens are prone to “strive to defend and
maintain their extant values, identities, and attitudes.”80 To defend and advocate for a
certain view in democratic politics means to perceive that view as superior to the rest,
including some otherwise perhaps equally reasonable opinions. Citizens, thus, tend to
strike a pose of superiority vis-à-vis their enemies insofar as they choose to stay active in
democratic politics. Put differently, if they do not assume their superiority, it is more
likely that they remain politically confused and inactive. When they are clear and active,
they seek “directional” more than “accuracy” goals.81 Their top priority is to ensure that
their opinions and desires are protected from the competing wishes of their opponents.
Critical in the everyday democratic practice is an attempt to proclaim the validity and
importance of their views while minimizing those of oppositional views. Studies show
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that not only do people dislike having their beliefs challenged, they are also “less inclined
to seek new information after finding out that they were wrong.”82 Often being deficient
in self-criticism, democratic citizens, wittingly or otherwise, seize on every occasion to
preen themselves on the thought that they and their group are superior to their contenders.
In this regard, the rise of inflammatory expressions and shameless attitudes discerned in
American politics today is certainly not aberrational; it is at most a flamboyant extension
of the typical democratic politics.83
Those empirical studies help us better understand the proclivities and
susceptibilities of ordinary citizens to impudence. Here, the task of political theory, as
David Mayhew once pointed out, is to offer “ontological illumination”—not merely
“normative illumination”—which provides us with “a window to the nature of political
reality.”84 If it is the norm rather than exception that democratic citizens often find their
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adversaries—and themselves as well, if they remain honest—being impudent and
shameless in the face of stark opposition, we need to attend to what makes the
comportment of impudence—which displays the sense of superiority in the form of
determined disregard or contempt for dissimilar or antipodal views and perspectives—so
appealing and enduring as well as exasperating.
That said, simply launching a normative condemnation of the unfortunate
corollary of the ontological, epistemological, and psychological conditions of democracy
while calling for bringing more virtues and virtuosity into the realm of democratic
politics can be beside the point.85 For example, Edward Shils claims that civility helps
citizens to show “esteem and deference to another person,” refraining them from
aggression and intimidation. It urges people to pursue a common good while keeping
their partisan interests in check. Benjamin Barber puts emphasis on civility as well,
believing that civility promotes “reciprocal empathy and mutual respect.” His strong
democracy demands active participation, and such a participation requires the virtue of
civility. Along the same lines, Jean Elshtain argues that shame “requires symbolic forms,
veils of civility that conceal some activities and aspects of ourselves,” which is therefore
an important part of “democratic habits and dispositions” that make respectful democratic
intercourse possible.86
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Those remedies can be called allopathic insofar as their moral treatments tend to
impose the means that have opposite effects to the symptom—civility, shame, and so on.
The allopathic approach, however, has failed to properly address the recurring pattern of
democratic impudence. Although it is true that the politics of impudence and
shamelessness can escalate mutual hatred and aggression, it is worth noting that
embodying the heightened sense of superiority itself is a feature not a bug87 in democratic
politics. Absent the sense of superiority, citizens likely remain politically confused and
stay inactive and passive. The point is not to replace impudence with those lofty virtues.
It is to scrutinize the mechanism of impudence—its emotions, operations, and
implications—and make it more conducive to a sound democratic politics.
In this respect, this study departs from, or takes some relief from, the popular
normative trend in political theory toward the construction of political ethics that calls to
civil manner and moral behavior. Instead, I shall offer a homeopathic remedy to the
problem of democratic impudence, a remedy that admits the need for gratifying the sense
of superiority—the very substance that causes the problem in the first place—and seeks
an alternative way to satisfy the desires for superiority while relieving the nuisance of the
politics of impudence and thereby improving the overall health of democratic life.
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THE PATHOS OF IMPUDENCE: AN ARISTOTELIAN ANATOMY
The objective of this section is twofold. First, by carefully reading Aristotle’s account of
anaischuntia/anadeia and other related feelings and emotions, I aim to offer an in-depth
analysis of impudence.88 Second, in so doing, I also direct much attention to my realistic
or deflationary reading of Aristotle’s political theory, which does not focus so much on
his teleological ethical project—which centers on the questions of how to actualize the
potentialities of human soul and how to bring into existence true human happiness
[eudaimonia]89—as on his penetrating gaze at diverse human behavior and its moralpsychology.
The most typical reading of Aristotle’s ethics and characterology would
emphasize the capacity of deliberate choice [prohairesis] and practical wisdom
[phronesis], with which we could wish the right object at the right time and choose the
right means to achieve them. Yet the genius of Aristotle as a political thinker does not lie
only in his teleological ethico-political project, but also—and perhaps more evidently, in
my view—in his perceptive understanding of moral and political phenomena
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[phainomena] per se. Phainomema refers to what appears to us in experience.90 In this
regard, Aristotle’s political theory is experiential and empirical—though not
empiricist91—in that he never loses sight of the political reality. Keenly acknowledging
the fact that it is almost impossible to “stimulate the many towards being fine and good
[kalokagathia],” Aristotle admits that however unfortunate it may seem, most people
“live by their feelings[.]”92 To pay due attention to Aristotle’s realism means to see his
analysis of things “that are human,” of which feelings [pathē] as well as the states of
characters [hexeis] are important part.
My reading of Aristotle helps us to better understand the mechanism of
impudence, examining its negative relationship with the experience of shame [aischunē],
its near relationship with courage [andreia] and daring [tólma], and a peculiar
condescending bearing it carries. Impudence arises in a particularly partisan social
context, where we, intentionally or otherwise, are prone to hurt the feelings of certain
group of people while sparing those of others. From a first person perspective, our
90
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impudence may remain unknown to ourselves, or we realize it but often do not fully
reflect upon it. It is the comportment we take as we feel empowered, inspired, and
assertive. As a second or third person, however, we often accuse our interlocutors and
disputants of their impudence, pointing to their shameless and provocative assertion.
To begin with, impudence can be understood by way of its negative relationship
with shame. For Aristotle, shame [aischunē] is “a kind of fear of disrepute”93 that comes
as a result of disgraceful actions. Although it is often treated much like a virtue in the
sense that the person prone to shame can also be considered “intermediate”94 as opposed
to two immoderate extremes, shame does not seem to be proper to the virtuous for two
reasons. First, the virtuous would never voluntarily carry out any disgraceful actions from
which a feeling of disgrace springs. It might be “a good thing conditionally: if a good
person were to do this, then he would feel shame.”95 In this hypothetical situation, we can
imagine a good person susceptible to the experience of shame. Second, shame is not
properly spoken of as a virtue since it is more like a feeling than a state of character.”96
When he says this, Aristotle is juxtaposing “a feeling” [pathos] with “a state” [hexis].
Pathos is a term that has “connotation of passivity” in a sense of “being affected.” It
could refer to “an attribute (an affection) or an event/experience (an affect),”97 but is
clearly distinguished from a state of character.
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Within the system of Aristotelian ethics—which is essentially a science of
virtues—impudence [anaischuntia] as a derivative of shame may seem to merit little to
no attention. For it is nothing but the absence of shame—the lack of an already
marginalized pseudo-virtue. It seems clear that impudence is even less proper to the
virtuous. Again, they would not engage in any reprehensible activities. Even if they do, it
is still very unlikely that they feel no shame at their own disgraceful actions. Those who
feel no shame are unreservedly bad. There seems to be no way to gloss over the baseness
of impudence. Perhaps this is why Aristotle includes anaischuntia into the list of feelings
that are utterly base. He states that “[not] every action or feeling admits of the mean. For
some have names immediately connected with depravity [phaulotes], such as spite,
impudence [anaischuntia], envy, and, among actions, adultery, theft, homicide. All these,
and others like them, are so called because they themselves, and not their excesses or
deficiencies, are bad [phaulos].”98
However, it is misleading to conclude that we can distinguish some people of
lowly character from others. Again, impudence is not a character but a pathos, which
implies that there are particular conditions against which people may or may not be
unusually susceptible to impudence. Aristotle claims that people usually “[feel] shame
toward those whose opinion [they take] account of.” The point is that there exists an
audience whom they think highly of and care about; the very audience is “those who are
going to be with them and those watching them[.]”99 What Aristotle pinpoints is a
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partisan or tribal attitude revealed in the feelings of shame or the lack thereof. One brief
conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of impudence by way of its negative
relationship with shame, therefore, is that whether or not we are prone to impudence
depends to large extent on the nature of the audience we converse, cope, and fight with.
The marginal place of impudence in the scheme of Aristotelian ethics is beyond
dispute. Yet the analysis of impudence paired with shame leaves us with some important
questions. What exactly is the affective and emotional experience of impudence? If
impudence falls on the domain of pathos, which means the realm of “things accompanied
by pleasure or pain[,]”100 what kind of pleasure or pain does impudence generate? What
are the effects of impudence on the person who has that bearing as well as on his
contenders? In other words, what is to expect of the politics of impudence? In order to
answer these questions, we need to see more carefully how this particular pathos comes
into play in reality, instead of placing impudence at the bottom of the Aristotelian
taxonomy of virtues.
At first glance, one would claim that the first question has already been answered.
As shown above, anaischuntia is a derivative of aischunē; hence the experience of
impudence also concerns a particular perturbation of the mind arising from the
apprehension of an evil at hand in the experience of shame. In other words, the emotional
experience of impudence is certainly the same feelings that shame is all about—the fear
of disrepute. The only difference is that in the case of impudence, those feelings are
experienced not by their presence but by their absence. This explanation, however,
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sounds almost absurd. What does it mean that the impudent person is being affected by
the absence of that particular fear of disrepute? Does this mean that he feels the
nonexistence of the very pain? How can we describe his affective experience of the nonfeeling? It seems that in this way, we cannot sufficiently identify what exactly is
experienced at the moment of impudence. But there is one clue to better address this
problem, which requires a further reading of Aristotle’s account of courage.
Courage [andreia] is certainly one of the most admirable virtues in the large
scheme of Aristotelian ethics. Interestingly, however, Aristotle finds an overlap between
impudence and courage in that both display a sense of fearlessness. That overlap, strictly
speaking, is illusory because the former reveals a particular type of wrongheaded
fearlessness while the latter is clearly the laudable one. Further, the truly courageous
person is not entirely fearless. Put it precisely, he is the one who fears “for the right
reason, in the right way, and at the right time[.]” As a virtuous man, he “feels and acts in
accordance with the merits of the case, and as reason requires.” Nonetheless, Aristotle
still acknowledges the fact that “some people extend the term ‘courage’ to cover [the case
of impudence], since [the impudent person] has a degree of similarity to the courageous
person, in that the latter is also a sort of fearless person.”101
This “transference of meaning”102 might be of no interest to those who faithfully
uphold the orderly system of Aristotelian virtues. Yet it is Aristotle’s point as well that
such a transference transpires as places where the virtuous coexist with—and are almost
101

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1115b16-20.

102

Ibid.

55

always outnumbered by—those who are not virtuous. He seems to suggest that the lure of
impudence arises from its pretension of holding qualities that courage is meant to offer
such as confidence and pride. Like “rash cowards,” who attempt to make themselves
appear to be courageous but do not actually “stand their ground against what is fearful,”
the impudent person might be driven and guided by a mistaken impulse. But the
perceived similarity between courage and impudence gives evidence for the latter’s
appeal. Impudence as a pathos does not have to be negatively defined as the absence of
shame; it can be understood by way of its alleged emotional contiguity to courage.
The confidence-inspiring element of impudence can be reaffirmed by my first
example: Socrates’s condemnation of his fellow Athenian citizens for their “tólma and
anaischuntia.” As was indicated in one of the footnotes prior, it is debatable how to
translate those terms into the right English equivalents. For instance, this phrase has been
rendered into “effrontery and impudence” (by Tredennick and Garold Tarrant),
“impudence and shamelessness” (by Harold Fowler Hugh), or “boldness and
shamelessness” (by G. M. A. Grube). What merits special attention is the fact that the
association of tólma and anaischuntia demonstrates that there exist semantic, discursive,
and emotional affinities between being over-daring and being impudent.
Tólma usually refers to daring aggression.103 In Aeschylus’s trilogy of Oresteia,
for example, tólma is first mentioned when Agamemnon is about to sacrifice Iphigeneia:
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But when [Agamemnon] had donned the yoke of Necessity, with veering of
mind, impious, unholy, unsanctified, from that moment he changed his
intention and began to conceive that deed of uttermost audacity
[pantotolmon].104

Similarly, both Sophocles and Euripides use the same term to describe Odysseus’s
blameworthiness.105 In Philoctetes, Odysseus urges Neoptolemus to contrive some evil
acts. He fully acknowledges the honest and noble nature of the son of Achilles, but
presses this young man to cajole and cheat the mind of Philoctetes nonetheless:
I know, my son, thy honest nature shrinks
From glozing words and practice of deceit;
But (for ’tis sweet to snatch a victory)
Be bold [tólma] to-day and honest afterwards.
For one brief hour of lying [anaides hémeras] follow me;
All time to come shall prove thy probity.106
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Notice that boldness is tied with impudent deeds. Boldness associated with impudence
offers confidence and power to set in motion a daring act. The juxtaposition of two
different translations of tólma also suggests that to be bold means to bear up with
difficulties to do something. The very boldness is in the service of disgraceful deeds. In
Euripides’s Hecuba, there is a scene where Odysseus let Hecuba—the Trojan queen now
enslaved by the Greeks—know the decision of her daughter Polyxena’s sacrifice and
admonishes her to “endure it [tólma tad].” This callous and unethical nature of
Odysseus’s words is confirmed by the immediately following chanting of the chorus
leader: “Alas! how cursed is slavery always in its nature, forced by the might of the
stronger to endure unseemly treatment.”107
When Plato’s Socrates characterizes “tólma and anaischuntia” as arguably the
most notable attributes of democratic citizens, this should be read in the nexus between
impudence and over-daring (or a perverted and pejorative form of courage). It is no
surprise that Plato later in his Republic critically assesses the refashioning of the meaning
of impudence in democracy: democratic people call “insolence good breeding, anarchy
freedom, extravagance magnificence, and impudence [anadeia] courage [andreia].”108
Plato would say that impudence deceives people by appearing to be other than it actually
For one brief shameless portion of a day [anaides hémeras]
give me yourself, and then for all the rest
you may be called most scrupulous of men.”
Note that Grene’s translation of anaides hémeras is more straightforward.
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is. Nonetheless, it is still true that people often equate one thing with another, calling, as
Shakespeare once put, “honorable boldnes impudent sawcinesse,” and vice versa.109
As shown above, the experience of impudence can be explicated through the
analysis of its relationship with shame on the one hand, and that with courage or daring
on the other. Impudence is a pathos that presumes a certain degree of partisanship, which
enables one to stay empowered and motivated while causing harm to his ability to feel
the proper shame before his opponents. In other words, impudence displays one’s status
brimming over with the feelings of confidence and daring, which would lead to his
shameless disregard for whom he comes into conflict with. His impudence, which is selfaggrandizing viewed from his first person perspective, can infuriate and exasperate
others. The reason that impudence can provoke others to anger is that it invites and
induces competing claims to superiority. For this, Aristotle’s Rhetoric offers an insightful
perspective.
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines aischunē as “a sort of pain and agitation
concerning the class of evils, whether present or past or future, that seem to bring a
person into disrespect,”110 which sounds not very far from the definition he makes in the
ethical works. Yet, with regard to anaischuntia, he drops one delicate hint for a richer
interpretation. He states that “[let] anaischuntia [be defined as] a belittling about these
same things.”111 Belittling here is oligōria, which is an action whose emotional
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manifestation cannot be reduced to the lack of the pain concerning disrespect. It can be
substantiated and instantiated in a range of different ways, but it comes with a perception
of one’s own dominance and superiority vis-à-vis one’s perceived inferior. Aristotle,
elsewhere in the same treatise, explains what he means by belittling more in details.
According to him, belittling is “an actualization of opinion about what seems worthless.”
It includes apathetic indifference to “whatever amounts to little or nothing,” but it also
carries with it a more active gesture of disregard and denigration. Aristotle highlights that
“there are three species of belittling: contempt [kataphronēsis], spite [epēreasmos], and
insult [hybris].”112
It is worth noting that belittling—contempt, spite, and insult—is a relational term
that presumes an asymmetric, hierarchical, or partisan human relationship. It requires a
concrete opposite party toward whom one embodies the pathos of superiority. What the
impudent person is said to belittle is not just the feelings of shame or fear of disrepute. It
also bespeaks the particular way in which he belittles his audience, conceiving of his
place as superior to them. The audience has to be regarded as worthless. It does not
necessarily mean that the impudent person has genuinely and indisputably firm grounds
for establishing his superiority over the given audience. The point is that his acts can be
seen as if he thinks he were superior to them. In other words, his impudence is
emblematic of a superior outlook, and can be construed as a way that he feeds off his
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self-assurance and self-importance. In belittling his perceived inferior, he can exult in the
asserted sense of superiority.
Reading Aristotle’s account of anaischuntia in conjunction with other related
concepts such as aischunē, andreia, tólma, and oligōria, we can now better understand
what is experienced when people become impudent. First, impudence is a form of
expressing a sense of superiority or a kind of self-assertion rising from an excess of
energy. Impudence can be motivational as it is empowering and inspiring. The lure of
impudence stems from this self-magnifying and enlivening character, which could
explain why people are inclined and vulnerable to impudence. Second, insofar as
impudence is indicative of the desire to belittle the opinion of another—and thereby
bringing down that person in general—it tends to provoke the anger of the other party. It
is displeasing to behold and deal with such impudence since the asserted superiority of
the impudent may be seen as a threat to the opposite party. These two points—impudence
is conducive to self-aggrandizement and it makes incursions into the tranquility of the
other party—are different aspects of the same phenomenon.
Two literary examples should suffice to illustrate this point. The first example
comes from the work of Shakespeare, where we can find one of the notable earliest
registers of the English word impudence. The passage below is from his well-known play
entitled All’s well that ends well [1623], which affirms the cheering connotations of
impudence while stressing the backdrop of a hierarchical relationship:
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KING
Art thou so confident? Within what space
Hop’st thou my cure?
HELEN
The greatest grace lending grace,
Ere twice the horses of the sun shall bring
Their fiery torcher his diurnal ring,
Ere twice in murk and occidental damp
Moist Hesperus hath quenched her sleepy lamp,
Or four and twenty times the pilot’s glass
Hath told the thievish minutes how they pass,
What is infirm, from your sound parts shall fly,
Health shall live free, and sickness freely die.
KING
Upon thy certainty and confidence,
What dar’st thou venture?
HELEN
Tax of impudence,
A strumpet’s boldness, a divulged shame
Traduced by odious ballads; my maiden’s name
62

Seared otherwise—nay, worse of worst, extended
With vilest torture, let my life be ended.113

This is the scene where Helen, the daughter of an acclaimed doctor, attempts to
persuade the ailing King of France to accept an offer of her treatment. Originally
pessimistic, the King is eventually convinced by Helen’s confidence. The relationship
between Helen and the King presumes an overtly and objectively asymmetrical hierarchy
in which she is naturally given a modest estimate of her own worth and expected to
submit herself to the power of her superior. Helen’s posture of confidence, which may
imply her potential non-compliance or resistance, appears to be impudent only against
her assigned lowliness and submissiveness. When she asserts her eagerness at the risk of
her life, we can see her impudence in action, parading as a curious amalgam of base
shamelessness and cheerful boldness. This distinctive semantics of impudence helps us
elaborate the meaning of Helen’s transgression of the expected boundaries drawn for
restricting her from going beyond the confines of the assigned submissive role. For
Helen, impudence and active agency seem inseparable.
The second example is from an English translation of Homer’s Iliad, which was
completed about half a century after the publication of All’s well that ends well. The
translator was the octogenarian Thomas Hobbes who deliberately chose the word
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impudence for anaideia—a Greek term that is the private of aidos [shame].114 The very
first pages of Iliad presents Achilles rising against Agamemnon, accusing him of
prioritizing his greed over any other matter including the task of safeguarding his own
soldiers. The reason that soldiers are dying of plague, according to the seer, is that “the
god’s enraged because Agamemnon spurned his priest [Chryses], he refused to free his
daughter, he refused the ransom.” Agamemnon—though he would later grudgingly agree
to give “the young girl Chryseis” back to her family—seems to be concerned mostly
about his own prize: “my prize is snatched away!”115 Here comes Achilles snarling at
Agamemnon rendered in the Hobbes edition:

O impudence! Achilles then replied,
What other of th’ Achaeans willingly,
Will, when you only for yourself provide,
Go where you bid, or fight with th’ enemy?116

Elaine Scarry drew special attention to this particular passage by juxtaposing the
Hobbes’s translation cited above with that of Robert Fagle’s which is more modern,
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popular, and literary. Her point is to stress Hobbes’s careful choice of impudence over
shamelessness.117 Whereas shamelessness—the word selected by Fagle—“designates a
state of moral deficit that could occur at any level of the political hierarchy, from its
lowest rung to, as here, its highest[,]” claims Scarry, impudence “is an allegation that is
normally reserved for a subordinate, for one with less majesty and status than the person
making the accusation.” Hobbes’s rendition, therefore, means to capture the tension
between Achilles and Agamemnon: “Hobbes, in choosing to use the word impudence to
describe King Agamemnon, has conspired with Achilles to reverse the normal
understanding of power lines.”118
Scarry’s perspicacity in highlighting the political hierarchy within which the
emotion and practice of impudence can make sense notwithstanding, her simple
characterization of Achilles as Agamemnon’s inferior can be misleading. Clearly,
Agamemnon is the king and commander. Yet it is also true that Agamemnon, as George
Kennedy once briefly pointed out, is rather “Achilles’s inferior in fighting, in fame, and
in birth.”119 That Agamemnon is under the accusation of being impudent, pace Scarry,
does not necessarily mark the subversion of the entire hierarchical structure. What
appears to be unequivocal instead is that Achilles is being provoked by the perceived
impudence of Agamemnon. Achilles understands that he has been treated as insignificant
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and unworthy and vents out his anger as a legitimate response. By making the very
castigation of Agamemnon for his impudence, Achilles holds him in contempt,
challenging his alleged superiority. In turn, this would invite Agamemnon’s disdain for
his opponent, giving rise to a vicious spiral of impudence.
The lesson I draw from the examples of Helen and Achilles is not that impudence
is “the vice of the saucy underling who doesn’t offer an appropriately studied
deference.”120 The point is that impudence is the mark of competing claims to superiority,
which buttresses or undercuts the alleged background hierarchy. In democracy, those
claims to putative superiority become more tentative, wrangled, and subtler. Although
democratic citizens normally discredit any monolithic and permanent status hierarchy,
they still understand their political views and those of their opponents in terms of high
and low, or of noble and despicable. Assuming their own superior status, in other words,
citizens do not have to abandon the precept of democratic equality entirely. Formal
equality recedes into the background—but not into complete oblivion. Citizens can treat
their opponent as an inferior while giving a perfunctory nod to democratic equality.
Equality is coupled with, and adumbrated by, the consciousness of the pleasing sense of
superiority. This reassuring sense of superiority manifested in the comportment of
democratic impudence is provocative and belittling. It is no surprise that Aristotle
understands that the elevation of impudence—contempt and insult, among other things—
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can cause serious faction [stasis] and disturbances in politics.121

MAGNANIMITY AS A HOMEOPATHIC REMEDY
Drawing heavily on Aristotle, among others, this chapter has shown thus far that although
impudence may seem to deserve absolute rejection as a classic example of baseness, it is
in fact an ambivalent pathos, which has both positive and negative valences. My reading
of Aristotle has suggested that like courage [andreia], impudence provides over-daring
confidence. The association of impudence and belittling [oligōria] has helped us
understand how competing claims to superiority can invoke, assert, or disturb a certain
hierarchy, provoking each other to anger and heightening mutual tension and aggression.
Notwithstanding that impudence may escalate mutual contempt and hostility,
simply denouncing the politics of impudence and insisting on bringing more shame,
deference, or decorum into the sphere of democratic politics might not be the best
solution. For democratic citizens do not seem to dispense with impudence without
seriously undermining its motivational power. Further, according to Aristotle, impudence
is a problem of vice or akrasia.122 It means that even if we can experience the moment of
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recognition or self-criticism and become much more uncomfortable with our own
impudent behavior, that does not necessarily prevent us from knowingly acting in the
similar way. If it is hard to force us to feel a pang of shame at displaying the
comportment of impudence in a particularly heated condition of democratic politics and
is even harder to make us bring to an end the politics of impudence, we should perhaps
develop a different strategy—a strategy that is rather homeopathic than allopathic. By
that I mean that the problem of impudence can be mitigated and well managed by
steering the superiority-promoting power—or dunamis, to use Aristotle’s own term123—
so that we can re-channel and re-direct the sense of superiority to better ends.
Recall that in Rhetoric, Aristotle enumerates three actions related to the
demonstration of anaischuntia, each of which presumes more explicitly the need for
asserting one’s sense of dominance and superiority: contempt, spite, and insult. All of
these will likely lead us to wrongdoings. An impudent or shameless person is one of the
classic examples of wrongdoers:

urination and defecation. Second, not only did Aristotle not have a robust conception
of “will” in the way we moderns do, placing exclusive focus on will can also be wrong.
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Let wrongdoing [to adikein] be [defined as] doing harm willingly
in contravention of the law. Law is either specific [idion] or
common [koinon]. I call specific the written law under which
people live in a polis and common whatever, though unwritten,
seems to be agreed to among all. … Now everything they do
willingly they do not do by deliberate choice [prohairesis], but
whatever they do by deliberate choice they do knowingly[.] …
Vice [kakia] and weakness [akrasia] are the reasons why people
make the choice of harming and doing bad things contrary to law;
for if certain people have one or more depravity, it is in relation to
this that they are in fact depraved and are wrongdoers; for
example, one is ungenerous with money, another is indulgent in
pleasures of the body, … another shameless through contempt
[oligōria] for public opinion[.]124
Impudence can be seen as an unpleasant threat to others. Why do we—those who are as
yet not virtuous enough—keep giving in to the pathos of impudence, then?
The answer given by Aristotle is vice and akrasia. In order to fully understand his
answer, we need to attend to his discussion of the human soul. Aristotle assumes that the
human soul consists of two distinct parts—one part is for reason [logon ekon] and the
other for the non-rational [alogon]. He then makes subdistinctions for each part. The nonrational part of the soul is divided into the merely vegetative section, which is “the cause
of nutrition and growth.” The other subdivision of the non-rational part of the soul
consists in “appetites [epithumia] and desire in general.” And this is the realm where nonrational desire “conflicts with and resists [reason].”
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The rational part of the soul is twofold as well: “one that has reason to the full
extent by having it within itself, and another [that has it] by listening to reason as to a
father.” The former is purely intellectual and the latter concerns human character. It is
worth noting that Aristotle states that the appetite element of the non-rational part of the
soul “does seem to partake in reason” insofar as it “both listens to reason and obeys it.”125
We might suggest, therefore, that his dual model could be seen as a kind of a tripartite
classification of the human soul with a middle domain that can encompass the second
subdivisions of each realm.
In fact, both vice and akrasia present a puzzle. The vicious person must be guided
by reason. For he is said to act on deliberate choice [prohairesis], which makes him not
different from the virtuous person on this particular matter. Both the virtuous, the vicious,
and the continent126 act on their rational decision. Yet the vicious person, on the other
hand, cannot be guided by reason precisely because he does not live in accordance with
reason. In this respect, he must be dominated by the non-rational part of his soul. What
that means, therefore, is that the vicious person is governed in part by the rational part
while at once being governed by the non-rational part. He decides to act viciously based
on his deliberate choice. His rational part of the soul is severely affected in such a way
that his decision serves to satisfy his non-rational desires.
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The akratic person acts on his non-rational desire, not on his deliberate choice.127
So it seems more simple to point out that he is controlled by the non-rational part of the
soul. For this person to be akratic, however, the rational part of his soul must not cease to
function because akrasia presupposes and presumes the presence of knowledge. It
concerns actions that he has knowingly done against his best judgment.128 Socrates would
not agree with this argument. For him, it is absurd to suppose that a wise man ever acts
against his best judgment.129 Those who are called akratic are simply ignorant, argues
Socrates.130 Yet, what appears to be true at the level of appearances [phainomena] is that
the akratic person “knows what he does is bad, but does it because of what affects
[pathos] him[.]”131 The main task before Aristotle was to reconcile the dispute between
the Socratic insight—that akrasia is an illusion—and the common beliefs [endoxon]—
that even some intelligent person [phronimos] often seems to be akratic. Aristotle retains
the interpretive space for akrasia by suggesting two conceptual divides: the division of
the universal and the particular and that of actuality [energeia] and potentiality
[dunamis]. He argues that it is possible that the akratic person has “knowledge of the
universal but not that of the particular,”132 and that he has knowledge while not attending
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to it.133
If the impudent person is akratic, what conclusion can we draw from this here?
That means the person acts on desires to disregard and disdain other people while
knowing that the very action he is taking might not be the best one. Whereas the
intemperate person, an example of the vicious person in Aristotle’s discussion, is “led on
by rational choice, believing he ought always to pursue the present pleasure,” the akratic
person “thinks the opposite[.]” The question is why he would “pursue it nevertheless.”134
The main lesson from Aristotle’s akrasia comes down to the problem of actualization.
The actualization of one potentiality would diminish the actualization of others.135 Even
if one holds a certain belief—such as that democratic citizens should to be respectful,
self-critical, and tolerant when interacting with other fellow citizens whose views and
perspectives are dissimilar and opposing to theirs—he can fall prey to impudence because
according to his perception [aisthēsis]136, the pleasure from impudence may appear to be
much more immediate. In the very enjoyment, he may anticipate that some regrets will
come. But that does not mean that he can easily stop yielding to impudence.
The Aristotelian philosophy of pathos offers a useful theoretical tool with which
we can better address the question of democratic impudence. That democratic citizens are
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susceptible to the pathos of impudence does not mean that citizens are characteristically
impudent or shameless. It does not have to be the case that citizens are a kind of person
for whom impudent conduct emanates from a certain fixed disposition. That people might
be simply akratic—not even necessarily be vicious—to be inclined to impudence means
that they are not entirely free of moral constraints. My final aim is to seek an Aristotelian
remedy to the problem of impudence, acknowledging the empowering and motivating
element of impudence and seeking out different strategies with which to keep motivation
and self-conceit alive while preventing or alleviating too much destructive aggression and
obstinacy.
Again, this remedy is homeopathic rather than allopathic in that it searches for a
way to negotiate—not to repress or reprove—the feelings of superiority. The point is that
we need to pay more sustained and explicit attention to the issue of how to address and,
to some extent, pander to the half-hidden desires for superiority. As we have seen earlier,
there seem to be the real urges within us for self-promotion or reassuring self-worth,
which are often spouted via the comportment of impudence. Rather than disregard or
suppress those haunting desires for superiority, my strategy is to find the way to harness
the pleasing and motivational power of superiority while directing that toward better
ends. For this particular purpose, I finally draw on Aristotle’s analysis of magnanimity.137
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I am indebted to Anne Norton for our conversation regarding the idea of
magnanimity. Though it was not about Aristotle nor about its relevance in terms of
taming impudence, our conversation led me to think further about the particular
moral psychology of magnanimity. Norton once claimed that magnanimity is
democracy’s peculiar virtue: “The practices of a liberalism triumphant in the
common-place points to the capacity of demoracy to exceed itself. If we look for a
democratic ethic, we should look for the ethic suited to its virtues, an ethic of excess,
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My suggestion may seem odd at first. For Aristotle, magnanimity literally means
“greatness of soul” [megalo-psychia]. He even states that magnanimity is “a sort of
adornment [kosmos] of the virtues”138—the complete virtue and excellence in the fullest
sense. The magnanimous man, the virtuous man of all, is the person who “thinks himself
worthy of great things and is really worthy of them.” Put simply, “he is the best
person.”139 Then, it looks almost absurd to turn to this greatest virtue—which would
probably remain as an unachievable goal140—in the course of searching for a realistic
remedy to the politics of impudence. There seems to be too wide a gulf between
magnanimity and impudence. Whereas the magnanimous person deserves high praises,
the impudent and shameless person is at most half-base. To demand that ordinary citizens
cultivate the virtue of magnanimity would be a bridge too far.
Furthermore, there are some ambiguities of Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in
the Nicomachean Ethics. Let alone the vexing question of whether magnanimity is
ultimately a theoretical virtue or a moral virtue141, scholars and commentators have long

an ethic that asks for more. Lack is the origin, desire the proper impulse, of
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expressed their discontents with his notion of magnanimity due in part to its tenor of
arrogance and aloofness. For instance, W. D. Ross understands that “as a whole the
picture [of the magnanimous man] is an unpleasing one.” It bespeaks “somewhat nakedly
the self-absorption which is the bad side of Aristotle’s ethics.”142 After quoting a lengthy
passage on magnanimity from the Nicomachean Ethics, Bertrand Russell comments that
“one shudders to think what a vain man would be like.”143 W. F. R. Hardie also points out
that since “nothing is great” for the magnanimous man, he gives an impression of
“looking down on human affairs[.]”144 H. H. Joachim and Angela Hobbs even suggest
that Aristotle is being humorous or flippant in his account of magnanimity while Jacob
Howland sees Aristotle’s implicit criticism of the magnanimous man.145
While acknowledging both conceptual and discursive difficulties that the study of
Aristotelian magnanimity might bring forth, I aim to propose a different reading of
Aristotle—a reading that does not center on his notion of magnanimity as the crown
virtue that is the pinnacle of Aristotelian human excellence nor on the magnanimous
man’s alleged deficiencies. Instead, my primary concern is with the pathos of
magnanimity that can serve as a backchannel to gratify the haunting desires for
Howland, “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 1
(2002), 29-31.
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superiority. Much emphasis, in other words, shall be placed on the images and emotions
that the pathos of magnanimity evokes and sets in motion. For this particular task, I
suggest that we ought to pay special attention to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where his more
earthy and modest account of magnanimity is put forward.146
One passage from the Rhetoric shows an obvious departure from Aristotle’s
general theory of magnanimity as a unitary and complete moral virtue. It is from the
section where he offers his stereotypical portrayal of young people. In general, young
people are described as impulsive and optimistic. They are “prone to desires and inclined
to do whatever they desire.” In his ethical works, Aristotle locates his discussion of the
attributes of the young within the context of feelings. For example, he underlines that
“the feeling of shame is suitable for youth” because young people “live by their feelings
[pathei], and hence often go astray[.]”147 For youth, therefore, shame seems to be a good
emotional deterrent. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle elaborates further on the subject. A few
more qualities are ascribed to this specific age group. Most notable is his explicit
reference to magnanimity.
Aristotle claims that although young people are concerned with honor, they “love
victory more[.]” For they “long for superiority and victory is a kind of superiority.” In
this context, he bluntly states that “they are magnanimous[.]”148 Anyone who is familiar
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with his definition of magnanimity found in his ethical works cannot but pause here and
ask: what can this possibly mean that those young people who are impulsive and
pleasure-loving deserve to be called magnanimous? The reason we can attribute the
magnanimous properties to those young people is that they, explains Aristotle, “think
[themselves] worthy of great things in magnanimity[.]”149 Yet nowhere in his ethical
works does he imply that the self-understanding of greatness alone can justify the name
of magnanimity. As we have discussed above, the magnanimous man is the person who
“thinks himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of them.” The person must
hold some qualities objectively discernible by others. In painting young people as
magnanimous in the Rhetoric, then, Aristotle seems to violate his own definition of
magnanimity. This tension, however, offers an important occasion for rethinking about
the concept of magnanimity.
Perhaps one would want to make Aristotle’s account of the young’s magnanimity
congruent with his earlier discussions of the very concept in the ethical works by simply
refusing to treat the young as magnanimous in the strict sense of the term. In
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle mentions those who “imitate [the magnanimous man].”
They clearly lack the virtue but still think “themselves worthy of great things,” which he
understands cannot be justified.150 Like those imitators, young people also think
“themselves worthy of great things,” and we know that Aristotle leaves the question
unanswered whether those young are truly virtuous. The answer is most likely to be
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negative, mainly because those young people are described as living by their feelings, not
guided by their virtues. Can young people be taken as imitators, then? The problem,
though, is that Aristotle seems to tolerate young people’s ungrounded claim to
magnanimity while peremptorily dismissing the self-evaluation of the imitator.
There exists one meaningful difference between the young and the imitator that
merits further attention. The imitator in his example are those who possess material
wealth, power, or other sorts of goods, and it is the fact of their ownership of such things
that would make them misread their magnanimity.151 The young described in the
Rhetoric, however, do not represent any particular economic or political classes. When he
explains that young people are magnanimous, that statement cannot be regarded as
describing any distinct characteristics attributable only to one or a few subdivisions of the
age group. Unlike those imitators, who at least have a great deal of something that
separates them from the rest of the population, young people do not necessarily have
anything that can possibly prove that they are better or higher than other groups of
people. To what extent is it plausible to call those young people magnanimous, who do
not even have anything whatsoever that makes them distinguishable clearly from others?
The incongruity between Aristotle’s account of the imitator and that of young presents a
puzzle.
Yet perhaps therein lies one Aristotelian answer. The real reason that we can call
the young magnanimous—in other words, the reason that Aristotle’s two different
accounts of magnanimity can be considered not necessarily erroneous or inconsistent—is
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that young people are potentially magnanimous. Seen this way, it is much more
convincing to say that their desires [epithumia] for superiority make them potentially
magnanimous. Read Aristotle’s explanation for the magnanimity of young people again:
And they are magnanimous; for they have not been worn down by life
but are inexperienced with constraints, and to think oneself worthy of
great things in magnanimity and this is characteristic of a person of
good hopes.152
Here, we can see that young people, by virtue of being young, are depicted as
“inexperienced” or “having not been worn down by life,” which is a sign of potentiality
revealed in the form of incompletion. Young people desire and long for superiority; and it
is worth noting that according to Aristotle, even the fully magnanimous person, who must
perfectly exercise the virtue of magnanimity to the full, still “wishes [bouletai] to be
superior.”153 That rational wish [boulēsis], which presumes the faculty of deliberation, is
the developed form of sheer desire [epithumia]. What potentiality [dunamis] is to
actuality [energeia], the desire of the young for superiority is to the rational wish of the
fully magnanimous person to be superior. In portraying the young as magnanimous,
Aristotle in all likelihood describes and attends to the phenomenon that they exhibit the
pathos of magnanimity, which is another form of the sense of superiority.
Turning to magnanimity, to be clear, I do not mean to demand that ordinary
citizens start conducting themselves with the utmost propriety and nobility. Within the
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Aristotelian understanding of human pathei, both impudence and magnanimity concern
similar species of pleasurable activities: self-aggrandizement and confidence-inspiration.
Aristotle states that “[t]he pleasures enhance the activities, and what enhances an activity
is proper to it; and what are proper to things different in species are themselves different
in species.”154 It reassures us that we can address the problem of impudence productively
by nudging people into embodying the sense of magnanimity to the extent that they are
gratifying their own urges for superiority but not in the form of contempt, disrespect, and
belittling. Rather than continue to intensify the already heated disputes fraught with
scurrilous mutual assaults, I argue that we should learn and embody an attitude of
magnanimous composure or disregard.
Like impudence, magnanimity is indicative of the sense of superiority—perhaps
in full blossom. It is enlivening, self-aggrandizing, and delightful. If democratic citizens
are magnanimous in the sense we discussed above, it means that they may still be biased,
prejudiced, self-centered, and arrogant, pointedly disregarding their opponents. Unlike
impudence, however, magnanimity does not tend to provoke the anger of the other party.
Nor does it propel its bearers to subject their opponents to insult. In magnanimity,
democratic citizens appear to be less flappable, less flammable, and less obstinate in
relation to their opponents precisely because in this case, the sense of superiority can be
confirmed and promoted not by hounding and pouncing on their confrontational
opponents, but by, at least to large extent, accepting and making light of their losses and
injuries.
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The key is this idiosyncratic composure in conjunction with the sense of
superiority, which makes it possible to strike an engaged yet detached pose with respect
to confrontational others. Imbued with the sense of magnanimity, even while dwelling on
their prowess and self-conceit, the magnanimous citizens do not initiate or promote the
downward spiral of the politics of impudence. They rather remain undamaged or at least
less affected by those who are taking a swipe at them. Magnanimity rids their mind of
immoderate anger and spite. Albeit detached, on the other hand, they would never retreat
into the state of pusillanimity. Since their longing to be superior puts them in constant
need of others as inferiors, they hardly vitiate their aspirations and willingness to engage
in others.

CONCLUSION
We began our inquiry with an acknowledgement that democratic citizens often fall prey
to impudence. Democratic impudence is at once an ontological (or existential),
epistemological (or intellectual), and psychological (or attitudinal) phenomenon, the
phenomenon that ordinary citizens often display their contempt or shameless disregard in
relation to those who hold dissimilar and opposing views and perspectives. This chapter
has suggested that such phenomenon is a sign that testifies to the existence of our urges
for superiority stirred up and stimulated in the antagonistic condition of democratic
politics. The negative consequences of the politics of impudence seem obvious. It would
heighten mutual anger, hatred, and aggression in the realm of democratic conversation
81

and engagement, which would result in the vicious spiral of a tense and vitriolic politics.
Nonetheless, instead of perpetuating the popular belief that ordinary citizens can
and should practice mutual respect in place of reciprocal impudence, we have sought a
different yet much more viable and productive strategy to honestly announce and assert
the sense of superiority while at once hedging against severe reactions to it. My proposal
appreciates and embraces the Aristotelian pathos of magnanimity—which shows an
undeniable departure from the standard Aristotelian teleological ethical project but is still
in line with his realistic political theory—that directs us to see how democratic citizens
can savor the feelings of superiority while preventing a much more worrying trend of
mutual aggression and hostility. To conclude, I shall re-emphasize the main contribution
of this chapter by way of locating its place in relation to the most notable works in recent
scholarship on democratic ethos, emotions, and attitudes.
First, Christina Tarnopolsky and others have attempted to rethink and rework the
politics of shame, focusing self-critical—instead of conformist—repercussions of
shame.155 Drawing largely on Plato’s Gorgias, Tarnopolsky sheds light on a particular
horizon opened up by shame. She warns against “the desire to banish shame from [one’s]
collective psyche and polity” as shame can lead us in two different directions: one “in the
direction of conformity and flattery” and the other in the direction of “critical reflection
and respect.” Tarnopolsky pursues the latter possibility with her formulations of “Socratic
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Another good recent example is Christopher Lebron, for whom shame is an
affective experience citizens should embrace and further cultivate as it prompts them
to self-critical reflection of potentially controversial matters such as racial injustice
and inequality. See Christopher J. Lebron, The Color of Shame: Race and Justice in
Our Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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respectful shame” and “Platonic respectful shame” as opposed to “flattering shame.”156
Granted Tarnopolsky’s close reading of Gorgias, it is hard to be sanguine about
transformative possibilities opened up by the politics of shame in terms of precipitating a
more open, reflective, yet engaged democratic politics. As I have argued above, people
may be immune to shame in the face of stark opposition, and even if they do experience a
moment of awakening that shame is said to offer, that does not necessarily mean that they
will ultimately succeed in putting their self-reflection, self-criticism, and moral and
political deliberation into effect.157 Instead, as long as they choose to stay active and
engaging in democratic conversations rife with sharp antagonism and deep
disagreements, they are prone to reassure themselves by promoting self-importance (or
group-importance) in the trappings of impudence. In fact, pace Tarnopolsky, the
dialogues between Socrates and Callicles staged in Gorgias can be read differently.
Callicles in the end refuses to discuss with Socrates anymore, snarling at the philosopher
that he “couldn’t care less about anything [Socrates says].”158 The increased emotional
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See the following remarks by Callicles and Socrates, respectively. Callicles: “This
man [Socrates] will not stop talking nonsense! Tell me, Socrates, aren’t you
ashamed, at your age, of trying to catch people’s words and of making hay out of
someone’s tripping on a phrase?”; Socrates: “This fellow [Callicless] won’t put up
with being benefited and with his undergoing the very thing the discussion’s about,
with being disciplined.” Plato, Gorgias, 489b and 505c.
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Gorgias, 505c. Callicles dismisses Socrates’s request to continue their
conversation: “Couldn’t you go through the discussion by yourself, either by
speaking in your own person or by answering your own question?” Gorgias, 505d.
The dialogues between Socrates and Callicles boils down to the question about the
way people are supposed to live. Socrates advocates the life spent in philosophy
while Callicles the life engaging in manly activities (speeches, oratory, and other
activities in politics). Is Callicles ashamed of pursuing his way of life one-sidedly and
narrow-mindedly? It’s not clear. Nor is clear either that he would become much more
self-critical and deliberative had he experienced the moment of shame. Jeffrey Green
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burdens and psychological costs may have made Callicles (and can likewise make
ordinary democratic citizens in real life) withdraw from the heated engagement in fear of
causing or receiving offenses.
Other scholars take a rather critical position on the trend in restoring shame as a
democratic virtue. Most notable is Jill Locke’s recent work on “unashamed citizenship.”
Locke aims to free democratic subjects of guilty feeling about shamelessness or
incivility. Whereas scholars writing on shame and civility explore the positive effects that
such emotional and attitudinal restraints put on democratic engagement,159 Locke is more
prone to raise the concerns of the negative effects of shame as a restraint against “the
ideal of self-representation, self-fashioning, or a healthy democratic skepticism toward
tradition and custom or hierarchy[.]”160 For Locke, democratic life would benefit not so
much from valuing shame as from invigorating shamelessness precisely because shame
as “an anchoring sensibility” tends to “discipline particular subjects in their personal,
social, public embodiments,” while making them “weaker, more timid, less confident[.]”
In other words, shame enforces a common set of values that contains “social disturbance
that meaningful democratic ideal of equality and self-fashioning necessarily bring
about.”161 Likewise, calling for civility also serves to protect the norms and interests of
those who feed on the existing social hierarchies. Instead, Locke’s call for “unashamed
points out the immunity of Socrates to shame and the challenge offered to him by
Callicles. See Green, “The Shame of Being a Philosopher: Critical Response to
Tarnopolsky,” Political Theory, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2005).
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citizenship” reclaims and embraces the somewhat shameless self-worth and pride of the
oppressed as a genuine ethos of democracy.162
My attention to the empowering element of impudence may resonate with
Locke’s study of “unashamed citizenship” precisely in that her study attempts to rescue
democratic shamelessness (or impudence, in my diction) from too simplistic and
moralistic condemnation while appreciating the empowering element of it. Yet, unlike
Locke, I do not tend to oversimplify the lived experience of ordinary democratic citizens
into a particular type of democratic politics defined as disruptive resistance to the status
quo of hierarchical domination. Critical for Locke are her bifurcated and vertical
understanding of social identities between the privileged and the disadvantaged as well as
her careful ascription of the attribute of shamelessness exclusively to the latter. In so
doing, Locke re-appropriates the pejorative—shameless or unashamed people—for the
radical position she intends to defend.163 Albeit sympathetic with her reconstruction of
shamelessness as a strategy suitable for a particular type of transformative politics,
especially when we have witnessed enduring structural domination—for instance, “white
supremacy, empire, heteronormativity, capital, and misogyny,” as Locke enumerates164—
I contend that the full richness and complexity of the lived experience of ordinary citizens
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cannot be squared perfectly with the simple opposition of the hierarchical domination and
the aspiration toward its subversion. Shamelessness, in particular, is not merely that
which underlings alone are accused of and they could or should flaunt in turn. Nor can
we boost it without reservation worryingy lest we be trapped in a downward spiral of
disregard and aggression.
On the question of impudence, I have instead attempted to offer a different theory
that understands democratic citizens primarily as a participant in and a sufferer of
competing presumptuous claims to superiority in the face of deep-seated differences and
disagreements. My focus is more on this mundane conversational situation where citizens
are encouraged to display impudent attitudes, regardless of their overall personal traits.
Some may be thought to be a person of a placid disposition while another is much more
temperamental and pugnacious. Some might be intellectually more sophisticated than
others. But the point is that democracy offers plenty of occasions in which ordinary
citizens hardly exercise a sufficient level of self-criticism, civility, and tolerance,
especially vis-à-vis those who they are wont to disagree, and instead tend to shamelessly
disdain, despise, or detest them—even when they acknowledge that what they are doing
can be in part disgraceful. Then, it behooves us to think about how to induce and keep
alive ordinary citizens’ active participation and at once to prevent too virulent and
embittering a politics without having recourse to the unrealistic and ineffectual normative
calls to mutual respect and decorum.
In her recent seminal work, Teresa Bejan painstakingly secures the conceptual
and moral space for what she calls “mere civility,” the gist of which is “its ability to
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coexist with and even communicate our contempt for others’ most fundamental
commitments while continuing the conversation.”165 Bejan understands that calls for
civility can often function as a subtly aimed twofold political message that is intended
either for silencing, instead of facilitating, public disagreement for the sake of security
and diversity (Hobbes’s civil silence model) or for facilitating public debate only among
those who are ready to appreciate the views of their opponents (Locke’s civil charity
model). In celebrating the ethic of civility, in other words, what we often do is to keep
our differences private in fear of causing a series of stridently antagonizing
disagreements, or to “[congratulate] ourselves on our open minds and sound views, while
conversing exclusively with those who already agree with us.”166
Bejan endorses neither. Nor does she abandon the ethic of civility entirely.
Instead, she thoroughly defends civility of a peculiar kind: “mere civility” based on the
model of Roger Williams. Williams, the founder of the famously inclusive colony of
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, was a religious radical who openly loathed and
condemned those whose religious views are dissimilar from his, which included many
protestant sects, American Indian pagans, Jews, Muslims, and Catholics. Yet he at once
tolerated those groups, bringing them to the conversation. What demands more than
anything of democratic citizens with respect to the question of civility, according to
Bejan’s Williams-inspired theory of “mere civility,” is not to keep quiet (pace Hobbes)
nor to muster enough respect for our opponents (pace Locke), but simply to refuse to stop
165
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the conversation with others from continuing. For that, she calls for “the mental
toughness necessary to manage and mind the gap between what we would have others
think—of us, and in general—and what they actually do.” It is the toughness, “requiring
[us] to cultivate, among other things, insensitivity to others’ opinions[.]”167
I am deeply sympathetic with the Bejan’s project carefully attending to the
problem of coexistence with confrontational others. Her main interests seem to overlap
mine in terms of holding a realistic expectation that each democratic citizen cannot
overcome his or her own partiality, and that democratic politics will always be rife with
mutual disrespect, contempt, and hostility unless we proactively and prophylactically
choose to extirpate the seed of real disagreements. What seems to be missing, or at least
what remains underappreciated, in her work, however, is the question of what it means
for ordinary citizens to be confident in front of others while being not overbearing to
silence or provoke their disputants. My reappraisal of Aristotelian pathos of magnanimity
calls more honest and careful attention to the sense of superiority in order to better
address this very question.
Again, it is of utmost importance not to confuse or conflate my aim to cherish the
sense of magnanimity in one’s mind with a much more aspirational pursuit of the
idealistic virtue of “civic magnanimity” or “civic friendship,” which demands—often
seasoned with Thomist or liberal deliberative spices168—liberality, politeness, a sense of
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equality, and humility. I have argued that those ideals are too high in nature to be relied
upon for actual political communities so that we need to arrange for a lesser goal.
Idealistic virtue can be easily felt as a burden to ordinary citizens, which would forestall
rather than facilitate their active participation.169
My goal has been to seek a realistic solution. First, it is important to nourish the
sense of superiority among democratic citizens so that they can stay motivated and
inspirited to entering the realm of antagonistic democratic politics. Second, what we can
realistically hope for is to cultivate a decent assurance, which is the natural attendant of
magnanimity distinguishable markedly from a more incendiary type of self-confidence
shown in the comportment of impudence. My account of the pathos of magnanimity does
not guarantee nor aspire to the situation in which ordinary citizens could celebrate
differences without reservation and condemn disrespect outright. Instead, the sense of
magnanimity, or a particular affective and moral-psychological condition it helps create,
allows citizens—while aiming at showing their own superiority—to deal with daily
conflicts and antagonism without forfeiting their composure. For the significance of
superiority for the magnanimous persons lies in their tendency to making light of the
on Political Science, Vol. 37 No. 4 (2008). For the liberal deliberative re-appropriation
of the virtue of magnanimity, see Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative
Democracy, 82-87, 186-187. One example of this highest virtue given by Gutmann
and Thompson is Nelson Mandela whose benevolence is indicative of his willingness
to accept the perpetrators of injustices in the spirit of reconciliation. More modest
version of civic magnanimity is described as “a commitment to seek a common
perspective at a deeper level of morality” or that to seek “the rationale that
minimizes rejection of the position [one opposes].”
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difficult situation by shrugging off those accusations and attacks coming from their
opponents. This equanimity can suspend the seemingly inexorable spiral of impudence
that would otherwise intensify and aggravate mutual anger and hostility.
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CHAPTER 3: The Symbolic

The Sublime People:
A Kantian Aesthetics of Citizen-Sovereign

I know of nothing sublime which is not some modification of power.
Edmund Burke

I never said that the vox populi was of course the vox Dei. It may be;
but it may be, and with equal probability, a priori, vox Diaboli.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge

True sublimity must be sought only in the mind
of the one who judges, not in the object in nature.
Immanuel Kant
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The concept of the people, however often misunderstood or traduced, is arguably the
most important notion in contemporary democratic theory and practice. All that we have
observed about democratic regime and culture—popular sovereignty, participation,
representation, popular movement, or democratic equality—presuppose the framework of
the democratic people.
Turning to the second mode of democratic frustration, this chapter focuses on the
symbolic dimension of democratic politics in which individual democratic citizens find
themselves as a citizen-sovereign, participating in “the continuing self-fashioning of the
demos.”170 To call this dimension of democracy symbolic, I aim to emphasize the
centrality of the people and popular sovereignty in democratic imaginations; arguably,
the people are the most authoritative idea, sign, and event of democracy. Due to the
indefinite nature of the people, individual democratic citizens display what might be
called a symbolic mind, a mind that is open and accustomed to references to the people
that often remain allusive, allegorical, and rhetorical.
The term symbolic also intimates that my analysis engages in part with the
conception of the symbolic order and its relation to the real, à la Lacan,171 in the sense
that there is the dimension of democracy centering on the languages of the people that
shapes the ways in which individual democratic citizens perceive and perform their
170
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subjectivity and agency, even while ‘the people’ itself remain indeterminate and
inaccessible. In other words, the order of the people influences the vicissitudes of
citizens’ democratic life, leaving them in a lurch between distinct sensibilities, attitudes,
and imaginations.
This chapter begins with two observations. First, although ‘the people’ is an
everyday term in democracy, it is easily obscured as soon as we start to speculate. For the
people never appear in any immediate form. There can only be a claim of the people, as
Jason Frank has aptly pointed out,172 but no claim is tantamount to the people themselves.
Its indefinite nature warrants a series of acts of representation in many forms: symbols,
statements, movements, or stories as well as political representation. The necessity of
representation implicated in the idea of the people or popular sovereignty seems to be at
war with the unrepresentable nature of the people, thereby placing individual democratic
citizens in permanent tensions with the people. These tensions can be characterized by
the tense dynamic of the need of individual citizens to invite and invoke the people at the
risk of betrayal and suppression by the despair emanating from the inescapably
incomplete and possibly false representation. This is a particular condition of frustration
in which citizen-sovereign are situated.
Second, there exist two predominating understandings of the people in
contemporary democratic theory and practice: namely, a reductionist paradigm and its
aspirational counterpart. These leading paradigms show, respectively, particular images
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of, attitudes toward, and assumptions about the democratic people. Whereas the former
has reduced the meaning of the people to a minimum, the latter has proclaimed the
transformative role of the popular power. One regards the people as an abstraction,
thereby liquidating the unnecessary illusion around its register, the other celebrates its
radical and rejuvenating effect. What we have been witnessing is the simultaneous
presence of the reductionist obduracy and the aspirational call for oppositional popular
politics that valorizes the manifestation of the people. Most extreme versions of each
paradigm would be commonly understood as minimalism and populism, respectively. I
take both to be more an impulse than an ideology.173 Certainly, not every democratic
theorist or citizen would readily endorse either minimalism or populism. Yet they
nonetheless adopt one of the two paradigms easily without going too extreme in either
direction.
It is important to remember that both paradigms often aim to neutralize the
productive meaning of the critical distance between individual citizens and the people.
The reductionist paradigm attempts to internalize the distance by dislocating the people in
the realm of abstraction while the aspirational paradigm tends to erase the distance by
prompting individual citizens to immerse themselves in the movement of the people.
Both reductionist and aspirational paradigms rightly recognize the uniquely supreme
power of the people. What each paradigm emphasizes, however, differs drastically. The
former puts individual citizens in awe of the abstract people, instilling a sense of
trembling fear of any unsettling popular forces of the claimed majorities. The latter is
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rather driven by, and riding on, a sort of empathetic delight and restlessness stemming
from the valorization of the popular energy of ordinary people, while promoting a sense
of self-righteousness. Each model shows its own affective foundation of what it thinks
should be the mission of democratic politics.
The problem of the reductionist paradigm, as will be discussed to the full below,
lies in its too much inhibition, or a preemptive aggression, on the radical potential of the
people, which withholds individual democratic citizens from exercising their power as
citizen-sovereign to participate in “the continuing self-fashioning of the demos,” to
reiterate the phrase by Sheldon Wolin quoted above. The aspirational paradigm
stimulates individual citizens to work on the “self-fashioning of the demos,” but lacks a
heightened awareness of the tensions between individual democratic citizens and the
people and of the significance of the critical distance between them, which in fact is the
key to a critical, ongoing, and regenerating process of the “self-fashioning of the demos.”
What I seek to offer in the following pages is a particular type of aesthetic174—
both reflective and affective—appreciation of the democratic people as an alternative to
the two leading paradigms. Drawing heavily on Kant, among others, I argue that the
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As I will argue in what follows, I suggest an aesthetic reading of the democratic
people as opposed both to the rational reduction of the people to a minimum and to
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people can be seen as an object of sublime, and that the sublime people allows us to
attend to the vexing yet dynamic—communicative, processual, and dialectic—
relationship between individual democratic citizens and the people, and, therefore, better
understand what it means to be citizen-sovereign. Put differently, the sublime people
provides individual democratic citizens with some space in which they embrace
frustration while harnessing the accommodating power of frustration to further generate
and guide democratic aspirations. By highlighting the importance of the interplay
between individual citizens and the people, I also demonstrate that the sovereign power
of the citizen-sovereign should be exercised not by impetuously giving a sovereign
outlook to the claimed people, but by keeping possibilities of the continuous regeneration
of the people.175

BEYOND THE REDUCTIONIST AND ASPIRATIONAL PARADIGMS
Democracy “is nurtured by illusion,” writes Robert Wokler. He emphasizes that the
unfulfilled promise of democracy is “mysteriously compelling,” which is “deemed both
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unattainable in theory and at the same time inescapable in practice.”176 Wokler’s
observation is astute. For democracy to be accurately and realistically understood, we
ought to pay special attention not only to the unattainable nature of democracy, but also
to its inescapably enduring appeal.177
Among those seemingly unattainable yet inescapably appealing democratic
promises does outstand its most fundamental principle that the people—and no others—
rule. Democracy simply means that “the people hold power and exercise rule.”178 This
promise, however, is what democracy may not be able to fully deliver in part because it
has never been entirely clear who the people are and what it means for them to rule. We
need a legitimate collective body to establish fair and equal terms of a democratic rule.
But they could only be legitimate through the system yet to be created. It is “a paradox of
politics,”179 often discussed under the rubric of “boundary problem.”180 The problem has
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attracted a number of philosophers to examine who comprises the people—or, in other
words, who is included, and perhaps more importantly, who is excluded181—but the
analytical and normative issues with respect to the boundary of the people are not my
main focus. Nor is my primary concern with endorsing any of the commonly suggested
methods of a democratic rule or ranking them—statist, pluralist, deliberative,
participatory, plebiscitary, direct, to name a few.182
Instead, I bring into focus that ordinary democratic citizens more or less
understand and enact popular sovereignty, and that the people are the central source of
democratic imaginations and a range of widely varying practices in democracy.
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Individual citizens involve the politics of the people—both positively and negatively.
They are confronted with the people both as an idea or a matter, in text or on street, and
at a certain juncture or over time. In so doing, they perform their democratic agency.
Their affective relationship with the people is presupposed in one way or another by their
intentionally directed action or inaction. Their customary languages of the people are
structured deeply in affective fashion, which would be exemplified by the two most
widely shared explanations for the meaning of the people.183
First, there is a penchant for imagining the people as an abstraction, profoundly
exemplified by what I call a reductionist paradigm.184 The people at large in democracy
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are thought to be the sovereign power, but that term is usually qualified by an impetus to
restrict the extent of this sovereignty; the people are generally held to be the constituent
sovereign, not the governmental one.185 Democracy, updated in modern terms, takes a
form of representation. In other words, modern democracy enacts democratic rule via
representation at the price of reducing and abstracting the people to the mere justification
of power. The people are, thus, “the ultimate source of political authority,” but not its
“wielder.”186
The notion of the people, imagined as the constituent power, plays a double role.
It first gives the perception of unity, and, second, a new modern outlook with which to
escape blame for ordinary people according to which democracy was long condemned as
the most unstable, vulgar, and potentially tyrannical form of rule. By making the
democratic people recede behind the manifold ways in which representation is
accomplished, in other words, the reductionist model successfully inhibits or places strict
controls on ordinary people as popular political energy. Put differently, those
reductionists have established the symbolic order of the people as an abstract foundation
in fear of—or with disgust at—ordinary people who they believe can be the host of
endemic democratic diseases.187
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Second, since antiquity, there is a lasting tradition that conceives of the people as
non-elites or commoners. I call this perspective, distinguished from the first one, an
aspirational paradigm.188 From this point of view, the greatness of democracy lies in its

have knowledge, who have neither learnt nor for themselves seen what is best, but
ever rush headlong and drive blindly onward, like a river in spate?” Histories, Book
III, in The Loeb Classical Library: Herodotus II (London: William Heinemann, 1928),
107. Similarly, Plato singled out license [exousia] as one of the outstanding
characteristics of democracy. Plato, Republic, 557b. Isocrates also regards it
lamentable that democratic citizens enjoy the sense of entitlement to do whatever
they please, listing, among others, saying everything [parrhesia], license [akolasia],
and lawlessness [paranomia] as central features of democracy. Aeropagiticus, in The
Loeb Classical Library: Isocrates II (London: William Heinemann, 1929). Modern
political thinkers such as James Madison and Baron d’Holbach often accused
democracy of its inherent propensity to chaos, tyranny, or anarchy, which should be
tempered and prevented in advance. See James Madison, “Paper No. 10” in Terrence
Ball ed., Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay: The Federalist with
Letters of “Brutus” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Likewise, John
Adams in his letter to John Taylor once put conventional wisdom commonly shared
among his contemporaries: “Remember Democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes
exhausts and murders itself.” John Adams, “Letter to John Taylor, December 17,
1814” in George W. Carey ed., The Political Writings of John Adams (Washington,
D.C.: Regnery, 2000), 406. Even when “the undoubted advance of democratic
political forms” took place in the mid and late 19th century, as Albert Hirschman once
put, there existed “a diffuse mood of skepticism and hostility” against the people.
See Albert Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, and Jeopardy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 19-27. See also Jason Frank,
“Democracy and Disgust,” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists, Vol.
5, No. 2 (2017) and Rebekah Sterling, “Irregular Motions: Democracy and the Mob”
[Unpublished; Presented at the annual meeting of the WPSA in April, 2014].
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The term ‘aspirational’ is from Melvin Rogers, “The People, Rhetoric, and Affect:
On the Political Force of Du Bois’s The Soul of Black Folk,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 1 (2012). The aspirational camp includes populist democrats
and radical democrats. The former group tends to emphasize the centripetal power
of the people via—usually, although not always—a single charismatic leader, and
thus is supportive of a strong presidency that transcends and unifies divided factional
interests and political wills. The people as a unified entity may well be identified with
this leader rather than to be mediated or reflected upon by him or her. See Ernesto
Laclau, On Populist Reason (New York: Verso, 2007), Benjamin Arditi, Politics on the
Edges of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2007). See also Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured:
Opinion, Truth, and the People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), chapter
3. Notice that Michael Kazin, an American historian of populism, places emphasis on
the positive aspect of populist politics by focusing more on the power from below.
See Kazin, The Populist Persuasion. The latter group, on the other hand, is generally
critical of the populist strategy and instead accentuates the transformative power of
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proposal of an egalitarian polity that would dismantle—if not eliminate—the hierarchical
rule of epistemic, political, and economic superiors over ordinary people. It ought to be
ordinary citizens and not extra-ordinary elites who should rule. In fact, representative
democracy or formal democracy can be seen at best as an unsavory compromise and at
worst as an oxymoron.189 For all the usual trappings of representative democracy—
routinized horse-trading among elites, dominant cultures that shape citizens as passive
recipients rather than active participants in politics, or sheer busyness of every day
created by the division of labor between professional politicians and ordinary citizens—
insulate ordinary citizens from democracy’s real and transformative possibilities.190
Democracy, therefore, cannot function within the frame of representative democracy, at
least not without serious impoverishment, as long as it keeps obstructing the exertion of

the people by pointing to either the spontaneously emerging ensemble of acting
multitude, marginalized ordinary people, or those who have no part. See Michael
Hart and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New
York: Penguin, 2004), Sheldon Wolin, “Democracy: Electoral and Athenian,” PS:
Political Science and Politics, 1993, and Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,”
Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (New York: Continuum, 2010).
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Representation,” Constellations, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2006), 298.
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For the theoretical analysis of how most advanced representative democracies
have become more oligarchic than democratic, which invites radical reconsideration
of the ideas and institutions of democracy, see John McCormick, The Machiavellian
Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Jeffrey Green,
“Liberalism and the Problem of Plutocracy,” Constellations, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2016), K.
Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017). Among important empirical studies in the context of American democracy
that could be paired with those normative works above mentioned include Larry
Bartels, Unequal Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) and
Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress and a Plan to Stop It
(New York: Twelve, 2012). For an analysis in the field of economics, see also Thomas
Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2014), where he documents the rising inequality originating from capital’s natural
tendency to replicate much greater than overall economy.
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popular political energy.
The proponents of this aspirational paradigm envision the image of the people as
the true bearer of radical potential of democracy. Accordingly, democracy itself has to be
redefined. A more real democracy comes to exist as disruption when the people long
dismissed, marginalized, and suffocated by the powerful elites appear to challenge the
existing hierarchical political order.191 What the people so understood symbolizes is a
popular anger against the allegedly inegalitarian order and those who safeguard and are
safeguarded by the very order.
These two mutually conflicting paradigms have been dominating in contemporary
democratic theories and practices. We might say that they are competing over ideological
hegemony if that means the system of thought that determines the whole body of
practices and expectations, including concerns about our senses and assignments of
energy.192 My emphasis is not, however, on the juxtaposition of the two views as absolute
antithesis to each other as many theorists seem to have pointed out. For example, Paulina
Ochoa Espejo has recently summarized those leading perspectives on the people by
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University Press, 2004), 581-606 and “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of
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Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1994). Wolin’s theory of fugitive democracy centers on “the ingenuity of
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democratic politics is normally repressed under the hierarchical rule but could
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people. For the recent account of global movements that call for a more direct
democracy, see Marina Sitrin and Dario Azzellini, They Can’t Represent US!:
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naming them as “a hypothetical account of the people” that is “held by many liberals”
and “the historical account of the people” that is often espoused by populists and
others.”193 Although I do not mean to deny the virtue of her succinct characterization that
neatly sorts out the leading views of the democratic people, I would still disagree on
calling them hypothetical and historical since the languages invite misunderstanding. On
the one hand, it is one thing to regard the people as an abstract foundation and another to
treat it as a construct of mere speculation, which the term ‘hypothetical’ seems to
connote. On the other hand, to argue for the active role of the people as an impetus for a
popular politics does not necessarily mean that the people have to be a factually
documented—or ‘historical’—group of democratic subjects. Either way, the idea of the
people is clearly part of democratic reality, which requires a particular interpretation.
The people can never fully be ossified into pure abstraction, but can also never be
embodied into mere literalness.
For the purpose of this chapter, it is worth noting that the two mutually unyielding
sides, each of which is for the other a wrong interpretation of the people, serve as an
enemy for the other whose growth each ends up encouraging. Why and how? First, the
two paradigms share the most fundamental assumption that the people are the largest, and
the most powerful entity ever conceivable in democracy. It is formidable. That which is
formidable—by definition, as its Latin origin, formidare, indicates—inspires fear and
respect or dread and reverence. Second, since, as Derrida once pointed out, there is no
193
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signifier that can communicate a specific intended meaning without allowing a glimmer
of other associations,194 the idea of the people intended as the former carries with other
significations as well, often provoking, unwittingly or otherwise, those who hold a
different meaning. The reductionist paradigm centers on its fear of the norm-erosiondriven popular power,195 which is really the driving force behind its taxidermy of popular
sovereignty. The aspirational paradigm gives a new transformative and revivifying
outlook to the popular energy while receiving, happily, the communion with the people.
Its fear is rather about the disabling or paralyzing effect of the reductionist fear itself.196
Each appears to the other to be the mere postulate of its counter-paradigm that aims at the
revaluation or transvaluation, to use a Nietzschean term, of the negative characterizations
of what their opponents are prone to fear. In so doing, each ends in proving further
evidence of the criticism of their enemy without sufficiently understanding and attending
to the critical contents.
My theory of the sublime people helps us to see these paradigms, taken together,
194
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as conducive to the customary schemes and languages of the democratic people while
pointing to the need for building an alternative perspective. Prior to discussing how the
theory of the sublime people offers a novel understanding of the democratic people, we
should examine the structure, mechanism, and dynamic of sublime, most meticulously
analyzed by Immanuel Kant.

THE SUBLIME: OBJECTS, PROPERTIES, AND EMOTIONS
The sublime is an old and massive concept. It has a long history going back at least as far
as Peri hypsous written by Longinus,197 an ancient text forgotten for a long time until it
was reintroduced and became widely circulated among European men of letters,
especially after the publication of its French edition by Nicholas Boileau Despréaux in
1674.198 The Greek noun from which the idea of sublime originates, to hypsos, means
height. In Peri hypsous, Longinus sets out to examine the height of logos—speeches and
writings.199 Although his treatise belongs to the tradition of didactic technical writing on
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Nicholas Boileau Despréaux is widely recognized as one of the central figures who
brought Longinus back to light through his translation, although a number of Latin
editions and at least one Italian edition already existed prior to his French edition.
Costelloe states that “Boileau transforms the Latin evaluative qualifier sublīmis into a
substantive neologism — sublime/sublimité — to reflect the original Greek noun[.]”
Timothy M. Costelloe, “The Sublime: A Short Introduction to a Long History,”
Timothy M. Costelloe ed., The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3-4.

199

Longinus, On the Sublime, trans. James A. Arieti and John M. Crossett (New York:
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as he indicates by citing a passage by an unknown philosopher, the fact that “the
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rhetoric, it is not geared towards teaching the art of persuasion by speeches [peithein tois
logois]. Instead, his primary focus is to address the ways in which the sublime is
manifested as height and conspicuous excellence in great speeches and writings. By
investigating a variety of texts from the most popular political speeches of the time such
as Demosthenes’s orations, Plato’s philosophical dialogues, Herodotus’s and
Thucydides’s histories, and the Septuagint, Longinus theorizes how the audience can be
astounded and overwhelmed rather than merely persuaded by the force of the sublime.200
In the eighteenth century, during which time modern aesthetics emerged and
flourished, however, there was a significant shift of attention from the sublime style to the
sublime materials or objects. Notable were the contributions by British literary scholars
and philosophers such as John Dennis, Joseph Addison, John Baillie, and Alexander
Gerard, who sought out to analyze empirical properties of material objects related to the
sublime experience rather than the stylistic qualities of speeches and writings.201 In one of
his famous Spectator articles, Addison, for example, directs much attention to the
“stupendous works of Nature” such as “an open champaign country, a vast uncultivated

infertility [of speeches and writings] has hold over our life.” See section 44.
200

Longinus was mainly concerned with style and the revealing power of language.
For example, five kinds of sources for the sublime are, according to Longinus, “a
solid thrust of conception,” “an intense and enthusiastic emotion,” “a sort of molding
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way things are put together in worth and loftiness.” But, in short, what constitutes
the sublime is the greatness of the mind [megalopsychia] of authors. See sections
8.1 and 9.2.
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An excellent introduction to the eighteenth century British aesthetic studies on
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counterpart, see Paul Guyer, “18th Century German Aesthetics” (2007).
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desert” or “huge heaps of mountains[.]”202 The central feature of these natural objects is
characterized as their absolute magnitude. It is their incomparable vastness and
unchallenged power that makes present of the sublime experience. Baillie makes a
similar point when he states that

A flowery vale, or the verdure of a hill, may charm; but to fill the soul, and raise
it to the sublime sensations, the earth must rise into an Alp, or Pyrrhenean, and
mountains piled upon mountains, reach to the very heavens…203

No less attention is paid to sublime emotions. Baillie points out that the immensity
of external objects, in fact, “dilates and elevates the soul,” exciting in us “a noble
enthusiasm of grandeur,”204 or what Longinus calls “an intense and enthusiastic emotion”
[sphodron kai enthousiastikon pathos].205 The sublime, therefore, involves a distinctive
relation between the sublime object and a particular aesthetic experience in the subject,

202

Joseph Addison’s “On the Pleasures of the Imagination” [Monday, June 23, 1712],
in Andrew Ashfield and Peter Bolla eds. The Sublime: a reader in British eighteenthcentury aesthetic theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 62. It does
not mean, however, that the interests in the sublime style and language ceased to
exist. For example, Rob Goodman has recently argued for the importance of the
rhetorical sublime based on his close reading of Edmund Burke on the deliberative
value of immoderate speech. See Rob Goodman, “The Deliberative Sublime: Edmund
Burke on Disruptive Speech and Imaginative Judgment,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 2 (2018).

203

John Baillie, “An essay on the sublime” [1747], in Andrew Ashfield and Peter Bolla
eds. The Sublime: a reader in British eighteenth-century aesthetic theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 88.

204

Ibid.

205

Literally, Enthousiasmos means ‘to be in god’ [entheos einai].

108

evoking a particular set of emotions. This aesthetic field, engendered around the sublime
object and subject, is worth special heed.
It is perhaps Immanuel Kant who developed the level of discussion of the sublime
with the highest philosophical rigor. Kant’s most extensive and matured theory of the
sublime, demonstrated in his “Analytic of the Sublime,”206 proffers the best framework
according to which we later propose a particular way of understanding the democratic
people as an object of the sublime.
Kant associates the sublime with emotions like awe and astonishment, but
famously emphasizes the sublime emotion as “negative pleasure.” The implication is
twofold: first, it is an indirect or derivative feeling incited in the sublime experience;
second, our mind is “not merely attracted by the object, but is also always reciprocally
repelled by it.”207 This point, in fact, resonates with Burke’s characterization of the
sublime as “delightful horror.”208 It is well known that Kant’s philosophical account of
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the sublime is largely influenced by Burke’s monumental study of the subject, A
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Idea of the Sublime and the Beautiful. Kant
explicitly cites and critically assesses Burke’s Enquiry in his theory of the sublime, which
is not always common in his writings. Burke’s physiological theory of the sublime also
points to the negativity of the sublime emotion.
Yet there are significant differences between the two thinkers. Burke accentuates
the physicality of this aesthetic experience. According to Burke, there has to be some
object “at certain distances” from the subject in order that the subject is ready for
“delightful horror.” Delight is conceptually distinct from pure pleasure as it is
fundamentally associated with pain. When “danger or pain press too nearly they are
incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible.”209 But if we recognize a
physical threat from a certain distance where our safety is guaranteed, or, in other words,
where we do not suffer the immediate danger, the very circumstance excites the idea of
pain, danger, or terror.210 Out of the absence or the removal of the immediate pain or
danger does arise the sublime emotion. Hence the sublime as a “species of relative
pleasure.”211
Kant does not ignore the virtue of the Burkean empirical and corporeal account of
the sublime. He also recognizes that “all representations in us, whether they are
pain: "The sublime dilates and elevates the soul, fear sinks and contracts it; yet both
are felt upon viewing what is great and awful.” Baillie, “An essay on the sublime,”
97.
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objectively merely sensible or else entirely intellectual, can nevertheless subjectively be
associated with gratification or pain.” Nonetheless, Kant goes beyond Burke’s account
because, strictly speaking, it is not correct “if we call some object of nature sublime”
without considering the conflicting interplay of imagination and reason.212 Burke
certainly shifted “the discourse of the sublime away from the study of natural objects and
towards the mind of the spectator.”213 And he acknowledged the fact that it is only after
having become an idea through a representation in the imagination does the terrible incite
the feeling of sublime.214
But for Kant, Burke’s problem is that his sensorial account focuses primarily on
the physical distance between the subject and the object as the constitutive condition of
the sublime. While highlighting the sublime as “the strongest emotion which the mind is
capable of feeling,” Burke stresses the external condition in which the sublime
experience would occur.215 What is missing is a thorough account of the internal
condition of the sublime experience, or, in other words, attentive reading of the inner
dynamic between imagination and reason, which would offer a richer view on the
dynamic between the subject and the object. Kant maintains that this negligence of Burke
leads him to fail to understand how the sublime experience makes present the limits of
the subject and its own efforts to meet the very difficulty. For Kant, what is essential in
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the sublime experience is an introspective turn that ends up making the subject turn back
to its own mind, which is the place in which the true sublime resides.
How exactly, then, does this conflicting interplay of imagination and reason take
place? According to Kant, we call sublime “that which is absolutely great” [schlechthin
groß]. When he says something is absolutely great, he means that is “great beyond all
comparison.”216 Not unlike Burke, Kant begins with a rigid distinction between the
sublime and the beautiful:

The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in
limitation; the sublime, by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar as
limitlessness [Unbegrenzheit] is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is
also thought as a totality.217

This succinct statement merits close attention as it bespeaks the gist of Kant’s theory of
the sublime. For Kant, it is not the case that we find the beauty from small objects and the
sublime from huge objects. As was shown above, what is properly sublime, which is
absolutely great, “cannot be contained in any sensible form.” We are challenged by what
is absolutely great since it is formless, which “surpasses every measure of the senses.”218
Since it is insensible or supersensible, no quality is directly represented in the mind of the

216

Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 131-132/5:248.

217

Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 128/5:244.

218

Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 134/5:250.

112

subject. Instead, limitlessness is represented through the failure of the very presentation
[Dastellung] of the quality. The sublime experience, therefore, begins with the experience
of “the subject’s own incapacity” [Unvermögen] or inadequacy [Unangemessenheit].219
Kant distinguishes “the mathematically sublime” from “the dynamically
sublime.” The former concerns what is absolutely great in magnitude, the latter in power.
In the case of “the mathematically sublime,” when the faculty of imagination involves
two actions, that is, apprehension [Auffassung] and comprehension [Zusammenfassung],
it is the failure of comprehension, or the capacity to represent the object as a whole, that
is revealed at the failure of imagination during its efforts to portray the absolutely great.
In comprehension, unlike in apprehension, “there is a greatest point beyond which it
cannot go.” The sublime object makes available to reflection this limit of comprehension.
In this regard, because of the inadequacy of the faculty of imagination, the sublime
concerns, states Kant, “only ideas of reason [Ideen der Vernunft].”220
This does not mean, however, that the sublime experience could and should be
understood as solely belonging to the domain of pure concepts such as the Whole or
Totality. A feeling of the sublime originates from the reflection of the sensible through its
failure, where the imagination becomes frustrated yet expanded, by means of reason. As
shown in the cited passage above, the concept of totality can also be thought, or, to be
precise, thought in addition to it [hinzudenken]. In that particular way, the sublime
experience involves an aesthetic representation of limitlessness. This experience of the
219
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limit and limitlessness ultimately produces “an emotionally moving satisfaction.”221 That
feeling is “a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the imagination … and a
pleasure that is thereby aroused at the same time from the correspondence of this very
judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible faculty in comparison with ideas of
reason[.]”222 The overall satisfaction is indicative of the fact that “imagination and reason
produce subjective purposiveness through their conflict [Widerstreit].”223
Much the same can be observed for “the dynamically sublime.” Kant also deals
primarily with the representation of the sublime in nature, but here the major concerns are
with what is absolutely great in power. His own examples are as follows:

Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into
the heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightening and crashes of thunder,
volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they
leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty
river, etc., make our capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison
with their power. But the sight of them only becomes all the more attractive the
more fearful it is, as long as we find ourselves in safety, and we gladly call these
objects sublime because they elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level,
and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another
kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-
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powerfulness of nature.224

The first half seems to be no different from Burke’s account of “delightful horror” as a
pleasure coming from the “removal of the immediate danger.” However, in the last part
of the passage, Kant attributes the reason we call such fearful objects sublime to the fact
that our mind is uplifting when imagination, in spite of its failed attempt to present and
face the fearful situation, ends up being enabled to entertain it. So, Kant’s philosophy of
the sublime, regardless of its difference in kind, underscores the peculiarity of the
sublime experience as the affectively charged affirmation of our cognitive and existential
limits and our own struggle to come to terms with those limits, which ultimately leads us
into his important remark of subreption.
Kant contends that there is a certain subreption in action in the sublime
experience. Subreption means a substitution of one with the other.225 Then, what
substitution does Kant discuss here? What exactly is ultimately revealed in his recourse
to “the voice of reason,” which is inseparable from, and also in fact essential to, the
elevation of the imagination? It is the faculty of the mind itself that undergoes its own
failing but at once surpasses the usual standard of senses. That said, when Kant defines
that the sublime are that in comparison with which everything else is small, it is not his
224
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primary point that there are absolutely immense and vast objects exterior to the subject,
to whose sublimity the subject cannot help but submit itself in awe. Rather, Kant revises,
or even inverts, the mismatch between the immense sublime object and the infinitesimal
subject by arguing that “nothing can be given in nature … which could not be diminished
down to the infinitely small” in comparison with ideas of reason. Sublime is our own
vocation [Bestimmung], demonstrated by our reason, awakened and galvanized by the
incapacity and inadequacy of imagination at the limit.226 The feeling of the sublime, often
projected onto the object, then, is nothing but “respect [Achtung] for our own vocation,
which we show to an object in nature through a certain subreption.” The sublime
experience creates a field in which the latent faculty of the subject is revealed and
confirmed, resulting in the empowerment and uplift of the subject. Hence Kant’s
conclusion: “true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the one who judges, not in
the object in nature.”227

THE SUBLIME PEOPLE AND REPRESENTATION: A KANTIAN STYLE
Now that we have discussed Kant’s view of the sublime in general, it is time to address
its application to the question of the democratic people. Although the sublime is often
considered to be primarily germane to our experience of nature or the work of art, there is

226

Jean-Luc Nancy points out that what the sublime excites in us is “more than a
feeling in the banal sense, it is the emotion of the subject at the limit.” See his “The
Sublime Offering,” Jean-Luc Nancy et al. Of the Sublime: Presence in Question
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 44. Italics mine.

227

Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 139/5:256.

116

good reason to construct the very concept as a means for rethinking about the democratic
people and democracy as well. In fact, any aesthetic experiences are already in part
political in the first place, as long as such an experience involves a constitutive narrative
that shapes the way we feel, imagine, and make sense of our own subjectivity in relation
to others and the world. Aesthetics, as Jacques Rancière contends, refers to “a certain
modality, a certain distribution of the sensible.”228 Highlighting the aesthetic horizon that
the democratic experience of the people opens up, therefore, can be a fecund way to
establish an alternative framework with which we can better understand the affective
structure of our democratic subjectivity and agency.229
My overriding emphases are on the ways in which we can judge the democratic
228
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people as sublime by way of doing justice to, and reflecting upon, both fear and delight,
or anxiety and excitement, that the people provoke, on how the liminal experience of the
sublime can offer critical insights into the interplay between the subject (individual
citizens) and the object (the people), and, finally, on how my Kantian rendition of the
sublime people overall can help us to better attend to and come to terms with the indelible
condition of frustration owing to the aesthetic representation of the people as
unrepresentable.
What does it mean to judge the democratic people as sublime, and how can the
sublime people as an interpretive framework deepen our understanding of democratic
life, allowing us to critically assess the two prevailing paradigms discussed above? Let us
begin with a simple acknowledgment that within the symbolic order of democracy, the
people are limitless with regard to measure and formidable with regard to power, which
makes the people perfectly qualified as an example of the Kantian sublime.230 In
democracy, the people are deemed to be the only legitimate foundation of power. It is the
people that is the greatest and irresistibly forceful category ever conceivable in
democracy. The people convey an impression of superiority and completeness. It is the
superiority and completeness that spring from the status of the sole fountain of political
power.231 Alexis de Tocqueville once described the status of the people in the democratic
world as “the cause and aim of all things, everything comes from them and everything is
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absorbed in them.”232 Kant, too, discussed the transfer of the supreme authority from
monarchs to the people by noting that “[t]he consequence was that the monarch’s
sovereignty wholly disappeared (it was not merely suspended) and passed to the people,
to whose legislative will the belongings of every subject became subjected.”233 The
people appear to be supreme beyond all comparison to the eyes of “metaphysical
democrats.”234
This vestigially metaphysical—or politico-theological—sense of the people has
not vanished even in the reductionist paradigm. The people are normally understood as
the sovereign—albeit rather colorless and lifeless in the reductionist rendition.235 Here,
the people need to be beholden. The implication, especially with respect to the
relationship between individual citizens and the people, is twofold. First, the reductionist
paradigm assigns the people—imagined and employed as an abstraction—a regulative
function so that individual citizens stand in awe of the order that the people symbolize.
Second, the concept of the people so understood is defined, designedly, by not being
geared toward promoting the popular energy of actual ordinary people. The symbolic
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order of the abstract people rather helps arouse fear and disgust236 in the minds of the
citizen against any attempts of the appropriation of the people for the sake of those who
are lacking the sense of complete wholeness. The interests of common people, even
though they are most likely the majority population, can still be seen as factional and
partial. To use a classical distinction, the sovereignty of the people [ho dēmos] should not
be confused with the supremacy of the common people [to plēthos].237 That said, it is not
entirely correct to say that the reductionist paradigm urges individual democratic citizens
to sever connections with the people. Instead, the citizen, as a beholder, is thought to be
already actively included in the structure of the people. Or, in other words, the people, at
this abstract level, incorporate every individual indiscriminately; popular sovereignty is
taken diffusively.
This reductionism is driven by fear originating in a harsh confrontation with the
people as an awe-generating sublime material. By choosing to revel in the reductionism,
however, those who subscribe to the reductionist paradigm fail to recognize and attend to
the people as a sublime object. They are unable to maintain critical distance necessary for
the aesthetic experience of the sublime. Kant states that for an object to be judged as
sublime, the subject should be able to consider the object as “fearful without being afraid
of it[.]”238 What it means is that one should fully acknowledge the formidable power of
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the people that would make her resistance seem completely helpless—hence she still has
fear of the people—yet should not be afraid of it, believing that she and the people are not
necessarily hostile to each other. Only then can she experience the people as sublime. The
reductionist paradigm does not allow this space befitting the subtlety of the sublime
experience. The feeling of awe attributed to the abstract people would degenerate into the
sheer terror once the people became released from the abstraction taken up by unruly
ordinary people, tending to cause disruption. Here, the fear of the people effectively
forecloses any possibilities of promoting the positive sensibilities of individual
democratic citizens toward any concrete body of the people as the source of popular
politics. Instead, they take the unitary version of the sovereign people—which
symbolizes a unified community, the Constitution, the nation, or simply the political
order itself239—as a means to contain the exertion of the popular energy of the common
people rather than to galvanize and release it.240 In other words, the reductionist paradigm
provides citizens with a strong perspective from which they can be markedly skeptical
and contemptuous of the popular outbursts that would likely disrupt the existing order.
Reductionism, therefore, can easily take shape as passivity and turn individual
democratic citizens into passive bystanders, leaving the terms of democratic politics
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defined and imposed by political elites. It does not require citizens to abandon their belief
in popular sovereignty. It only demands that they hold the belief in the broadest and the
most abstract fashion. Therein lies the power and danger of this paradigm.
Consider a classic example from the early modern era. Thomas Hobbes once put
that “in every commonwealth, the People Reigns.” In what exact sense can the people
rule in every commonwealth? What about monarchical or oligarchic polities? The key to
understand his point is his characterization of the people, which resonates deeply with the
reductionist paradigm. For Hobbes, the people—as opposed to crowd—are “a single
entity with a single will.” It is an abstraction. In monarchies, therefore, “the People” still
“exercises power [imperat]”241 precisely because “the King is the people.”242 Likewise,
Hobbes’s parliamentarian contenders such as Henry Parker, the author of Jus Populi,
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argued that the Parliament is, in fact, the people.243 We can replace King and Parliament
with the Constitution, the political order, the democratic norm, et cetera. The logic still
stands. What we see is the pattern in democratic thinking that makes the people enshrined
in the highest principle of democracy while at once draining it of its vital potentials. As
an abstract justification for the legitimate constitutional norm, the people rather appear as
figurative reference, reverential gesture, and historical commemoration. Appealing to the
people still takes place in the reductionist culture. The terms, however, are always
innocuous and consensual.
Holding the reductionist view, which seems to metastasize political passivity, can
be self-defeating especially when the interests of entrenched elites are persistently
furthered by institutional constraints on popular power in representative democracy.244
The unitary and abstract notion of the sovereign people and strictly representative
institutional arrangements can put individual citizens in an irritating situation as they see
democracy secretly allowing the powerful and the privileged to dominate ordinary

243

Quentin Skinner, “Hobbes on Representation,” European Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 13, No. 12 (2005). See also Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), chapters 4 and 5.

244

One of the reasons that ordinary citizens often find themselves frustrated at the
haunting inability of representative democracy to secure the democratic ideal of
power sharing is that there are always some elites, even while advertising more
democracy in one way or another, who are continuously articulating and rearranging
institutional structures that could favor their particular interests. Amel Ahmed aptly
documents the ways in which the seemingly fair and just electoral systems are
designed to protect the elites’ interests by allowing exclusionary safeguards even
while giving the governed some power of electoral control. See her Democracy and
the Politics of Electoral System Choice: Engineering Electoral Dominance (2013). In
this vein, David Bateman’s recent study that focuses on the problems of exclusion
particularly in “democratizing” contexts is also informative. See his “Democratic
Exclusion: The Right to Vote in the United States, United Kingdom, and France,”
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania (2013).

123

citizens while failing to fulfill even the very minimum presumption that reductionists
cannot but hold: democracy provides individuals with “a sufficient chance to win and a
sufficiently large payoff in the future rounds.” This “prospect of alternation” is believed
to make it possible that one “can be governed by different others in turn,” thereby being
able to be “represented some of the time,”245 which does not correspond to the everyday
democratic experience of individual citizens. If they witness instead the glaring
incongruity developed between their de jure sovereignty and de facto subjection, their
respect for the formal democratic order—which is driven by their fear and disgust against
the tendency of norm-erosion by popular uprisings—may have to be recalibrated.
Otherwise, their somewhat legitimate fear can degenerate into blind deference to any
authority as long as it is sanctioned by the norm of popular sovereignty broadly
understood, irrespective of the exclusion of broad segments of the population from
enjoying democratic agency. Their respect for the abstract people—popular sovereignty,
the Constitution, the order, et cetera—can be deceptive, “[hiding] existential
subjection.”246
The aspirational paradigm, on the other hand, aims to contest and challenge the
undemocratic authority in the name of actual people.247 Yet the actual people, too, are a
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construction that commands a particular definition, delimitation, and characterization.
This counter-paradigm cannot be immune from some figurative and synecdochical
elaborations on the people. Their elaborations are anti-elitist, often led by anti-elitist
elites. The people as “an aspirational category,” thus, become “a site for symbolic action
where new configurations of self, society, and the characteristics of both might be reimagined.”248
What the aspirational paradigm offers is a reconstruction of the image of the
people. The people are deemed not merely as the “origin” of the existing political order,
but rather its “undoing.”249 Here, the idea of the people as non-elites intersects rather than
opposes the idea of the people as the constituent power, forming a momentum for a lively
popular politics. That comes with a sweeping reorientation of sensibilities toward
ordinary people and popular energy. The main strategy is to argue for an overcoming of
the consciousness of representation in opposition to the existing political authority.
Individual democratic citizens are encouraged to think as if they can instantaneously
experience the people as such by empathizing with, or even identifying themselves with,
the actual people so created. All mediations appear to be superseded in the alleged
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presentness of the real people. In other words, representations are supplanted by an
experience of communion.250
The aspirational paradigm rightly attends to the formidable and unparalleled
power of the people—characteristics that would make the people a sublime object. At
first glance, unlike its reductionist counterpart, the aspirational paradigm seems to secure
the space where one can consider the people “as fearful without being afraid of it.”251 Yet
this approach, too, fails to maintain the critical aesthetic distance necessary for the
sublime experience by nullifying the radical otherness that the people can provoke. Also,
the presentness of the claimed people takes precedence over the infinite and inexhaustible
characteristics of the people. Dispelling the fear of the people altogether by conjoining
individual citizens and the people, the asipirational paradigm provides an opportunity for
individual democratic citizens to feed on excitement and self-righteousness proceeding
directly from their communion with the supposedly real (and therefore just) people. In so
doing, however, the space of possibilities has narrowed.
As the aspirational paradigm conceives of people as essentially recalcitrant to the
political establishment of representation, it calls for a disruptive and immediate politics
that can suspend the motions of the everyday politics. This move may seem to be
productive and even necessary especially when representative democracy largely remains
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centralist, elitist, non-participatory, and managerial.252 Yet it comes with costs: the
promotion of the mythical idea of the unmediated people, which would distract individual
democratic citizens from the laborious democratic task of persuading other fellow
citizens and shifting public opinion over time.
If reductionists in the end are likely to promote the highly individualist
contemporary democratic culture by refraining from taking popular actions, their
aspirational counterparts, unwittingly or otherwise, fall under the opposite yet similar
myopic narcissistic spell by taking unreservedly assertive actions immersing themselves
in the movement of the claimed people. The chances become higher especially in the
current circumstances with the advanced technological and cultural outlets for both
individualist hedonistic withdrawal and the various kinds of self-gratifying instant
activism.253 Whereas the hypersensitivity of the reductionist model toward the fear of the
popular energy results in an allergic reaction to, and disengagement from, popular
politics, the aspirational model rather makes the relationship between individual citizens
and the people too much reflexive, instantaneous, and decisionistic rather than
communicative, processual, and dialectic.
The sublime people attempts to harness the motivating power of the warranted
fear both from the reductionist hypersensitivity and from the aspirationalist self252
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indulgence. In order to clarify my distinct position, it seems necessary to examine the
recent rediscovery of the sublime with regard to its relevance for radical democratic
politics, perhaps most profoundly exemplified by Jason Frank’s account of Burke and
“the radical democratic sublime.”254 As I use the term sublime strictly in the Kantian
sense and put much emphasis on what the sublime experience does to the democratic
subject, such an analysis, albeit rather brief, seems indispensable.
Frank draws an important lesson from Burke that political authority is grounded
in the affective bonds as much as it is held by the law and institutions. Although Burke’s
conservative political philosophy was based on his praise of a natural aristocracy against
an unruly democracy,255 both Burke and Frank share in common a critical view of the
determined inattention of political rationalism to the aesthetic dimension. For both of
them, the sublime, at the intersection of politics and aesthetics, functions as an affective

254

Jason Frank, “Delightful Horror: Edmund Burke and the aesthetics of democratic
revolution” in Nikolas Kompridis ed., The Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought (New
York: Bloomsbury, 2014). Also see his Constituent Moments, especially chapter 6 on
Aesthetic Democracy.

255

“A true natural aristocracy is not a separate interest in the state, or separate from
it. It is an essential integrant part of any large people rightly constituted. It is formed
out of a class of legitimate presumptions, which, taken as generalities, must be
admitted for actual truths. To be bred in a place of estimation; To see nothing low
and sordid from one's infancy; To be taught to respect one's self; To be habituated
to the censorial inspection of the public eye; To look early to public opinion; To stand
upon such elevated ground as to be enabled to take a large view of the wide-spread
and infinitely diversified combinations of men and affairs in a large society; To have
leisure to read, to reflect, to converse; …To be led to a guarded and regulated
conduct, from a sense that you are considered as an instructor of your fellow-citizens
in their highest concerns, and that you act as a reconciler between God and man …
These are the circumstances of men, who form what I should call a natural
aristocracy, without which there is no nation. Edmund Burke, An Appeal from the
New to the Old Whigs, in Consequence of Some Late Discussions in Parliament,
Relative to the Reflections on the French Revolution (London: Printed for J. Dodsley,
Pall-Mall, 1791), 129-130. Emphasis original.

128

device for legitimizing political authority. Certainly, Burke famously assigned the
sublime eventually to “a story of continuity—a myth of traditional British Constitution
dating back to Magna Carta[.]” Yet Frank is correct to point out that it is also true that
revolutionary spectacles—in other words, “that which rupture[s] the continuity of
experience and tradition”256 that Burke so harshly criticized in his antirevolutionary
writings257—contain the chief qualities of what Burke’s own earlier aesthetics attributes
to the sublime: “novelty” and “astonishment.” Burke shied away from democracy
precisely because he understood the way in which “the people’s authority … might rely
upon a pervasive sense of its own sublimity[.]”258 Frank, after carefully documenting the
evolution of Burke’s aesthetics of the sublime, formulates “the radical democratic
sublime” as an affective and aesthetic foundation for the making of a radical democracy
by locating the sublimity in the grandeur and spectacles emanating from the rupture as a
new democratic beginning.
Frank attributes the radical democratic sublimity to the “polyvocality” of the
people. Like Walt Whitman, he associates “popular voice with the sublime” and discerns
“this sublimity as an aesthetic resource of democratic regeneration.”259 His vision of
“aesthetic democracy” firmly resists the dominant tendency of treating democratic life
only as statistically recognizable and completely subordinated to the institutional process
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of representation. Relying upon Whitman’s account of the “autopoetic” people, Frank
highlights the sublime potentialities of “force and power of immediacy,” which prove to
be the only antidote to “the complicity of compromise, institutional mediation, and
political deliberation.”260 The people so understood are multitudinous and spontaneous,
and always in the process of becoming, while “remaining forever a people that is not …
yet.”261 This aestheticization of the people as an unmediated power seems to be an
antidote to the reductionism that I mentioned earlier, or to what Whitman called “the
growing excess and arrogance of realism,”262 pervading the democratic theories and
practices, then and now. However, Frank’s celebration of the Whitmanian people as well
as his left Burkean account of the sublimity of popular spectacles displays a problem that
is similar to what I pointed out earlier as the major shortcoming of the aspirational
paradigm.
The problem is not that he is replicating one of the popular strategies of resistance
by flaunting the “vulgar” and “promiscuous” people and re-appropriating the pejorative
260
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for the radical position he intends to defend.263 The real problem comes from his attempt
to embrace the poetic overcoming of the representational limitation. Certainly, Frank
understands that Whitman emphasizes the necessity of poetic mediation that can
crystallize popular voices.264 But the people so created are still thought to hold the power
of immediacy, diametrically contrasted with the power created through the conventional
representative mechanism. That said, Frank seems to simplify the difficult situation in
which democratic citizens are placed, the situation he himself has earlier pointed out as a
dilemma that “the people have been at once enacted through representation … and in
excess of any particular representation.”265 But if we attend to this dilemma by assigning
the sublimity to the presence of the unmediated people whose “autopoetic” power can
express itself directly to individuals “without mediation, without conditions, without
distance,”266 we may end up evading the very dilemma by opening the door (perhaps
unintentionally) for a more utopian conception of the immediacy of the people.267
How Frank constructs his version of aesthetic democracy by using the notion of

263

Frank pays careful attention to why and how Whitman actively embraced the
vulgar characteristics of the people instead of establishing a vision of the detached
lawgiver-like poet. The problem of reviving and reinforcing the anti-democratic
frame, which is inherent to some of the radical democratic theories, see Sterling,
“Irregular Motions: Democracy and the Mob.”

264

On this point, I would like to thank Jason Frank for his comments on the earlier
version of this chapter.

265

Frank, Constituent Moments, 3.

266

Frank, Constituent Moments, 198.

267

Pierre Rosanvallon once accused the yearning for the immediate presentation of
the people of its tendency toward “l’impolitique, the unpolitical, by which [he
means] a failure to develop a comprehensive understanding of problems associated
with the organization of a shared world.” Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of
Distrust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

131

sublime also merits critical assessment. His focus is almost exclusively placed on the
awe-generating characteristic of the sublime object. For example, popular uprisings can
be understood as sublime because of its massive scale and disruptive, and therefore,
astounding spectacles. Therefore, Frank’s theory of “the radical democratic sublime,”
while aiming at upending the conventional but debilitated institutional representative
democracy, boosts the aspirational communion with the claimed people. In so doing,
however, his radical resistance to the reductionist ideology can fall prey to being
appropriated as a further development of the dichotomy that the very ideology is based
on. He cares not so much about what the sublime experience does to the subject as what
constitutes the sublime object. Frank’s radical democratic sublime, in this particular
sense, calms rather than expands and incites our democratic imaginations.
What my rendition of the Kantian sublime people demands is a restoration of the
distanced stance. I claim that we need to underline the necessity of representation
implicated in the idea of the people or popular sovereignty and its inevitably incomplete
and infinite nature more carefully. We tend to think that writing, far from speech,268 is
only a secondary device for expressing what we already think and will, but it is often
writing process itself that gives birth to our thoughts. We exchange different things,
believing that they must share exactly the same values, but in fact it is our act of
exchange itself that creates such values. Likewise, contrary to the belief that
representation is a means to translate—or mistranslate—the pre-existing will of the
268
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people, it is in fact the representational structure itself that gives rise to the democratic
people. To understand that representation is necessary and it ends necessarily in failure
requires us to abandon the misleading idea that the people somehow exist prior to and
beyond the representative scheme of politics.269
Certainly, this is hardly a new idea. From Hobbes to Claude Lefort and Edmund
Morgan, a number of political thinkers and historians have pointed out the problem in a
wide variety of ways. Lefort famously states that in democracy, the “locus of power is an
empty place.”270 It resonates with Morgan’s rather blunt historical account. Morgan notes
that unlike a monarch who is “a visual presence,” the people “are never visible as
such.”271 Thus, “[b]efore we ascribe sovereignty to the people, we have to imagine that
there is such a thing[.]”272 In other words, “the people do not exist except through
approximate successive representations of itself.”273 That is why democracy has to
“[involve] the symbolic creation of an artificial body of the people.”274
Again, it may sound odd because representation simply signifies “a making
present again,”275 which presupposes the existence of something that is being represented.
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But, as Hobbes explained quite clearly, representation can be formative. The represented
is preceded by representation. In the sixteenth chapter of Leviathan, he states that “A
Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person,
Represented[.]” And it is “the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented,
that maketh the Person One.”276 As far as our purpose is concerned, what is important
here is not so much to about his notion of unity as about the fact that “the representation
involved here is not so much mimetic, but actively imaginative as in drama and
liturgy[.]”277
The sublime people directs our attention precisely to this imaginative element of
representation. Every claim to the people—reductionist and aspirational, institutional and
extra-institutional, legal-procedural and poetic—is an act of imaginative representation,
which is attended by the experience of “the subject’s own incapacity” to fully make
present of the people.278 What that means is that when the individual citizen conjure up,
encounter with, or participate in, the democratic people, there comes an opportunity of an
aesthetic experience in which she see that the people are not entirely sensible, surpassing
the limit of her imagination and conventional thoughts. It betrays that her ready-made
picture of the people is utterly inadequate, coming to a realization that how incapable she
is of representing the people as a whole. It is the failure of her imagination and
comprehension.
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What is represented in the failure of imagination vis-à-vis what is absolutely
great, as we learned from Kant, is their limitlessness. This failure—the failure of
presentation [Dastellung]—is due to the limitlessness [Unbegrenzheit] of the people.
Here comes, first, “a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the imagination,”
alongside “a pleasure … from the correspondence of this very judgment of the
inadequacy[.]” This twofold aesthetic experience of the limit and the limitlessness
eventually engenders “an emotionally moving satisfaction.”279 This is a uniquely sublime
experience to which the people can provoke. To be precise, this is what the sublime
experience does to the individual citizen.
My theory of the sublime people permits a careful review of a vibration, “a
vibration … a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to” the democratic
people.280 It calls for a drawing up a more accurate balance sheet of fear and delight.
Unlike the two leading perspectives that encounter with the people either with fear or
with excitement, but not in both ways, the sublime people proposes a reading that makes
use of both sensibilities or attitudes and gives the democratic people its due while
acknowledging the challenges it gives rise to. Insofar as the limitless magnitude and
power of the people are concerned, the fear of the people can be well warranted. It cannot
be dismissed outright simply as ideological manipulation. The boundless, abysmal, and
unsettling nature of the people may incur authentic fear and anxiety, fear of uncertainty
and anxiety about self-loss. On the other hand, the valorization of the people, which let
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the potentials of the people outrun the known limitations, inspires jovial feelings and
restlessness. The theory of sublime people immunizes individual democrats against
fantasies that the people can appear as overcoming of the representational limit. Such an
endeavor runs a risk of falling, metaphorically, into “visionary rapture” [Schwärmerei],
that is, “a delusion of being able to see something beyond all bounds of sensibility.”281
Whereas the reductionist paradigm intends to dispel the fear and direct the anxiety
to cease by devitalizing the people, the aspirational paradigm focuses attention on
amplifying self-indulgence in bringing transformative popular energies into existence.
Yet what they fail to see, and, thus, fail to make use of, is the genuine pleasure of the
sublime, which originates not from attending the event of the sublime per se, but from
uplifting oneself through actively coming to terms with the partly unpleasant or difficult
experience of the sublime. It is a salutary pleasure in proving one’s capacity via
recognizing and overcoming one’s own limit. The sublime experience of the democratic
people is important not because what the people are often claimed to be but because what
the claim of the people causes to be done.
This point leads us back to the Kantian subreption. It is not the case that the
people as an object deserve the full credit of sublimity. The sublime people, in the end,
serve as an important medium, which stimulates and elevates the capacity of each
individual citizen who is expected to gain prominence over the sublime object through
the mechanism of subreption we discussed earlier.282 Crosscutting the dichotomous
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conventional logic of democratic politics—holding the rather romantic283 idea that they
can neither fully celebrate nor do without the people, by which they are at once attracted
and burdened—those individual democratic citizens can make the people known in their
absence and make representation visible in its negation.284 When the people become
invisible at the usual site of representation, they should see this vanishing as at once their
abiding. On the other hand, when they feel as though the people were appearing without
mediation, they should be able to restore a distanced stance so that they can see the
imaginative representation properly.
In other words, the sublime people calls upon the democratic subject to confront
the people communicatively rather than enter completely into communion with it. What is
suggested is to participate in the collective while using it as promoting her own
singularities simultaneously. What the sublime people, therefore, proposes is a vibrant
democratic politics, where individual democratic citizens are allowed and encouraged to
keep invoking and engaging with the democratic people as an indispensable inspiring
idea and real force while holding up against the tendency of endangering themselves to
283

I use this term with special care. Frank Ankersmit once argued that romantic
mentalities or attitudes are the aesthetic foundation of representative democracy.
Briefly speaking, he referred to a particular type of attitudes toward embracing and
respecting for “multiplicity, for all the paradoxes, oppositions, and contradictions in
sociopolitical reality[.]” See Frank Ankersmit, Political Representation, 99-132. In
general, the post-Kantian Romanticism is often deemed as an attempt to overcome
the tragic split between idea and nature or imagination and reason through artistic
intervention. See Friedrich Schiller, On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry, and F. W. J.
von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism. For an excellent (and balanced)
study that portrays Kant as a legitimate precursor of his romantic followers, see Jane
Kneller, Kant and the Power of Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007).

284

“I renounce my present life, my present and concrete existence [the I am] in
order to make myself [a what I am] known.” Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 142.

137

lapse into uncritical passivity and the idolatry of the claimed people.

CONCLUSION
Many advanced democratic societies, the United States as well as others, have been
increasingly egalitarian on the one hand, but still stubbornly hierarchical on the other.
Ordinary citizens have been markedly alienated from politics, but at once enjoying the
growing number of chances for overly assertive activism. One would think that the idea
of the people seems to fade into oblivion, but it is still widely circulated and invigorated.
It often remains reflex and not thoroughly reflected.
One of the most important conclusions to be extrapolated from this chapter is that
both the reductionist alienation of the people and the aspirational celebration of the
people fail to attend to an affective foundation suitable for a critical and resilient
democratic citizenship. Motivated by uneasiness with the contemporary democratic
theory that the people are often either unduly abstracted or unwarrantedly celebrated, I
aimed to establish a middle term, or a different perspective, which is excluded and
distinct from the two extreme camps outlined above, seeking to construct the people as an
object of sublime, especially of a Kantian kind.
The framework of Kantian sublime that I have developed affirms, amplifies, and
cultivates the popular energy necessary for a lively democratic politics while at once
avoiding any hint of the mirage of the immediacy of the people. This leads us to further
develop the ways in which the people as an inspiring force can invigorate and tether our
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democratic imagination to shape and alter political structures, programs and agendas,
opening up different levels of horizons that have been often ignored or simplified by the
dichotomous understanding of democracy and the democratic people. Without it, I
contend, democratic politics would easily become distorted, either squashed into its
torpid minimum or swallowed up by intemperate and uncritical assertiveness, populist or
otherwise.
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CHAPTER 4: The Temporal

The Time of Frustration:
Suffering, Convalescence, and Growth

My blood moves slowly.
Friedrich Nietzsche

Ich Bleibe.
Joseph Beuys

Real change is best understood by staying in one place.
When I travel, I see differences rather than change.
I resent traveling south in early spring in case I am away from home
when I see my first tree coming into leaf.
If this happens, I see the leaves, but not the growth or change.
Andy Goldsworthy
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Previously, I have paid special attention to the two distinct dimensions of democracy—
communicative and symbolic—where the democratic subject takes the modality of
citizen-partisan and citizen-sovereign, respectively. These distinctions are intended to
emphasize that the distinct webs of relations are woven into the democratic world that
citizens inhabit. Individual citizens qua citizens find themselves thrown in those webs of
relations.
To be democratic citizens, as this study claims, means to enter into those
relations. I have noted that there exist particularly frustrating problems concerning each
of those dimensions of democracy. On the one hand, individual citizens form and
perform their democratic agency in relation to other fellow citizens. The particular
frustration attributed to this communicative dimension of democratic politics originates
from two distinct conflicting pressures that individual citizens can hardly dispense with.
First, they are thought to treat one another based on the principle of mutual respect.
Second, they are striving for superiority as they come to interact with those whose
opinions and views are dissimilar and even hostile to theirs within the context of partisan
competition.
I argue that it would be futile to solve this problem by simply repressing the urge
for superiority while making moralist pleas for mutual respect, civility, and tolerance
precisely because it is not realistic—given ontological antagonism, epistemological onesidedness, and, as a result, attitudinal impudence found in the everyday democracy—nor
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entirely desirable as such an endeavor, even if it does become realized, would discourage
democratic citizens from actively engaging in a series of conversations and contestations.
Certainly, it is not desirable just to wink at if not promote the sense of superiority because
it would result in nurturing mutual impudence, hatred, and aggression.
On the other hand, individual democratic citizens exercise their democratic
agency in relation to the people. This concerns the symbolic dimension of democracy,
where citizens adhere to, interpret, and enact the principle of popular sovereignty. The
peculiar frustration with which these citizen-sovereigns are confronted proceeds from the
indefinite nature of the people as well as the simultaneous presence of two distinct
traditions that understand and define the people in quite different ways.
The first tradition, which I called the reductionist paradigm, understands the awegenerating constituent power of the people, but reduces the role of the people to a
minimum abstraction as the legitimate foundation of the basic authority of democracy. It
does so precisely in defiance of any attempts to support the release of the popular energy
in the name of the people. The second tradition, which I called the aspirational paradigm,
regards the people not as an abstracted symbol, but as commoners whose voices and
interests often remain unheard and marginalized by the liberal representative scheme of
democratic politics. Individual democratic citizens are exposed to these mutually
conflicting significations with respect to the people, which arouse and promote the fear of
the people, on the one had, and the delight or collective effervescence of popular power,
on the other. Both tendencies can go unduly and extreme so far as to fall into either
minimalist passivity or populist over-indulgence, respectively.
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My study for both problems aims to understand the democratic experience of
individual citizens in relation to other fellow citizens and to the people, proffer a novel
perspective from which to better attend to each of the frustrating situations, and finally
show how a more persevering democratic citizenship can take shape. For the problem of
the democratic subject as citizen-partisan, I propose the theory of magnanimity, arguing,
based primarily on my reading of Aristotle, that we need to promote the sense of
magnanimity as a non-destructive form of superiority, which can satisfy the citizen’s urge
for superiority for the sake of keeping motivation alive while at once foreclosing any
possibility of incendiary mutual hatred and aggression. Apropos of the democratic subject
as citizen-sovereign, I provide the theory of the sublime people by drawing largely on
Kant’s aesthetic. I demonstrate that by attending more closely to the limitlessness of the
people, we can better understand the fear and delight or anxiety and excitement that
individual democratic citizens may genuinely feel when they invoke, encounter, and
engage with the claimed people. My theory encourages individual citizens to participate
in the liminal experience of the sublime people without confusing any rigidly held
construct of the pseudo-people with the immediate presence of the people. The
experience of sublime could allow individual democratic citizens to see themselves
elevated through recognizing and overcoming the limits of their own imagination,
thereby paving the way for the ongoing regeneration of the people.
My views of citizen-partisan and citizen-sovereign tacitly suggest the third mode
of democratic subjectivity or agency, which I call citizen-becoming. Both magnanimity
and sublimity are proposed in a way to serve the maturation of the democratic self.
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Certainly, these are not moralist prescriptions recommended to impose on democratic
citizens. For my theories of magnanimity and sublimity are expected to steer citizens
down the path by tapping their moral-psychological satisfactions and aesthetic pleasures.
Yet my project, still, assumes that it is preferable and worthwhile for citizens to actively
participate in a series of vital and pressing democratic activities in the communicative
and symbolic dimensions of democratic politics on the condition that they sustain and
further develop their capacities and motivation so as to secure maximum openness to the
future engagement. Both magnanimity and sublimity require some temporal space to
grow, which in fact presumes a particular understanding of democratic time and
temporality. Now, I would like to turn the question of time and frustration.

DEMOCRATIC TIME BIFURCATED
Time is notoriously difficult to investigate. It is so shadowy, elusive, and unfathomable a
concept, which often escapes simple articulation.285 First, time seems to be a prerequisite
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for our own existence, something we cannot not assume a priori.286 Yet the category of
time itself is a social product as well, which bears particular social and political
determinations.287 Time, in this manner, is a structure discernible only within a particular
socio-political framework of temporality.
For instance, Emile Durkheim highlights the social origin of time-consciousness
by pointing out that “‘[t]he division into days, weeks, months, years, etc., corresponds to
the recurrence of rites, festivals, and public ceremonies at regular intervals.”288 Time is
objective, public, and orderly, defining the rhythms and regularity of our existence. We
can hardly express our temporal existence without objective signs and methods whose
bases are undoubtedly social and collective. The best graphic illustration of the
connection between the temporal and the social (and the political) is perhaps Joseph
Conrad’s description of anarchist resistance in his novel The Secret Agent. Mr. Verloc,
the anarchist hero, takes a mission to explode the Greenwich Observatory. To blow up
the symbol of centralized time is deemed to make the centralized political power
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shattered.289
On the other hand, however, time is deeply internalized and personalized, whose
essence can only be grasped subjectively. As Saint Augustine aptly pointed out, time is in
us as much as we are in time. Plenty of notable philosophers and writers, especially from
the end of the nineteenth century onward, have drawn much attention to this authentic
experience of felt-time. These are a group of people who embodied the kind of
disorienting yet romantic atmosphere of fin-de-siècle evidenced by their resistance to the
sweeping rationalization, bureaucratization, and acceleration in rates of production,
transportation, and communication of the time. Perhaps it was the growing predominance
of objectivity, as Georg Simmel once put, that triggered the fascination of them with the
opposite.290
Examples abound across different genres. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology
began with a rediscovery of the inner awareness of time. Henri-Louis Bergson redefined
the notion of duration [la durée] as an authentic, unquantifiable, and non-spatial
conception of time with which we better understand our experience of true freedom.
Marcel Proust displayed the enchanting and captivating experience of “a fragment of time
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in the pure state” [un peu de temps à l’état pur], and Walter Benjamin, who was deeply
inspired by Proust, also laid stress on the revealing moment of awakening [das
Erwachen].291 These examples show the mounting interests of the writers in grappling
with the temporal experience of inmost authenticity. By illuminating and attending to the
field of subjective felt-time, these thinkers sought out a kind of deliverance from the
relentless course of objective and mechanical time.
When it comes to democratic time, people tend to adopt the dichotomous pattern
of time. But, here, the layers of bifurcation have been multiplied: objective and
subjective, apathetic and intense, stretched out and short-lived, and ordinary and extraordinary.
For example, Max Weber once stated that “[we] are all ‘occasional’ politicians
[Gelegenheitspolitiker].”292 In the context of modern democracy, according to Weber,
ordinary people may act politically, but they do so only sporadically. The extent of their
involvement in politics seems markedly insignificant and its time span is fairly short. The
implication is twofold. First, the everyday phenomenon that can best characterize the
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political life of ordinary citizens in modern democracy is rather passive acquiescence
than active participation. Second, however rare and episodic, there still comes some
occasion so impassioned and political that the inactive daily routine can be temporarily
suspended. Weber’s own proposal of leadership democracy [Führerdemokratie]
highlights the need to undercut the tyranny of bureaucracy—manifested in the famous
image of “iron cage” or “a shell as hard as steel [stahlhartes Gehäuse], to be more
precise”293—while emphasizing an opportune time [kairos] of interruption in which the
charismatic leader emerges in tandem with and by virtue of democratic plebiscitary
participation.294
The similar contrast between ordinary and extraordinary time is pronounced in the
political thought of Hannah Arendt as well. Although Arendt’s first and foremost
contribution to contemporary political theory centers on her denunciation of the
Weberian paradigm of political rule and power as Herrschaft,295 she nonetheless helps
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perpetuate, as it were, the binary of ordinary non-political and extraordinary political
time. Arendt famously distinguishes political action from labor and work. Labor displays
the temporality of sheer repetition that corresponds to the cyclical rhythm of life itself
while work is a forward-looking project defined and determined by the linear progression
of artificial human time. The temporalities of both activities amount to the time of the
everyday. On the other hand, action is deemed to be rare, fleeting, and extraordinary.
Insofar as action—the political activity par excellence—bears the qualities of true
novelty and unusual theatricality that disturb the dominance of the regular progression of
time, the temporality of action can be judged as truly extraordinary.296 With her
distinctive treatment of action, therefore, Arendt, not unlike Weber, accepts and
reinforces the divided time-consciousness.
Contemporary democratic theorists seem to overemphasize relatively short-lived
moments of higher register in one way or another. Some theorists interpret those
claims that archein should be understood with its paired counterpart prattein; the
former originally meant ‘to begin’ or ‘to lead’ and the latter ‘to achieve’. Her account
of archê suggests a more horizontal and egalitarian relationship among equal fellow
citizens rather than the Weberian hierarchical relationship between sovereign master
(Herrscher) and its subjects. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958). See also Patchen Markell, “The Rule of the
People: Arendt, Archê, and Democracy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 100
No. 1 (2006).
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allegedly authentic democratic moments as reinvigorating the monotonous institutional
democracy, while others take those instants to be even more radical so as to fuel a more
fundamentally transformative or oppositional politics. Margaret Canovan, for example,
understands that democracy has both procedural and redemptive sides, which are
conflicting but at once mutually complementing each other. Her complementary or
reconciliatory thesis suggests that constant misrepresentation and failure of procedural
democracy should be regarded as creating a fertile ground for a redemptive democratic
politics, which would challenge but ultimately help keep animating the machinery of
democracy.297
Sheldon Wolin also lays stress on two configurations of democracy. In democratic
theory and practice, there are “two diametrically opposed notions that symbolize two
equally opposed states of affairs.” “One is the settled structure of politics and
governmental authority typically called a constitution, and the other is the unsettling
political movement typically called revolution.” These two states of affairs are often
taken to be mutually antithetical. For constitution is “the suppression of revolution” and
revolution, “the destruction of constitution.” Albeit opposed, states Wolin, the two
notions are connected by way of their respective relations to democracy. Hence
democracy’s two configurations: constitutional democracy or “democracy housed within
297
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a constitution” and “aconstitutional conception of democracy or democracy “as resistant
to the rationalizing conception of power and its organization.”298
Apparent in Wolin’s analysis, again, is the tacit acceptance of the two
diametrically opposed modes of democratic time. In other words, democracy is construed
either as routine mechanical processes controlled and constrained by its constitutional
and institutional forms or as rare and short-lived revolutionary movements energized by
ordinary citizens’ spontaneous and intense actions. The greatness of democracy,
according to Wolin, lies in its vitality, energies, and overflowing excesses. Only the
latter, which is believed to suspend the normal progression of the everyday by creating
momentary intervals of extraordinary egalitarian politics, can be called an authentic
democracy. Here, Wolin, too, employs the dichotomous temporal frame by idealizing
those fleeting yet exceptional moments of collective effervescence. Although Wolin’s
proposal seems more dramatic and less associated with institutional practice than that of
Canovan, they nevertheless all value the interruptive quality of those rare moments.
When it comes to democratic time, therefore, democratic theorists are prone to
place much emphasis on relatively short-lived moments at which citizens find themselves
acting as a ruling agent by expressing their wishes, desires, and opinions through various
means of participation, electoral or otherwise. The rest of the ordinary time has hardly
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been recognized as a democratic time.299 Put differently, it seems as though we simply
assume that there are two dimensions or two axes of democratic engagement: pitch
vertically and duration horizontally, if we use a musical analogy. Pitch concerns the
intensity of engagement (high or low) while duration its elapsed time (short or long).
According to conventional wisdom widely accepted in democratic theory and practice, an
authentic democratic time is that which occupies only one quadrant reserved for high
pitch and short duration—with reference to an overtly enthusiastic yet episodic time.
This time of high intensity is sharply distinguished from and diametrically opposed to the
low pitch and seemingly endless processes that embody languid ordinariness.300
The central question, therefore, is whether the life of democratic citizens can be
fully captured and elaborated within this bifurcated temporal frame. This view of
democratic time can go awry, but not because the differentiation between ordinary and
extraordinary time in democracy cannot be discernible. To continue to use a musical
analogy, there is an acoustical reason that we tend to focus more on (or hear more
clearly) a melody that sits in the high range of texture. Likewise, it is understandable that
299
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we pay more attention almost naturally to the exceptional events of higher register.
Nonetheless, the bifurcated view of democratic time can still be problematic because this
frame can constrain the ways in which democratic citizens understand their political
agency temporally. First, it would push citizens to a false choice, a choice between
retreating into the humdrum routine of ordinary time and taking part in extraordinary
spectacular events as if the only way they can experience democratic time is by conjuring
it up as a series of ordinary proceedings drained of élan vital save just a few ebullient but
rare and short-lived events. These two modalities are mutually constitutive and
intensifying: the former appears to be mostly abstract, trivial, and monotonous only in the
light of the latter, and vice versa. Second, it naturalizes the pattern of thinking about and
organizing democratic life in terms of disruption, intensity, and instantaneousness rather
than continuity, duration, and growth.
What is missing in this picture? Quite ironically, it is time itself that is absent.
Again, I do not mean to underestimate the value of short-term but largely ephemeral
extraordinary forms of democratic participation and mobilization—electoral or popular. It
is understandable that those moments of higher intensity draw much attention. Elections
matter. Critical elections matter to a greater extent. Fugitive moments of democratic
action are of great importance. My point, however, is that all of them matter especially
when they serve to inspire future action and help strengthen the ongoing methodical work
of politics. The problem is that the overemphasis on extraordinary moments tends to
increase the dependence of transformation on exceptional events, crisis, and
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sensationalism.301
The exception attracts quick attention and crisis calls for radical change. As its
etymological root—krinein, or to decide—indicates, crisis designates a particular pointtime when a resolute decision should be made. What effect would this trend of
highlighting momentary time have on ordinary individual citizens? At the moment of
exception, time comes at us from ahead fast. It arouses the sense of urgency and
promotes impatience. This situation itself may not be destructive. It could even be
productive as it stimulates the urges for a far-reaching revolutionary reform that can
extirpate the root of the problem. Yet it is also true that when the level of excitement is
too high, people usually want to see a quick fix. They prefer an immediate
improvement—which often comes as a merely temporary expedient carried out with less
efforts or reflection—over a change that would take much more time and endeavors.
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My point is that real change (good or bad) is almost always a partial change,
which can be made even without the politics (and rhetoric) of crisis, and therefore
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When the initial excitement passes, people become more careless302 about a
concatenation of non-sensational issues. In other words, democratic citizens, who do not
necessarily think and act in strategic terms, often let themselves oscillate between
impetuousness and carelessness. These are two different forms of inattentiveness,
carrying with them too much excitement and boredom, respectively. Torn within the
dichotomous temporal consciousnesses, citizens are excessively nervous and restless
when they refuse to retreat into nonchalance, while being unable to allow themselves a
time to fully experience what is really going on. Time shrinks in the former and it
disappears into sheer mechanical movement in the latter.

NIETZSCHE AND DEMOCRATIC TIME
What needs to be restored is an alternative view of democratic time with which to
conceptualize a temporal space suitable for ordinary but impassioned experience and a
call for an art of staying in such a temporal space. This is a time that is intensely felt yet
not compressed, passionate yet rather slow, and carefully attended yet not necessarily
expressive. It is a time we can call a journey or project, highlighting its diuturnity and
invitation to undertaking. This particularly arduous and prolonged dimension of
democratic time is where the citizen can exist as citizen-becoming.
Citizen-becoming is a mode of democratic subjectivity distinguishable from the
other two categories I used previously, citizen-partisan and citizen-sovereign. The most
302
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remarkable difference is that there is no real or symbolic counterpart with or against
which the subjectivity of citizen-becoming takes shape. It is obvious that citizen-partisan
and citizen-sovereign are expressive of democratic agency. Their performance as a doer
is clearly implicated. Yet citizen-becoming concerns the longing and realization of one’s
autonomy over time, which entails the questions of self-transformation, self-growth, and
self-overcoming.
In fact, the actor, as Arendt once pointed out, “is never merely a ‘doer’ but always
and at the same time a sufferer.”303 The democratic subject, just as the word subject
originally meant, is essentially that which suffers, or is subjected. The democratic subject
as citizen-becoming suffers that which is beyond her control—her own desires, others,
and democracy itself. The open-ended texture of democracy shows its particular bias for
change, which enables and prompts individual citizens to have a penchant for hope.304
The things individual citizens have most hoped for, however, often do not happen. Even
if their hopes do become realized, they usually do not in the way nor at the time that
would have been considered ideal. Their desires are almost destined to be
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“asymptotic.”305 Democracy’s intimation of its proclivities toward change, combined
with the deferrals of the desires that citizens ordinarily experience, constitutes a particular
discomfiture with respect to time. Moreover, as Stanley Cavell discusses in his seminal
account of Ralph Waldo Emerson, “the democratic demand for consent” presumes “the
training and character and friendship Emerson requires for democracy as preparation to
withstand not its rigors but its failures, character to keep the democratic hope alive in the
face of disappointment with it.” Cavell sees clearly the predicament that “we will be
disappointed in democracy,” and that “the human individual meant to be created and
preserved in democracy is apt to be undone by it.”306
The democratic subject thus is the one who endures frustration and resistance. She
can take the initiative in renewing or rebuilding the situation, but only through selftransformation via attending to the time of frustration. Otherwise she would only be
equipped with basic reflexes, blindly following the recurring pattern of extraordinary and
ordinary time. The secured temporal space allows the citizen to involve the longitudinal
engagement in those difficulties. The time of citizen-becoming, therefore, is a time of
suffering, convalescence, and growth. This engagement brings a heightened perception of
democratic reality, often overlooked by the clamor of the subject as a doer visible in the
short-lived moments. In order to develop my theory of time as a journey, I turn to
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Friedrich Nietzsche.
Much has been written about Nietzsche.307 As far as Nietzsche’s political theory
is concerned, there are two predominating approaches.308 On the one hand, the recent
decades have witnessed a surprising turn in Nietzsche scholarship with regard to his
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contribution to and role for “an invigoration of democratic theory.”309 Despite the fact
that Nietzsche was an unapologetic elitist who never flinched from his abhorrence of
modern democracy throughout his entire career, a number of democratic theorists have
nonetheless sought democratic possibilities in Nietzsche’s allegedly non- or antidemocratic writings.
Those commentators tend to read Nietzsche in favor of agonistic struggle geared
toward an ongoing pluralistic contestation against every attempt at conclusive closure.
Nietzsche’s acerbic and consistent criticisms of the Enlightenment philosophy, dogmatic
religion, morality, rationalism, and utilitarianism serve as important theoretical sources
for their agonistic vision of democratic politics.310 One scholar suggests that we view
Nietzsche’s idea of Übermensch as an inspiring ideal type, claiming that “[every]
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individual should emulate this figure as an illustration of what one can become if only
one were to engage oneself in the way of creation.”311
Amid this growing trend of democratic rendition of Nietzsche, on the other hand,
we have heard some voices to the contrary as well. Frederick Appel and other scholars
have reasserted the undeniably aristocratic political posture in Nietzsche’s philosophy.
They take those democratic theorists to task for the selective reading of Nietzsche. They
claim that Nietzsche’s elitist and authoritarian stance should be thoroughly understood,
and if we do, it is hard to interpret his political theory as promoting democratic openness
and difference.312
Although I, too, seek democratic possibilities in Nietzsche, my goal here remains
local and therefore modest. I aim to offer a close reading of a number of passages for the
purpose of conceptualizing the way that citizens can cultivate a novel view of democratic
time. Nietzsche’s sensitivity toward time—both tempo and temporality —helps us form a
revision that would demand the correction of many of the stereotypes of bifurcated time
pointed out earlier. His view of time is intimately intertwined with his understanding of,
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or attitude toward, suffering. We can perhaps even say that his ideas of becoming and
self-overcoming are ultimately about how to stay with and make most use of the negative.
Let me begin with proposing a critical assessment of one particular interpretation
of Nietzsche. The prime example, especially as long as our purpose is concerned, is
William Connolly’s democratic reading of Nietzsche. Connolly stands out as strongest
among others in that he uses Nietzsche’s notion of time as a means to build his own
theory of democratic time as a rift. Since my main concern is not with investigating
whether or to what extent Connolly is (or whoever else can be) Nietzsche’s most
legitimate commentator,313 my disagreement with Connolly is nothing to do with the fact
that he has formulated a position that Nietzsche would never defend. There is no
ambiguity about his departure from Nietzsche.314 Like Connolly, I also aim to interpret
Nietzsche as my guiding company in thinking about particular questions such as
democratic time, without necessarily endorsing his overall positions. Yet the lesson I
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draw from Nietzsche is quite different from that of Connolly.
Reading Nietzsche for his version of radical democracy, Connolly provides an
interesting twofold claim, especially with regard to the question of time. First, not only
did Nietzsche clearly recognize the accelerated pace of modern time, he also understood
the very phenomenon as something deeply democratic. Second, despite Nietzsche’s
supposed abhorrence of democracy, his overall project—updated in Connolly’s deft
hands—could be in service of the provocation of democratic time as a disruptive rift.
The passage to which Connolly draws special attention is from The Twilight of the
Idols:
[Democratism] has been the form in which the organizing force
manifests its decline. … The West in its entirety has lost the sort of
instincts that give rise to institutions, that give rise to a future: it
might well be that nothing rubs its ‘modern spirit’ the wrong way
more than this. People live for today, people live very fast, —
people live very irresponsibly: and this is precisely what people
call ‘freedom’.”315
Connolly warns against the tendency of reading this passage as only displaying
Nietzsche’s lamentation over the democratization of the modern world. “Lurking within
this lamentation,” argues Connolly, “is the understanding that a quick pace of life and
democracy are closely interwoven.”316 Democratic life so understood tends to be
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dismissive of a long and steady time befitting any teleological and traditional worldview.
Nietzsche’s unflinching disdain for democracy notwithstanding, claims Connolly,
it is misleading to believe that he would have absolute, deep-seated aversion to the
“significant shift in the tempo of life” in democracy. According to Connolly, Nietzsche
rather prizes the fragmented and disruptive temporality that democracy seems to presume
because it is prone to engender a certain condition conducive to, rather than hostile to, his
anti-foundational pluralism. Even while taking Nietzsche to task for his “aristocratic
lamentation,” Connolly reads him as a harbinger of democratic pluralism whose ideas of
tempo and temporality, particularly, can guide us into thinking about the fractal present
promoting “the possibility of improvisation and self-experimentation.”317
Connolly’s efforts to portray Nietzsche as a proponent of the disruptive
temporality and fast tempo that he himself endorses continue unabated in his reading of
Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal recurrence of the same [die ewige Wiederkunft des
Gleichen], arguably the culmination of his poetic vision of time and temporality. Like
many of Nietzsche scholars, Connolly pays special heed to the section from Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, entitled “On the Vision and the Riddle [Vom Gesicht und Räthsel],” where
Nietzsche envisages an image of time as a gateway. This passage is meant for a dwarf
who has been involved in a dramatized conversation with Zarathustra:
Behold this gateway, dwarf!’ I went on: ‘it has two aspects. Two
paths come together here: no one has ever reached their end. ‘This
long lane behind us: it goes on for an eternity. And that long lane
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ahead of us—that is another eternity. ‘They are in opposition to
one another, these paths; they abut on one another: and it is here at
this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is
written above it: “Moment”. … ‘Behold this moment!’ I went on.
‘From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs back: an
eternity lies behind us.318
At first glance, Nietzsche seems to underscore a magnificent moment [Augenblick]319,
which suspends the linear operation of mechanized time. For Connolly, “the gateway
Moment” is primarily the time of dissonance where two opposing paths offend each
other. The “Moment,” says Connolly, is “a protracted present,” which creates an occasion
ripe for “accidents” by suspending ordinary punctual time. This image of time portrays
the vitality of life, which escapes the simple logic of causality. Here, eternal recurrence is
not as much about “the repetition of long cycles” as about “the fecundity of the moment
from which new twists and turns can flow,”320 which intimates a Deleuzean open
future.321 The primary source of democratic possibilities that Connolly seeks in Nietzsche
is this idea of time as a rift, rupture, or fracture, which is conducive to “a spirit of
presumptive generosity” for a more active and agonistic democratic politics.322
For sure, Nietzsche’s aesthetic view of life could be read against the dissecting
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and mechanizing course of time that reduces human life to dead matter. Connolly’s
rendition of Nietzsche, however, exposes two problems. The first problem is Connolly’s
negligence or mischaracterization of the complexity with respect to what he understands
to be “the significant shift in the tempo of life.” The other one is his ignorance of the
kinetic element of Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence, not just of the idea itself, but of
what this particular idea causes to be done. I will address the first problem here and the
second one in the following section.
Let us first return to Nietzsche’s comment from The Twilight of the Idols: “One
lives for today, one lives very fast—one lives very irresponsibly: it is precisely this which
one calls “freedom.”323 The reason that we cannot read this statement merely as a
welcoming remark as Connolly did is not just because we see here Nietzsche’s mockery
of “freedom” (in quotation marks) as license quite conspicuously.324 For Nietzsche, the
decline of the power of organization—especially, of an older kind which was based on
transcendent values, profoundly exemplified by Platonic metaphysics and Christianity—
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marks a new beginning. But it is rather a challenge than a triumph. We need to approach
to this new beginning with alacrity, but this does not mean that we can bear and bear with
time as a rift and fracture wholeheartedly.
We can find Nietzsche’s similar tone in his discussion of the demise of God as
well. Nietzsche’s concern there is not so much about declaring God’s demise—for it is
“an accomplished fact of recent Western history”325—as about the ways in which we
think and feel about its demise. In The Gay Science, he attends to the problem without
jubilation or lamentation. What he faces is rather a predicament:
God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How can
we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?” 326
The predicament that looms large is nihilism, or the radical repudiation of meaning. With
the withering away of the otherworldly foundation of the old belief system, its structure
of meaning has collapsed. It is daunting rather than liberating because we are now
inclined to choose between a positivistic and a nihilistic embrace of meaninglessness.
“The significant shift in the tempo of life” is the tempo that could facilitate
nihilism. Nietzsche finds it disturbing because people lose their touch with “the right
time.”327 This is why Connolly’s portrayal of Nietzsche seems to go awry. Following
Nietzsche’s path, Walter Benjamin and Byung-Chul Han take into serious account the
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issue of time without meaning. Benjamin sees this time as robbed of meaning because
“[its] method” now has become merely “additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the
homogenous and empty time.”328 In the same vein of thought, Han distinguishes “the
operation of a processor [Prozessor]” which “proceeds solely through addition” from
“the procession [Prozession].”329
Both “processor” and “procession” derive from the Latin verb
procedere, which means “to step forward.” The procession is
harnessed by narration scenically. Scenography marks them.
Because of their narrativity, a particular temporality inhabits them.
Therefore it is neither possible nor meaningful to accelerate their
procedere. Narration is not addition at all. The procedere of the
processor, on the other hand, lacks all narrativity. Its activity has
no image, no scenes. In contrast to the procession, it tells [erzählt]
nothing. It simply counts [zählt].330
Han here captures the decline of temporal gravitation or temporal tension, which would
transform time into “a mere sequence of point-like presences.”331 The modern time, in a
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word, has become a disenchanted processor. The time, being deprived of its narrative
quality, now “seems to overtake itself.”332
Here, Han makes a very important conceptual distinction between experience
[Erfahrung] and experiencing [Erlebnis]. Whereas the former presumes temporal
extension, the latter does not necessarily do so. We can say, for example, “[t]he
significant shift in the tempo of life” makes people feel constantly hastened on. They are
probably prepared, perhaps too readily, for momentary experiencing [Erlebnis]. What
seems to be lacking is enough time for a genuine experience [Erfahrung].333
The experience merits special attention. As Giacomo Marramao rightly pointed
out, the experience is experience-journey [Er-fahrung], which is like “taking a
journey.”334 Reinhard Koselleck also noted that the verb “erfahren (to have an
experience) implies going from one place to another,” which involves “something like a
journey[.]”335 As will be discussed more in the following pages, taking a journey is in
fact what Zarathustra displays with regard to the idea of eternal recurrence, not the
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indulgence in eternal now as Connolly seeks to demonstrates.336 If fractured, ruptured,
and accelerated time prevents us from, rather than invites us to, undertaking a genuine
experience, Nietzsche would rather have us pause. He rather praises quite the opposite
tempo of life. Two examples will suffice: one from The Gay Science and the other from
Ecce Homo, his autobiographic essay.
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche explains some “atavism” that “rare human beings
of an age” represent. It is as though they appear suddenly as “late ghosts of past cultures
and their powers” because they are so rare and extraordinary especially in the world
everything “change[s]” too rapidly.” Here, he stresses the importance of preservation
against the fast tempo. Hence his comments: “in our case, what is absolutely necessary is
an andante of development, as the tempo of a passionate and slow spirit[.]”337 Second
one, which is from Ecce Homo, describes a passage from the earlier part of the second
book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.338 Setting aside his apparent pompousness and generous
use of figural languages—both of which are not unusual for him—we can see his high

336

Once Zarathustra uses a metaphor of river to describe his self-overcoming.
“When Zarathustra was on dry land again he did not go directly to his mountains and
his cave, but instead took many ways and asked many questions and found out this
and that, saying of himself jokingly: “Look at the river that flows back to its source in
many windings!” For he wanted to learn [Denn er wollte in Erfahrung], what had
transpired in the meantime among human beings[.]” Nietzsche, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, Book III, “On Virtue that Makes Small,” 133.

337

Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §10.

338

The passage is as follows: “The figs fall from the trees, they are good and sweet;
and as they fall, their red skin ruptures. I am a north wind to ripe figs. Thus, like
figs, these teachings fall to you, my friends: now drink their juice and their sweet
flesh! It is autumn all around and pure sky and afternoon.” Nietzsche, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, Book II, “On the Blessed Isles.”

169

praise of the tempo of the speeches: “a tender adagio.”339
It is not unusual for Nietzsche to emphasize a medium or rather slow tempo—he
even asserts that his blood “moves slowly”340— precisely because one of the most
important and overarching themes for him—both Zarathustra in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
and himself in Ecce Homo—is convalescence, which should be understood in the context
of a self-overcoming journey.
Why do we need an andante or even adagio in democracy? Why and how is the
accelerated and fractured tempo and temporality detrimental to our democratic life? One
answer is given no other than Sheldon Wolin. Wolin takes the question of time and tempo
in his opening essay for Theory & Event entitled “What Time Is It?” He demonstrated
that the accelerated pace of modern life has been a real threat to both democratic theory
and practice. Wolin is concerned with “a pervasive temporal disjunction that has
contributed to serious political difficulties and helped to make the task of the theorist
daunting.”341
By that temporal disjunction he means the discrepancy between the tempo of
democratic politics (and theory) and that of economy (or popular culture and war).
Whereas the latter is mostly “dictated by innovation, change, and replacement through
obsolescence,” claims Wolin, democracy “requires … a leisurely pace.” The same applies
to theory as well. He laments over the fact that our daily life has become more vulnerable
339
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to the accelerated turnover times of capital, fashion, et cetera. He clearly acknowledges
that the current temporal mode of political existence whose characteristic volatility and
ephemerality have failed to preserve and foster a fertile condition for democratic politics
and theory: democracy has “thus exchanged the tempos of deliberation and
contemplation for the temporal rhythms of contemporary culture and economy.”342
Wolin’s firm resistance to the disjunctive and accelerated temporality may
surprise some readers. It would even provoke those who otherwise admire his radical
democratic position to displeasure. As I briefly sketched Wolin’s view on democracy
earlier, he normally understands democracy “as resistant to the rationalizing conception
of power and its organization” or what he defines as “aconstitutional conception of
democracy.”343 His notion of fugitive democracy is rather disruptive, transgressive, and
demotic. The tempo of fugitive democracy does not necessarily have to be extremely
hasty, but does not sound so leisurely either. But, here, in this essay, Wolin sounds more
like Max Weber for whom politics means “slow, strong drilling through hard
boards[.]”344
Yet my call for a Nietzschean passionate and slow tempo does not just mean to
appreciate the time of deliberation and contemplation. It must be geared toward the
journey of self-overcoming. Before we delve more into the question of self-overcoming, I
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would like to note that the mischaracterization of the Nietzschean tempo by Connolly and
the likes might have proceeded from their confusion of being fast and being lively, only
the latter of which is almost always approved as commendable by Nietzsche. In order to
elucidate this point, I would make a short excursion into Robert Schumann.

INTERLUDE: ALLEGRO, NOT PRESTO
Robert Schumann’s G-minor Piano Sonata (No. 2 Opus 22) begins with a lively
movement. Schumann indicated a tempo on the score: “as quickly as you can” [so rasch
wie möglich]. Interestingly, what follows later in the coda is Schumann’s seemingly
unrealistic direction: “faster” [schneller], and then, “even faster” [noch schneller].
Without acknowledging two different kinds of tempo implicit in these directions, one
may misunderstand Schumann’s point and thus be left wondering what his direction
could possibly mean other than an embroidering overstatement that nobody can actually
execute.
The confusion is first caused by translations. Following Beethoven, Schumann at
the time believed that the notations on music should be written in German. The term
“rasch” refers to allegro while “schnell” indicates presto. Perhaps quite different from
what we currently believe, there were originally only two terms indicating tempo with
regard to its speed: adagio or slow and presto or fast. Allegro was originally an indication
signifying the mood of a piece of music: cheerful and lively as opposed to solemn [grave]
and languid [lento]. For example, we can say “allegro e presto” for an expression mark
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demanding a particularly cheerful mood [allegro] and the fast speed [presto].
Schumann’s original notations, therefore, can be interpreted as indicating two separate
messages: the nuance of the movement of notes [rasch; allegro] and the rate of the beat
[schnell; presto].345
This revealing example of allegro and presto helps us to think further about the
question of time and tempo entangled with its moods. Nietzsche is precisely important
because he seems to understand a particular way of living with time, that is, taking a
journey slowly yet cheerfully.

BECOMING AND SELF-OVERCOMING
Connolly sees Nietzsche “as a prophet of time as becoming in a world without God.” He
contrasts “the experience of punctual time” to “becoming” in favor of the latter which he
identifies as “real time.” Real time is a time ripe for “divine accidents.” It is the
“Moment” so fecund and pivotal as to make “new twists and turns” that exceed efficient
causality. Connolly, in so doing, perpetuates the popular opposition of the ordinary and
the extraordinary time, hoping for the “paradoxical coincidence of fulfillment and
interruption,”346 opened up by the pure moment.
The problem of this overemphasis on the divine aspect of becoming is that it may
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blind us from seeing its human aspect. For Nietzsche, first and foremost, becoming
simply refers to change, or the fact that everything changes. Nietzsche affirms the dictum
of Heraclitus, panta rhei: “Heraclitus will always be right in thinking that being is an
empty fiction. The ‘apparent world’ is the only world: the ‘true world’ is just a lie added
on to it [hinzugelogen].”347 And “[c]hange does not stop.”348 Time, or change, however,
arises by and for perspectives. For Nietzsche, we are not disinterested spectators with
respect to our change. The sensitivity toward motions and changes cannot be separated
from the heightened interests in growth and degeneration.
The basic temporal structure of becoming is determined by will or striving.349
Willing or Striving involves a reach toward the future, and this movement, “that which
gives the forms which are the pathos of any life,”350 is also famously called will to power
[Wille zur Macht]. The will to power is first explained as a process of organism,
applicable to all living creatures. What all of these would mean to an individual is that
she could and should reflect upon herself in terms of her striving, suffering, overcoming,
and growth. This requires a backward look as well. For in order to understand her own
aims, she “must uncover the processes that shaped the drives working in [her].” In other
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words, she “must grasp what function the drive plays in her, by seeing why she has it.”351
This is in fact what genealogy is for.352
Here I pay attention to the relationship between the will to power, selfovercoming, and suffering, or how Nietzsche sees suffering intimately tied to both what
we have become and what we might become. Echoing the doer/sufferer duality I quoted
from Arendt earlier, Nietzsche understands that “every action calls forth suffering” and
“[all] suffering calls for action.”353 What is obvious in the human condition is that “the
more we get involved in the active dimension of our existence, the more keenly we feel
its passive dimension or our vulnerability to suffering.”354 As long as we keep on acting,
we cannot avoid our suffering. As T. K. Seung emphasizes, “[to] suffer is to be passive,
which is the meaning of the Greek word pathe[.]”355 The will to power entails suffering.
For Nietzsche, two strategies are starkly juxtaposed with each other with respect
to the question of suffering: “abolishing suffering” [Leiden abschaffen] and “constructing
suffering” [Leiden schaffen].356 According to Nietzsche, traditional moralists, scientific
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determinism, and nihilism all represent the former. They all hold the view that “suffering
is something that needs to be abolished.”357 As far as our purpose is concerned, the most
serious problem of this approach is its determined inattention to the formative element of
suffering. They see suffering as either something we have to avoid, or something that we
have to passively accept while hoping for the final compensation. Nietzsche challenges
both. Defending the discipline of suffering [Die Zucht des Leidens] instead, Nietzsche
contends:
[Don’t] you know that this discipline has been the sole cause of
every enhancement in humanity so far? The tension that breeds
strength into the unhappy soul, its shudder at the sight of great
destruction, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, surviving,
interpreting, and exploiting unhappiness, and whatever depth,
secrecy, whatever masks, spirit, cunning, greatness it has been
given:—weren’t these the gifts of suffering, of the disciple of great
suffering?358
This passage does not just affirm the truistic idea: no pain, no gain. It rather shows how
the movement of the will to power takes a variety of forms and the need for us to
recognize it. Suffering is an unhappy and frustrating site for self-overcoming via
reflecting upon the will to power.
Self-overcoming [Sebsüberwindung] is arguably the central theme of Thus Spoke
“Leiden schaffen—sich selber und Anderen—um sie zum hōchsten Leben, dem des
Siegers zu befähigen—wäre mein Ziel.”
357
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Zarathustra. Perhaps contrary to the conventional wisdom, I view Zarathustra primarily
as a sufferer, not as a Übermensch. By that I am less interested in the highest ethical and
aesthetical values that Zarathustra as value-creator displays—often pictured as the
Dionysian rapturous superabundance—than in the journey he cannot but undertake.
While not underestimating the heroic stature of Zarathustra, I point out that Thus Spoke
Zarathustra is primarily the story of him “going under,”359 not of his ascent to zenith.
Self-overcoming requires temporal space, envisioning a particular temporality.
Right before the section called “On Self-Overcoming” in the second book of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, we see Zarathustra recalling and musing on his losses and sufferings. He
cries out to his enemies, or it could just be a soliloquy: “More evil you did to me than all
murder of human beings. You took from me what was irretrievable[.]” What was taken
away from Zarathustra? Those include his youth, wisdom, yearning, and pledge. He
meditates: “How did I bear it? How did I overturn and overcome such wounds? How did
my soul rise again from these graves?”360 He knows how far he has overcome.
Three points are important here. First, it is unclear who exactly his enemies are.
But what seems obvious is that Zarathustra clearly sees, and possibly casts his bitter
accusations against, the power of time. What he has lost is that which he once possessed
and enjoyed. Thinking of those things he held so dear, Zarathustra is now looking
backward. The tension between his autonomous will and the brutal necessity of time
appears on the surface. Second, his overcoming is his convalescence. It includes the
359
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process of healing wounds. In fact, it is the beginning and ending of the self-overcoming
process. Third, it is his “invulnerable” and “unburiable” “will”361 that has made possible
of his self-overcoming, which is therefore a good preparation for the discussion on the
subject of self-overcoming and the will to power.
In “On Self-Overcoming,” Zarathustra talks to the “wisest ones.” The wisest are
truth-seekers, believing that they are driven by their conviction, morality, or “will to
truth.” Yet Zarathustra points out that their alleged “will to truth” is in fact nothing but “a
will to power” in disguise, implying that the most fundamental driving force of life is the
will to power even though like the wisest, we may not be full aware of this half-hidden
motivations. The people, who are unwise, are deemed to be better in that they know,
perhaps intuitively, the basic premise that life moves lively by virtue of its will to power.
Zarathustra’s teaching on the will to power continues. He recounts what he has
learned from “life,” or “the living.” The lesson is threefold. First, “all living is an
obeying.” Second, “the one who cannot obey himself is commanded.” Third,
“commanding is harder than obeying.” Zarathustra opposes commanding to obeying, but
at once complicates the relationship between the two. He understands that the power to
command is predicated on the capacity to obey. He urges us to see the intricate working
of the pleasure coming from the will to be master. Zarathustra implies that selfovercoming is an ongoing struggle against oneself. It involves a temporal extension. We
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have “crooked paths” to “walk.”362
Here, I propose a political reading of “On Self-Overcoming.” The lesson that we
can draw here is rather political, or even democratic. Zarathustra’s insights into the
relationship between commanding and obeying evoke the classic definition of democratic
rule by Aristotle. What distinguishes a constitutional rule [politikē archē] from a rule of a
master [despoteia or despotikē archē], according to Aristotle, is the democratic principle
of power sharing.”363 The citizen performs his agency both as a ruler [archon] and the
ruled [archomenos]. “The excellence of the citizen,” states Aristotle, includes both
“ruling and obeying.” The ruler in a constitutional rule “must learn by obeying.”364 That
is the meaning of to be part of “the free” [eleutheros].365
Zarathustra says that “all commanding … is an experiment and a risk[.]” Selfcommanding or autonomy is a risky and burdensome experiment in part because in so
doing, we make ourselves “the judge and avenger and victim of [our] own law.” What is
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required of us is a heightened awareness of the intricate movement of the will to power.
Both the strong and the weak exercise the will to power in a variety of ways. Since
commanding is harder than obeying, people might aspire to command via obeying, and
vice versa. We should be able to see what we are doing when we are ruled as much as
when we are ruling. To invoke the earlier passage on the discipline of suffering, this is the
time when the suffering of the frustrated gives rise to “inventiveness and courage in
enduring, surviving, interpreting, and exploiting unhappiness[.]”366 Zarathustra also
mentions the possibility of “the weaker who sneaks into the fortress and straight to the
heart of the more powerful—and there … steals power.”367 In addition, we need to
consider the opposite case as well: whether we choose to exercise the will to power
against us. One illustrative example is given by Montesquieu.
Montesquieu once deftly described the cunning of the will to power in his story of
Troglodytes.368 Troglodytes were a group of primitive people who once were subject to a
fierce rule by a foreign king. After conspiring to kill the king and wiping out the entire
royal family, Troglodytes were able to choose their own government. They tried many
different forms. First they selected magistrates but became annoyed too soon and
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slaughtered them all. Then, they chose to let their savagery rule the society, agreeing to
refuse to obey anyone. Everyone welcomed the idea, but absent of sympathy, fairness,
and justice, most of them suffered from famine, flood, property disputes, diseases, and
eventually perished.
Only two virtuous families survived the collapse of their community, and they
continued to thrive while establishing and practicing a virtuous democratic rule. Then, at
the peak of their prosperity and virtue, they suddenly decided to choose a king. The man
who was chosen as king by the assembly was an old, virtuous, and respectful citizen. He
said to the deputies of the assembly that “if you are absolutely determined to [bestow the
crown upon me] I must perforce accept it; but you may be certain that I shall die of
misery, having at birth seen the Troglodytes free, and today seeing them subjects.”369 The
lamentation of the new king well summarized the problem of the Troglodytes:
I can see exactly what is happening, Troglodytes; your virtue is
becoming burdensome; in your present situation, without a leader,
you have to be virtuous in spite of yourselves, for otherwise you
could not survive, you would fall into the misfortunes of your
earliest forefathers; but you find this yoke too heavy to bear, you
prefer to be subject to a prince and to obey his laws, which would
be less strict than your own customs; you know that then you will
be able to satisfy your ambition, amass riches, and live a life of
ease and self-indulgent pleasure; and that, as long as you avoid
serious crime, you will have no need of virtue.370
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This is a colorful illustration of the will to power, which resonates deeply, rather in an
inverted way, with the comment of Zarathustra: “even in the will of the serving I found
the will to be master.”371
Against the overemphasis on the Nietzschean non-punctuated divinely accidental
time, I have underlined the human side of his notions of becoming. Becoming is the will
to power, aiming at self-overcoming. Self-overcoming requires the discipline of
suffering, which demands an astute attention to oneself within the extended temporal
space. It is a journey, or, as Zarathustra put, a walk on a crooked path. Both Stoic peace
of mind [apatheia] and Epicurean tranquility [ataraxia] cannot be Nietzsche’s ideal.372 It
is even harmful to expunge suffering from our experience. He rather follows the tragic
tradition: pathei mathos.373

CONVALESCENCE: A JOURNEY TO HOME VIA FRUSTRATION
A striving for self-overcoming requires a genuine experience [Erfahrung]. If we can talk
about the democratic subject as citizen-becoming, she would be the one who undertakes a
journey of self-overcoming. Such an experience marks the maturation of the democratic
self, and this journey defies the desire for adhering to the dichotomous time371
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consciousness. The operative dualism emphasizes the unusual and excessive excitement
about the extraordinary moments, which is predicated on or even demands the distinctive
monotony of the everydayness. Two distinct times are thought to be interruptive and
offensive to each other but ultimately mutually interdependent. In other words, citizens
can easily be trapped in the recurring oscillation between inertial apathy and
untrammeled dedication to the momentary events. They leave their ordinary time largely
unattended and uncultivated, which further intensifies the dichotomous understanding of
democratic time. Being easily drawn into the vicissitudes of the ordinary and the
extraordinary, citizens likely keep the mundane everyday at bay.
Yet the citizen would hardly see her own growth unless she becomes a true
dweller in the everyday.374 As Nietzsche worried, she could remain far less accessible to
herself. Essential is to learn how to stay or tarry in the ordinary time. To pay due
attention to the ordinary, however, does not mean to simply indulge in daily trivial
pleasures by completely surrendering to the present. It rather means to build or restore the
narrativity of becoming and self-overcoming by way of facing, attending to, and bearing
witness to—rather than avoiding—one’s own suffering and difficulty. Suffering has a
cognitive and psychological value. The restored narrative resists the opposition of tense,
disruptive, yet fleeting moment and lengthy, mechanical, yet disinterested process in
favor of a carefully nuanced cooperation of the two for the sake of the reclaimed and
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revitalized everyday. Instead of escaping from the pettiness and monotony of the
ordinary, the democratic subject as citizen-becoming can and should propel herself to
return to the quotidian everyday to make the ordinary time more endurable and alluring.
It is a journey to investigate how what we have been affects what we are, and perhaps
more significantly, what we might become.
To live in such a way is in fact closer to what Nietzsche would aspire to do:
namely, one uses oneself up to the full. Nietzsche’s famous epigram, amor fati, is
“neither narcissistic hubris nor fatalistic masochism, but rather the courage and the
composure to accept one’s own life in all its reality and potentiality.”375 That love [amor]
might be misleading. As it may indicate that what is needed is an explosive and volatile
type of excitement that passes quickly. Instead, the Nietzschean amor is like what
Dostoevsky once described as “love in action.” Unlike “love in thought,” which is greed
for an immediate effect, “love in action” secures temporal space. It is “labor and
fortitude.”376
Here we see the connection between amor fati and his notion of eternal
recurrence, about which we yet to discuss much. Like Alexander Nehamas, I am far less
interested in examining this idea as a cosmological theory of time.377 It is not just because
Nietzsche once made it clear that each one is in the world only once and “no imaginable
chance will for a second time gather together into a unity so strangely variegated an
375
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assortment as he is.”378 We can find other evidence to imply otherwise, especially in his
notebooks. What I am most interested in is the meaning of posing a truly “abysmal”
thought itself such as the idea of eternal recurrence.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra illustrates that Zarathustra severely suffers from the idea
of eternal recurrence. He is stuck between determinism and voluntarism, necessity and
freedom, or Spinozan Nature and Faustian Will. In “The Convalescent,” particularly,
Zarathustra “collapsed like a dead man,” lost his appetite, and remained ill “for seven
days.”379 In fact, as Paul Loeb reminds us, Zarathustra himself never “seems to fully
express, explain, prove, endorse, teach, or definitely affirm the thought of eternal
recurrence.”380 This ambiguity has sparked a plethora of interpretations.381
What is most revealing, though, is the sharp contrast between Zarathustra and the
allegedly unqualified characters such as dwarf, animals, and the likes. Those characters
are incapable of understanding the depth of the idea of eternal recurrence, but do not
hesitate to reiterate the sketchy phrases of the grave thought. Zarathustra, on the other
hand, makes himself the object of his learning in the face of the abysmal thought, and live
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with the very thought. Here, the Moment [Augenblick] is not the temporal form of
Zarathustra. He needs some time for a genuine experience and convalescence. He takes a
journey to himself.
That Zarathustra is the convalescent is a significant reminder. “To convalesce”
[genesen], states Heidegger, “is the same as the Greek néomai, nóstos. This means ‘to
return home’; … The convalescent is on the road to himself, so that he can say of himself
who he is. In the passage referred to, the convalescent says: I, Zarathustra, the advocate
of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle[.]”382
For those who do not have or care much about their autonomous will, the notion
of eternal recurrence would not matter much. If they abandon the perspective of
autonomous agents and choose not to fight against the necessity, they might even take
pleasure in renouncing their agency. It is those who cherish freedom who feel real terror
in facing their infinitesimal power against the cosmic rule.
In democracy, we routinely meet the problem of heteronomy,383 but not everyone
fully experience and make most use of it. Grudgingly or not, citizens often submit
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themselves to the decision made by the collective, of which each of them is only a small
part. Of course, democratic citizens should not be obsequious; but they cannot be too
cantankerous either. Democratic freedom and autonomy are intertwined with the genuine
experiences of loss, submission, or heteronomy. To live up to the promise of democracy
means to inherit a certain sensibility of suffering and frustration, constantly asking the
question how carefully we attend to our suffering and frustration.
Citizens-becoming should see themselves as an agent of self-overcoming. They
must keep themselves from being overtaken and overexploited by the fast-paced eventful
time, the time that demands their instant reactions and aggravates their addiction to
distractions. They need to secure some temporal space for exploring and reflecting upon
their sufferings. Delving into the profound depth of suffering is crucial precisely because
there they can find their frustration clearly as the meeting-place of converging two sides:
hope and despair. Hope and despair do not just meet but form an angular extremity at the
site of frustration. Frustration is a corner where those two can become explicit as they
intersect. This is a kind of in-between time in which they are pressured to accept their
failures and losses while at once not necessarily abandoning their initial hopes in its
entirety. Besides they may find something else while lingering in frustration, something
that they were not seeking in the first place. It is the time in which they make sense of
frustration and make most use of it for convalescence and potential growth.
Learning about themselves—learning, in part, that their desires and hopes are
never absolutely clear, distinct, and precise—citizens can better come to terms with the
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condition of being undefined.384 What citizen-becoming experience is not just a
momentary acceptance of loss or failure. It requires a pivotal tract of time during which
citizens can grow more attached to reality, not less, and become more attentive,
inventive, and determinant, as Nietzsche’s discipline of suffering aspires to do, even
while teetering in a liminal realm of tensions and bearing up against an uneasy tug
between too much impatience and languid resignation.

384
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